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THE PROBLEM OF PERMANENT REPRESENTATION AT THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

THE increasing volume of affairs continuously dealt with by the League of Nations Secretariat, the annual pressure of business handled by the Council and Assembly, and the recurring events of great importance with which the League is called upon to deal, such as the Sino-Japanese dispute and the disarmament and economic conferences, have involved serious consideration by governments of methods for the efficient conduct of their part of such work. The problem is not new, but has existed in constantly growing measure, both for member and for non-member states, ever since the beginnings of the League, and recent events have only made it appear more pressing.

In the early days, while the Secretariat offices were still in London, there was apparently little appreciation of the rôle that the League was to fill. The Peace Conference did little for the League except to draw up the Covenant and give the League a few tasks through provisions in the treaties. It did, however, name Sir Eric Drummond as Secretary-General, and set up an Organizing Committee, composed of representatives of the states members of the Council, which authorized him to engage a temporary staff and open offices.[1] He immediately set about this task, expecting early ratification of the treaty. In these early appointments the attempt was made to secure the best qualified persons available, largely chosen from those who had participated in the work of the Peace Conference, and recognizing their nationality only to

[1] Council 1920, *Minutes of Fifth Session*, Annex 57, p. 219.

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the extent required to secure broad representation.[2] Furthermore it was understood that the members of the Secretariat should act during their period of office purely in an international capacity, and not in any way as representatives of their own countries. The nucleus of the existing system of dividing the highest posts among the Great Powers appeared, however, in the appointment of three Under Secretaries-General, of whom one was French, one Italian and one Japanese, but the later system of a cabinet of his nationals for each of the Under Secretaries-General was avoided by naming a French assistant to the Italian, and a Japanese to the French representative.[3] In May 1920 the Council approved this preliminary organization, and the 1920 Assembly provided for the removal of the Secretariat to Geneva.

It was not until after the first few meetings of the Council and the First Assembly in the late fall of 1920 that the probable rôle of the League was made clear. The Covenant provided permanent representation on the Council for the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and gave them a majority of votes, and they early manifested a tendency to keep many of the more delicate and dangerous tasks out of the hands of the League. Repeated urgent appeals from Armenia, then attempting to establish its independence from Turkey, or at least to save itself from annihilation, failed to bring help, as no state was willing to undertake a mandate,[4] nor was any Great Power willing to send troops even as part of an international force.[5] A half-hearted suggestion was made that the League itself should take the mandate, but no steps were taken to provide a police force or funds. Intervention in the Polish-Russian war was sidestepped, the Great Powers contending that had intervention seemed wise they might have undertaken it without consulting the League,[6] none of them appearing to consider that the League was equipped to manage such an intervention.

[2] *Ibid.*, Annex 57a, p. 231.

[3] *Ibid.*, Annex 57, p. 220.

[4] 1920 Assembly, *Records*, p. 54.

[5] Rumania specifically offered to participate in setting up such an army.

[6] 1920 Assembly, *Records*, p. 270.

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The same attitude was made manifest in the admission of new states. Esthonia's first application for admission was refused on the ground that her proximity to Russia might subject her to invasion,[7] and both the British and French representatives in the 1920 Assembly indicated that they considered that no government would permit the use of its troops under Article X of the Covenant for the purpose of protecting such frontiers.[8]

It was also evident, from the time of the Peace Conference, and later in the early Council meetings, that no state conceded any right to the League to limit its sovereignty in the slightest. President Wilson had definitely disavowed the idea of a superstate,[9] Cecil had held that there should be no interference with internal affairs of any nation,[10] a French commission had reported early in 1919 that the Covenant guaranteed to all states, great and small, the exercise of their sovereignty,[11] and the Dutch had been assured that no limitation of sovereignty was contemplated.[12] At the first Council meeting Lord Curzon stated that the very name of League of Nations should dissipate the idea of the establishment of a superstate or supersovereignty. He stated that "the League is an association of sovereign states [which] does not interfere with nationality. It is upon the fact of nationhood that it rests."[13] Hymans, the head of the Belgian delegation to the First Assembly, stated that the League "is not, and must not be, a super-State which aims at absorbing national sovereignties. Its aim was to establish frequent and friendly intercourse between independent States."[14]

Premier Orlando early attempted an explanation of the League's position which indicated its basic difficulty. The League, he stated, was operating under two principles—one,

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 622.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 626, 633.

[9] Miller, *Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. II, p. 343.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 566.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 238, 243.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 623.

[13] Council, *First Session*, January 16, 1920, p. 4.

[14] 1920 Assembly, *Plenary Sessions*, p. 30.

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the absolute sovereignty of states; two, restraint through the League, a "spontaneous coercion, a reconciliation of conflicting views on the basis of self-restraint."[15] Most of the League's difficulties have resulted from the impossibility of developing "spontaneous coercion" very far in the face of unlimited sovereignty, and the fact that the member states were firmly determined not to weaken that sovereignty.[16] As a result nationalism in the League has become more frankly recognized as time went on, an attitude reflected in the character of the permanent representation of the member states in Geneva and elsewhere.

Another element which helped to determine the rôle the League was to play was its lack of universality. First there came the failure to permit general entry, not alone of ex-enemy states but of others. Then came the failure of the United States to ratify the Peace Treaty.[17] While there appears little evidence that the attitude of the United States toward absolute sovereignty differed greatly from that of other states, its lack of vital concern with many of the League's most dangerous problems would presumably have assured less partisan judgment, and thereby strengthened the principle of spontaneous coercion. Probably even more serious was the absence of the ex-enemy states, since it permitted overemphasis by the League of the rôle of executive agent for the peace treaties, a rôle which France particularly was inclined to push.[18] Several states appreciated the importance of this lack of universality,[19] and the Argentine suggested the admission of all sovereign states as a first amendment to the Covenant.[20]

[15] Miller, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 567-568.

[16] For an expression of this attitude see the statement of Japan's conception of the League in 1919 in Miller, *My Diary of the Peace Conference*, vol. XVII, p. 253. Her reservation of Far Eastern questions has been part of her policy since the League was founded.

[17] *Cf.* Rappard's statement, "Evolution of the League of Nations" in *Problems of Peace*, Second Series (1927), p. 7.

[18] *Cf.* Bourgeois' statement, 1920 Council, *First Session*, p. 3.

[19] *Cf.* Motta's statement, 1920 Assembly *Records*, p. 572; also Tittoni's, *ibid.*, Eighth plenary session, *Journal*, p. 44.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 277.

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The tendency of the Great Powers to avoid making serious commitments on important matters which appeared to come within the scope of the League's activities under the Covenant, while dealing freely with the affairs of lesser states, was a cause of no little concern to these states. For example, when Poland found that the agenda of the second session of the Council in 1920 included both the Danzig question and the Polish minority treaty, the sole items on the agenda of the third session were the control of the typhus epidemic in Poland and the investigation of conditions in Russia, and the fourth Council session commenced that consideration of minority questions which has continued ever since, all matters of intimate concern to Poland, it is scarcely to be wondered at that the Poles, shortly after their organization as a state, decided to set up a permanent delegation in Geneva. This body, the first of its kind to be established, was composed of a number of foreign office officials, whose purpose was to inform themselves of the progress of League affairs, and pass the information on to their government, and to facilitate the work of the visiting delegates from Warsaw.

The states defeated in the war found themselves in a situation similar to that of Poland. Barred from the League in addition, yet finding their affairs a matter of recurring consideration by that body, it appeared to them essential to keep track of the course of events. Germany set up a League of Nations office in the ministry of foreign affairs, and her consulate in Geneva maintained a close check on developments there.[20a] Count Mensdorff came early to Geneva as a permanent delegate from Austria, and was shortly replaced by von Pflügl, the present incumbent. Hungary sent an observer to the First Assembly, who recommended the appointment of a permanent observer, which was made shortly thereafter. Bulgaria commissioned her minister in Berne as permanent representative in March 1921.[21]

[20a] With the resignation of Germany's principal representatives in the Secretariat, the consulate again assumes the rôle of permanent delegation.

[21] At about this time, too, a number of South American states designated their representatives at Paris or Berne as permanent delegates to the League,

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Both China and Japan [22] early felt the need of a European bureau which could keep in close touch with the League. Their problem was partly that of all the distant Powers, that is, how to keep the foreign office closely in touch with events in Geneva in spite of the difficulties of time and distance in transmitting necessary information. In the case of these two Powers there was the added difficulty of translation, both of League documents for their governments and of communications from their foreign offices for the League. From the beginning China has hoped for much from the League, and she set up an office in Geneva in March 1921. This was later transferred successively to other European capitals, but is now again in Geneva.[23]

The Japanese, alone of all the Great Powers, also established a permanent delegation, first in Lausanne, then in Geneva, but early in the League's history removed it to Paris and attached it to the embassy there. A League of Nations Division was also established in the Division of Treaties in the Japanese foreign office, and the Paris office was later separated from the Embassy and attached to this division, under the immediate direction of the Japanese member of the Council.[24]

This problem of distance has been met by the overseas British dominions largely by the use of the offices of their High Commissioners in London. Though Canada [25] and South Africa have permanent delegates for special reasons, neither

but the significance of these appointments appeared to be merely that these men served as chiefs of their delegations at the Assembly and received documents circularized by the League.

[22] *Cf.* 1920 Assembly, *Records*, Nov. 30, 1920, p. 220.

[23] The Chinese delegation followed the delegate, who was at different times minister to London, Rome and Paris. The present head of the delegation is minister to Switzerland, but spends a large part of his time in Geneva.

[24] The effect of Japan's withdrawal on this office is not as yet entirely clear. There are many advantages to Japan, even as a non-member state, in maintaining the office as a center for League business. At least one of the secretaries has been sent to the Berne legation, where he can continue his work on League affairs. This legation might be expanded, or the Paris bureau might be moved to Geneva and attached to the Japanese bureau near the International Labour Office.

[25] For Canada's position see statement by the Hon. N. W. Rowell, 1920 Assembly, *Records*, p. 328.

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Australia nor New Zealand has opened Geneva offices, depending on Great Britain [26] and their own London offices to look after their interests. It will be noted, however, that no non-European state with a large interest in the League has neglected to have an office within easy reach from Geneva.

France, Italy and England set up League of Nations bureaus in their foreign offices, although avoiding the creation of delegations in Geneva. These bureaus, coupled with their dominance in the Council, then relatively a more important body than today, diminished the necessity of establishing such delegations. France, disappointed in her attempt to secure for the League a strong central organization with an army and general staff, adopted a policy of a strong central service of her own to keep closely in touch with all aspects of League affairs, and of training experts in the various fields of activity of the League. In October 1919 she organized the *Service français de la Société des Nations,* in the Political and Commercial *Direction* of the foreign office, with a higher personnel of twelve, including economists, lawyers, military, naval and air experts, as well as diplomats of career.[27] She has since maintained and increased the expert staff of this office. Italy set up a similar office in her foreign ministry in 1920,[28] though the emphasis here was on the diplomatic rather than on the expert side, the office being used as a channel through which experts in other departments might carry on League work, rather than as a group of experts who in large part were able to carry on the work themselves. The transition to the Fascist form of government, while involving personnel changes, did not greatly modify the character or functions of this office.

The British office was small,[29] there being a tendency to leave the work taken up by the League in its accustomed place, and to use the League office only as a coördinator of required contacts.

In these early days the important diplomats of the Great

[26] *Cf. Official Journal,* February 1933, p. 187.

[27] *Annuaire générale de la France et de l'étranger* (Paris, 1920-21).

[28] *Guida ai Ministeri e dagli altri Uffici Pubblici di Roma* (Rome, 1920).

[29] *Diplomatic and Consular Year Book* (London).

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Powers had little to do with the League, and the Secretariat, allowed to follow its own path, was definitely international in its outlook. The leading figures in its early personnel were in many cases drawn from non-diplomatic careers; Secretary-General Drummond's experience had been as much that of civil servant as diplomat, Mantoux, Director of the Political Section, and Rappard, of the Mandates Section, were university professors, and of the two first American appointments Fosdick was a lawyer and Sweetser a journalist.[30]

During the early period in London and Geneva, selections for Secretariat posts had been made personally by the Secretary-General. The First Assembly appointed a committee to draw up a statute for the Secretariat, and the committee's report [31] showed no fear of nationalization of that body. The committee urged that future appointments should as a rule be made only after competitive examination, but that by exception the Secretary-General should be allowed to appoint collaborators belonging to specific nationalities, "thus reflecting the composition of the League itself". There was no recognition of a right of the nationals of the Great Powers to the higher posts, the only restriction on the choice for these posts being that the incumbents should be chosen from different parts of the world and from persons of influence in their own countries. It was further recommended that these higher posts be reduced in importance by cutting them down to one Deputy Secretary-General and one Under Secretary-General, and filling them for short terms only. At the same time their great importance was recognized in outlining their task, which was to be the general direction of the political affairs of the League and the establishment of principles for other affairs, the maintenance of close connection with the Assembly and with commission and conference delegates, and with the world's important political centers. There was every reason to believe that those Great Powers whose influence in League affairs was bound to be decisive would wish to control such important posts.

[30] *Cf.* Rappard, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-32.

[31] *League document A. 3. 1921. V.*

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Such was the concept of the rôle of national representation in the early days; the Great Powers depending on the League bureaus in their foreign ministries and on their Council and Assembly representation to look after their interests, the defeated states and those others with whose affairs the League had most to do setting up offices or appointing delegates in Geneva or Berne, and the rest of the members not yet seeing the necessity of providing any such representation or of pushing for representation in the Secretariat.

Before long, however, the Secretariat developed a stronger rôle than had been at first anticipated. An early plan of the Political Section to establish an intimate exchange of information with foreign offices was quietly blocked by furnishing the section only information obtainable elsewhere, and then frequently late, or through the medium of the Council or Assembly representative when he came to Geneva for a meeting, and other similar efforts to increase the importance of the League as an international center were coolly received. But the Secretariat found means to increase its influence over events in the League. It frequently happened that the chairmen of League committees were nationals of distant states and could not keep in close touch with affairs. Other committeemen failed to give sufficient time to their work or otherwise failed to push it energetically, and the actual conduct of business between sessions passed to the sections of the Secretariat dealing with the same subjects. The Secretariat also prepared projects for presentation to the Council and Assembly, and thus often determined the form they were apt to retain. This gave the Secretariat, which was responsible to the Secretary-General alone, a large measure of control over events between sessions of committees, the Council and the Assembly.

Meanwhile branch offices of the Information Section had been set up in the principal capitals, with nationals of the state concerned in charge. This increased the scope of the Secretariat's knowledge of the course of events in these countries and promoted good will for the League.[32]

[32] *Cf. Official Journal*, November 1921, p. 1049.

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Such developments made representation on the Secretariat a matter of greater concern than had at first appeared, and increased the importance to the Secretary-General of securing a staff which could keep him informed concerning the wishes of governments in affairs with which the League was dealing. Though governments did not generally take the matter of Secretariat representation very seriously as yet, increasing interest was manifested in appointments to those sections dealing with political affairs.

Before the entrance of Germany into the League, however, the matter became acute. When the German cabinet approved Stresemann's draft note of application it issued a note stating that "it was of vital importance that Germany should obtain a permanent seat in the Council of the League". It was made clear also that Germany was to use her influence in the League for the revision of treaties, disarmament of other states, and for other matters of national policy. The story of the battle over her permanent seat in the Council is too well known to need repeating; she secured it only after a struggle which brought plainly into the light of day the fact that national interests and prestige had become very strong factors in the League. In addition to her permanent seat Germany secured a dozen places in the Secretariat, well distributed throughout the organization, including an Under Secretary-General.[33]

In spite of this evidence of increasing nationalism, the growing importance of the League as an international body also was recognized in various positive ways during this period. There was an increasing percentage of prime ministers at Council and Assembly meetings, and the League became bolder in treating such dangerous questions as disarmament and the organization of peace. It was due partly to this increased importance of the League that the struggle for place became intensified. The change was reflected also in a new burst of activity in establishing permanent delegations. Brazil, presumably as a move in her effort to obtain a

[33] For a graphic account of the struggle for Council seats see John Spencer Bassett, *The League of Nations* (London, 1928), chapter XIV.

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permanent Council seat, set up the only delegation which had an ambassador at its head.[34] With her failure to secure the Council seat the delegation returned to Brazil. Seven more delegations were opened in 1925 and 1926,[35] partly because of the plainer recognition of nationalism in the League, partly through fear of the consequences of Germany's entry and appreciation of the need for permanent representatives to observe these consequences, and partly for the purpose of solving the problem of distance.

By this time the general form of these permanent delegations was set. They differed greatly in every respect except the one that they were officially concerned with League of Nations affairs. Even the titles of the delegates and of their delegations were not uniform; the Canadian delegate was called Advisory Officer to the Canadian Government[36] and was not a diplomat of career; the Portuguese officer was called Chancellor, and his office a chancellery; the Chinese bureau was called the Permanent Office of the Chinese Delegation; the Rumanian office was called a legation, though the term is of doubtful significance as used here. Many of the delegates had no offices, being merely the diplomatic representatives in Berne or Paris and occasionally even farther away. In a number of instances the delegate was solely and simply an observer, and failed to present himself to the Secretariat on arrival at all. Several came and left without notifying the Secretariat, the first notice of their departure coming when a successor presented himself. There appears to have been but one case of the appointment of a delegate who was a national of another than the appointing state. This person later presented himself as the delegate of a second state, but withdrew from the former post.

It was naturally the less important delegations in which these irregularities of procedure were most common. The better established delegations, such as the Chinese, Polish,

[34] *League document C. 157. M. 38. 1924.*

[35] Canada, Latvia, Liberia, Persia, Portugal, Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

[36] Order in Council of Dec. 17, 1924. As Canada had no diplomatic representation abroad at the time the office was set up, a non-diplomatic title was used.

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Rumanian, Hungarian and Canadian, set up well appointed and even elaborate quarters, with able men in charge and capable staffs, who combined the maintenance of a more or less complete reporting system with the diplomatic work of dealing with the Secretariat and representing their governments when regular representatives were not sent. A great difference developed between states as regards the extent of this rôle; in some cases the delegates have been consistently used as Council representatives, in most cases they have been included in the Assembly delegation, and they have been frequently used as delegates at conferences, though more often in those in which the interest of the state concerned was small.

The post of permanent delegate at Geneva for those states which have set up delegation headquarters has become important, and is now considered by many delegates preferable to any diplomatic post except the great capitals. The work of some of the delegates, not alone for their own states but as members of the Council or as conference delegates, has been notable. There is an indirect gain in prestige for a small state with a brilliant Council record. In one or two cases the personnel of the office has been increased to take care of the additional volume of business involved in Council membership.[37] It sometimes happened, however, that a state decided that its position was not sufficiently improved by the additional expense of sending high-class men with an ample staff, and the size of the delegation was diminished, the personnel changed, or the office abolished altogether.[38]

The legal position of a permanent delegate is somewhat obscure. He usually comes armed with a letter from his government to the Secretary-General stating that he is the permanent delegate of his state, and asking that he receive the consideration of the Secretariat. Sometimes the notification

[37] In the Japanese office in Paris one man was engaged a large part of the time exclusively on minorities questions, for which the Japanese member of the Council was rapporteur.

[38] Twenty-two delegations have been set up in Geneva. Six were subsequently suppressed but four of these were reconstituted. Among the Scandinavian states only Denmark has a permanent delegation. The Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland have none.

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is merely mailed to the Secretary-General. There are no rules making it essential to present such credentials at all, nor any concerning the qualifications of the person who presents them, nor concerning the attention he is entitled to receive. If he acts as delegate to a conference he must present separate credentials. Though the term "accredited" to the League is commonly used, even in League of Nations documents,[39] there can be no accrediting as that term is understood in international law. The Secretary-General is not the head of a State, and has no right to refuse to receive the representatives of any member State.[40] Likewise there are no rules governing the departure of delegates. The Swiss government usually receives notification concerning arrivals and departures at the same time as the League; in any case they exchange information on this matter. There has been little change in the institution of permanent delegate for several years, and pending new developments in the League itself none appears imminent.

The Secretariat has been less stable as an institution. Gradually as the pressure for place continued, a certain general plan for the division of posts became recognized. With resignations and changes, replacements were made on a more definitely national basis, until the representation of the principal member states was plainly marked. The most definite instance of this sort was the cabinet system in the higher Secretariat. As indicated above, when the posts of Deputy Secretary-General and Under Secretary-General were created, nationals of states other than his own were assigned to each of these officers, but this arrangement did not last. There was early a shift of personnel which resulted in the installation of diplomats in these posts and of a *"chef de cabinet"*,[41]

[39] *Cf.* Report of setting up of Greek delegation, League of Nations *Monthly Summary*, Sept. 1, 1921, p. 85.

[40] *Cf.* Pitman B. Potter, *Permanent Delegations to the League of Nations* (League of Nations Association, Geneva, 1930). Schücking and Wehberg, however, consider the League a confederation and allow it the right to accredit and receive representatives (*Satzung des Völkerbundes*, Berlin, 1926, 2d ed., p. 116).

[41] This development is traced in Rappard, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

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corresponding to his chief.[42] By 1926 the French Deputy Secretary-General had a small exclusively French cabinet. The Italian Under Secretary-General was handling internal administration and the Disarmament Section with a staff of five, all Italians except one French typist. Among the staff of the Japanese Under Secretary-General, however, only the *chef de cabinet* and one typist were Japanese, the remainder being of diverse nationalities. The cabinet of the Secretary-General was British, except for one New Zealander, but the work of this group was more administrative than political.[43] On Germany's entry into the League a German Under Secretary-General was appointed and two of his countrymen were named for his cabinet, and by 1928 the Japanese had reduced their cabinet also to a national basis.[44]

There was much criticism of this system. The regular meetings of the Secretary-General with the heads of these offices gave the incumbents intimate knowledge of all that took place within the League and a controlling voice in League policy. There was always direct communication between these offices and the home governments, and this communication was sometimes used as freely to serve strictly national interests as to further the work of the League. On the other hand, this close contact with governments made it possible for the League to know at all times the attitude of the principal states, and thus to secure immediate support for important measures or to avoid taking steps which might meet the opposition of a Great Power.

Another point at which rivalry was most acute was that of Directorate of Section. The Directors of the sections into which the work of the League was divided had access at all times to the Secretary-General, and were called in when matters concerning their sections were under discussion. The Under Secretaries-General, in addition to their function as members of the Secretariat directorate, were Directors of one or another of these sections as well. The other Directorates

[42] *Official Journal*, 1922, p. 1053.

[43] *Ibid.*, 1926, p. 72.

[44] *Ibid.*, 1927, p. 165; 1928, p. 71.

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were occupied by the nationals of various states, Frenchmen alone holding more than one. The French had also the most complete representation throughout the higher Secretariat. In 1932 the only sections in which they did not have at least one member in the first category were Minorities, Mandates, where the nationals of states holding mandates are not represented, and the Social Section, which deals with opium traffic, child welfare, and so forth. The British, strong in higher posts, had a much smaller representation in the next lower grades, and no representation at all in six sections.[44a] The Italians were only slightly less numerous in the first category than the French, and almost as broadly distributed, and the Germans followed the Italians closely. The Japanese representation has always been small, but there has been no strong disposition on Japan's part to protest, probably because so many of the issues dealt with by the League were of purely European concern; Japan never appeared to feel that her prestige was involved by her representation in the Secretariat.

Among the smaller states, Secretariat representation was scattered, and in no case sufficiently large to cover the field well. In the important Legal, Information, Political, Financial and Economic sections, no state except a Great Power was represented in all, and only the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain found a place in as many as three. A certain amount of liaison work in these sections, which in the case of the Great Powers may be done by their representation in the Secretariat, falls either to the permanent delegation, if the state has one, or must be handled through a diplomatic officer at Berne, Paris or elsewhere, or directly by the foreign office of that state. While the importance of this liaison work may be overestimated by small states, the fact that it occasions a demand for positions on the part of the Great Powers indicates that the same demand for positions on the part of the small Powers might be reasonable in those sections at least in whose work they are most deeply interested. In the case of both the

[44a] In the lower categories the predominance of French and English representatives is due to the use of French and English as the official languages of the League, making necessary the use of office staff able to use one or both of these languages.

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Great and the small Powers it is probably as frequently a matter of prestige, however, as a need for representation, which is responsible for the strong agitation in favor of their nationals. A considerable number of appointments have been made of nationals of states but slightly interested either in prestige or in representation of their interests; the impartiality of such persons and their ability in their tasks can be depended upon, but they cannot be considered as forming part of a national representation in the sense used here.[45]

A determined effort on the part of some states has been made during the past few years to modify the system to their own advantage, and on the part of others to break it up entirely. The 1928 Assembly appointed a committee to consider a modification of staff regulations "in view of the experience since 1922."[46] On the basis of their report, the 1929 Assembly resolved that every post should be open to promotion from the whole body of League officials, and that although an equitable distribution of posts among the different nationalities must be considered, ability and training were of prime importance. The Assembly then appointed another committee to prepare a report on the basis of this resolution.[47]

The 1930 Assembly constituted a new committee to deal particularly with the question of the Under Secretaries-General, but this committee failed to agree,[48] and was reconstituted by the 1931 Assembly with orders to report the following May. This committee failed to reach a unanimous agreement, but did succeed in clarifying the issue, and in presenting a series of alternative proposals. The committee's report, arrived at after a singularly stormy session, was turned over to the Fourth (Budget) Committee of the 1932 Assembly, where the struggle recommenced between those who favored retaining or increasing the existing degree of nationalization of the Secre-

[45] The situation is well described by Rappard in "The Future of the League of Nations" in *Problems of Peace*, Third Series (1929), p. 17, and in *The Geneva Experiment*, p. 58.

[46] *Resolutions and Recommendations of the Assembly, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 63*, 1928, p. 62.

[47] September 23, 1929, *ibid., No. 74*, 1929, p. 32.

[48] October 3, 1930, *ibid., No. 83*, 1930, p. 41.

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tariat and those who wished to break it down. A report was finally reached, and the Assembly passed a resolution providing that all persons of the rank of Director of Section or above should take an oath of office in which they agreed neither to seek nor to heed any instructions except from the League itself. Persons in the highest posts should be chosen, like others, for their ability. There should be two Deputy Secretaries-General, one of whom was to be chosen from states not permanently represented on the Council. There should be three Under Secretaries-General. The Legal Adviser, though his title was not to be changed in order that he might retain his non-political character, was to rank with the Under Secretaries-General. Only the Secretary-General and the Deputies were to have cabinets, and only two Members of Section were allowed in these, but in the sections of which the Under Secretaries-General were Directors one of their nationals should be allowed as Member of Section. Not more than two nationals of any one state were to be allowed to hold the posts from Secretary-General down through Director of Section. The term of office of the Secretary-General was fixed at ten years, with three-year renewal, the Deputies for eight years with five-year renewal, and the Under Secretaries-General for seven years with a seven-year renewal.[49]

This arrangement was arrived at as part of a political bargain among the Great Powers, with such concessions to the small Powers as would ensure getting the resolution through the Fourth Committee and the Assembly.[50] The new Secretary-General, Avenol, a Frenchman, was promoted from Deputy, and the two new Deputies were Pilotti, an Italian, and Azcarate, a Spaniard, a man whose state was already represented on the Council, and for whose nomination one Council member refused to vote for this reason.[51] The Under

[49] October 17, 1932, *ibid., No. 103*, pp. 17-20.

[50] For the supposed terms of the bargain see *New York Times* of October 16, 1932.

[51] *Official Journal*, July 1933, p. 805. There has been an improvement under the new arrangement. The new Secretary-General has a New Zealander and a Czechoslovak in his cabinet, the Spanish Deputy Secretary-General has a Dutch *chef de cabinet*, and the Italian has but one Italian assistant.

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Secretaries-General appointed were a German and an Englishman, though neither was a diplomat of career. Had Japan not resigned from the League it is to be presumed that the third Under Secretary-General would have been Japanese; as it was the post was left temporarily vacant. The restriction concerning not more than two officers from the same state in the higher posts affected only France, and Comert, Director of the Information Section, resigned and accepted a post in the French foreign office.[52]

During the period when the situation in the higher Secretariat was becoming so acute, the Great Powers had gradually developed their representation in Geneva at two other points. The first of these developments was due to the number and frequency of conferences and meetings at Geneva. Delegates from the same state were apt to stop at the same hotel, and as time went on the custom became so fixed that exceptions to it in the case of Great Power delegations were comparatively rare. In the case of the Assembly the stay of the delegates was long, and the volume of documents and papers was considerable, and something approaching an office was set up in the hotel where the delegation was staying. This of course dwindled to small proportions when the Assembly was over. But with such affairs as the Special Assembly called to consider the Sino-Japanese situation, and the Disarmament Conference, which has already lasted intermittently over eighteen months, these hotel arrangements have definitely taken on the appearance of permanent offices. In some cases private switchboards and ushers have been installed. The Japanese maintained a delegation of approximately fifty for the Special Assembly and of sixty for the Disarmament Conference, which with minor delegations for intermediate conferences and the press bureau occupied most of the rooms in the Hotel Metro-

[52] For the changes in personnel and their significance, see *Journal de Genève*, December 30, 1932. Simultaneously with Germany's announcement of her withdrawal from the League, Trendelenburg, the German Under Secretary-General, his *chef de cabinet* and the German member of the Political Section handed their resignations to the Secretary-General. Their replacement is unlikely, as they were considered to be representatives of the German government. (*Cf. New York Times* of October 22, 1933.)

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pole. These quarters were to a large extent abandoned when the Assembly broke up and the Disarmament Conference adjourned for the summer but, with the resumption of the latter, will probably be reëstablished on a more modest scale.

These quarters have nothing official about them, and can be diminished or abandoned at any time with only such limitation as arrangements with the hotel proprietors require. They have officially no regular personnel, though they include almost invariably several persons from the League of Nations bureau in the foreign office, who are not of course permanently assigned to Geneva. There is always a certain amount of clerical personnel. These offices have the advantage of freedom from most of the social or legal obligations of a regular diplomatic post, and can give their entire attention to business.

Another equally logical development is that of the non-resident permanent delegate. Both Great and small Powers sent a variety of persons to the early meetings both of the Council and Assembly. In democratic countries these substitutions were frequently due to political changes in the government at home. The inconvenience of this practice was not at first obvious, but as the Council and Assembly continued year after year to deal with some of the same questions, the advantages of having the same representatives to deal with them were obvious, particularly in the case of controversial questions where a person consistently following them was in a strong position vis-à-vis a possibly less well instructed adversary. The French took advantage of the great skill Briand demonstrated in handling League of Nations affairs, and as he continued to serve as foreign minister through cabinet after cabinet a decree was issued naming him permanent delegate of France to the League of Nations.[58] The significance of this title appeared to be that Briand henceforth should be the French representative on the Council and included in the French delegation to the Assembly. The Germans, after suffering from lack of continuity of policy in both the Council and Assembly, finally settled on a similar solution. Instead of choosing a parliamentary leader, however, they selected a

[58] Paul-Boncour is the present incumbent.

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diplomat of career, von Keller.[54] It is not certain, of course, that a permanent delegate of this type would prove permanent in the face of so sharp a political upheaval as that which took place with the advent of Hitler to power. Presumably Germany will refrain from participation in the work of the Council and Assembly during the two years pending withdrawal, and von Keller will disappear from Geneva with the German Under Secretary-General. But barring this type of political change, a permanent delegate is sure enough of his post to enable him to develop a continuous policy in either the Council or Assembly.

None of the other Great Powers has yet adopted such a policy. Mussolini has shaken up Italy's diplomatic and cabinet representation at frequent intervals, and the League representation is included. The British have usually named a person of prime importance in the government as their chief delegate—a policy involving changes in the incumbent—with frequent substitutions during less important sessions. Austen Chamberlain served at nineteen sessions, Lord Cecil at thirteen and Balfour at fifteen, however.[55] The Japanese have ordinarily used an ambassador from Paris or London, but have had neither an individual nor the incumbent of any office acting in a fixed capacity. The smaller states which have secured seats on the Council have followed the British rather than the French practice, that is, they have preferred to send a prominent statesman, substituting for him on occasion a representative from their foreign office at home or from their permanent delegation in Geneva.

This institution did not originate with the Great Powers. A number of Latin-American states named their Paris or Berne representatives in this capacity in the very early days, though it is not clear that such action resulted in greatly prolonging the term in Paris or Berne.

Through this period of over ten years of League develop-

[54] See *Journal des Nations*, November 30, 1932.

[55] There has been unofficial British discussion of a permanent delegate; *cf.* London *Daily Herald* of November 27, and *Journal des Nations* of November 28, 1932.

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ment non-member states have been unable or unwilling to hold themselves aloof. Both those which have later become members and those which have not, have often found it either advantageous or necessary to establish contacts, which they have developed in their own way.

States which are contemplating applying for admission have sometimes set up representatives in Geneva to prepare the way. Such was the case both with the Irish Free State and Mexico: the former, even before she received dominion status, intended to pave the way for membership when she should become eligible; the latter hoped to remove the slight given in 1919 (the omission of Mexico from the list of states invited to join the League) by securing an invitation from the League instead of applying for membership, as is the usual custom. The Irish delegation was maintained after admission, and has been very active, but the Mexican was closed, as an economy measure, the year after Mexico's admission.

Russia has participated in a number of important conferences, such as the Disarmament and Economic Conference, but has bluntly refused to participate in others, sometimes on the ground that, having no diplomatic relations with Switzerland, she was disinclined to send representatives to Geneva.[55a] The correspondent of her government news agency, TASS, has developed the function of transmitter of documentary and statistical information of slight newspaper value but useful to his government. He is not in any sense a diplomatic agent, and is not only not possessed of a diplomatic passport but the Swiss require him to have a visa of an adjoining state as well as a Swiss visa. Litvinoff, the present commissar of foreign affairs, has long served as Russia's representative in disarmament conferences, and his work in this field resembles that of the permanent delegates of France and Germany.

The main lines of the relations of the United States with the League are too well known to call for repetition. Several appointments of Americans to posts in the Secretariat were made before the peace treaty was rejected, and with the exception of the American Under Secretary-General remained at

[55a] *Cf. Official Journal*, March 1926, p. 488.

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their posts thereafter. For some time the only contact with the State Department was personal, between these individuals and such officials as they knew in Washington. By 1923, however, the Geneva consulate had been brought in official contact with the League, Consul Haskell being sent to the Conference on the Simplification of Customs Formalities in a "consultative capacity". The same year Magruder, secretary of legation in Berne, came in the same capacity to the Conference for the Suppression of Obscene Publications. From then on, representatives from the consulate and the legation were frequently ordered to observe or participate in League Conferences, and Hugh Wilson, the minister in Berne, was recognized as the official channel of communication between the Secretariat and the State Department.[56]

By this time the importance of Geneva was fully recognized by the State Department. Prentiss Gilbert, then assistant chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, was sent to Geneva to look over the situation, and after reporting to the department was sent back to Geneva to establish an enlarged consulate with a greatly increased staff, which was to maintain a complete system of reports on those activities of the League and the International Labour Organisation which were of interest to the Department of State. The culmination of the consulate's participation in the work of the League came in the 1931 Council meeting called to deal with the Sino-Japanese dispute, when Gilbert was authorized to sit with that body (Wilson then being absent in Washington), for consideration of questions concerning the application of treaties to which the United States was a party.

Since that time the increasing concern of the United States with League affairs has resulted in Wilson's taking an apartment in Geneva[57] near the Secretariat, and the preoccupation

[56] For the extent of American participation see "The United States and the League of Nations during 1931", *Geneva Special Studies*, vol. III, no. 1, and "American Cooperation with the League of Nations", *Special Study no. 4*, League of Nations Association (Geneva, 1930, 1932).

[57] Other government representatives have found it advantageous to do this, among them the head of the French League of Nations Service and the former Polish minister of foreign affairs.

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with League of Nations affairs and disarmament questions of two men in the Division of Western European Affairs.[58] The League in turn raised Sweetser to the position of Deputy Director of the Information Section, and appointed a second American to that section, and a former officer of the Department of State to the Disarmament Section.[59]

The development of representation of states at the International Labour Office has not been greatly different from that at the League. This office, although established at the seat of the League as part of its organization, leads a largely autonomous existence. The nature of the problems with which it deals, and the fact that such conflicting interests as exist have developed between employers and workers rather than between states, change somewhat the nature of the problem of national representation within or without this organization.

Within the organization the problem has never occasioned the differences which have so seriously affected the League Secretariat. The point at which it arose was the determination of the "eight states of chief industrial importance" which were to have places on the Governing Body of the Organisation.[60] There is a rough analogy between the Council and this body, and between the interest in permanent Council seats as aids in directing policy and in permanent seats on the Governing Body for the same purpose. But as the policy of the International Labour Organisation was much less important politically to the members than the policy of the League, there was much less interest displayed. As a matter of fact Germany was voted one of the "eight states" at the time the Governing Body was organized in 1919, though her application for membership in the League was not accepted until 1926.

Much the same attitude appeared concerning posts on the staff of the Labour Office. The posts of Director and Deputy Director have been the occasion for some political discussion

[58] League of Nations work has also taken a good deal of the time of Norman H. Davis, ambassador-at-large, the only person of the rank of ambassador not accredited to a particular post.

[59] *Cf.* C. Howard-Ellis, *Origin, Structure and Working of the League of Nations* (Edinburgh, 1928), p. 175 (note).

[60] *Cf.* 1920 Assembly, *Records*, p. 552.

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and intrigue. But even here it has been much less serious than for posts in the League Secretariat; in the Assembly resolution of 1932, which dealt so carefully with the higher posts in that body, the question whether the post of Deputy Director should be abolished was left to a later decision of the Governing Body, which had not been made after several subsequent meetings.[61]

The question of representation in Geneva outside the Labour Office has never been a matter of serious concern. The Great Powers, with the exception of Japan, have no delegations in Geneva. The Japanese delegation, originally set up as part of the League delegation in 1920, was detached when the latter was moved to Paris, and established as an independent organism attached to the Social Bureau in the Department of Home Affairs. The Geneva bureau is headed by the Japanese delegate on the Governing Body, Japan being one of the "eight states", and he has a staff of five. At the time Japan withdrew from the League it was feared she might take similar action in regard to the Labour Office, but she has not done so. There is precedent for membership in one without the other,[61a] and, barring such a strong domestic reaction in Japan as should make impossible any connection with the League,[62] Japan might well continue to remain a member. It is significant that although the Japanese Under Secretary-General of the League resigned before the end of his term, and was not replaced, the Japanese member of the Governing Body retained his position.

In the case of the other Great Powers the relations between the Labour Organisation and the government are conducted to a greater or less degree independently of the foreign office.

[61] The question of workers' representation in International Labour Conferences from states such as Germany and Italy occasions much difficulty, however, the other workers' delegations insisting that those from such states are really government delegates. As provided by the labor statute of the peace treaties, they are chosen by labor organizations, but the relationship between these organizations and the state is not that contemplated when the treaty was drawn up. *Cf. Journal des Nations*, May 1, 4, 22, 1933.

[61a] Germany from 1919 to 1926, Brazil from 1926. *Cf.* C. Howard-Ellis, *op. cit.*, pp. 233-236.

[62] *Cf. Journal des Nations*, May 1, 1933.

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The Labor Charter of the peace treaties permits direct contact between the Labour Office and the ministries of labor of the member states,[62a] and in most states this has resulted in practice in a large measure of independent relationship. Great Britain and France, for instance, though matters concerning the ratification of labor treaties must go through their foreign offices, permit almost complete independence of action otherwise to their labor ministries, the representatives on the Governing Body being named from those ministries. In Italy the concept of the totalitarian state cuts across this independence. In the past, Germany's attitude was similar to that of France and Great Britain, but with the advent of Hitler to power the same problem arose as in Italy's case, and was solved by withdrawal from the Labour Organisation.[63] The Italian member of the Governing Body is a minister plenipotentiary attached to the foreign office, and also serves as one of the government delegates to the Labour Conferences, while the secretary-general of the Ministry of Corporations serves as the other, thus establishing a personal liaison between the foreign office and the ministry handling labor questions.

The situation in the smaller states with democratic governments is similar to that in the large. The labor ministries are free to deal directly with the Labour Office, except where treaties are concerned.

At no time has the relation of the United States to that office been close since 1919, when America was host to the first Labour Conference in Washington, before the peace treaties had gone into effect. No such liaison through nationals on the staff such as existed in the League Secretariat has been built up. The Labour Office, however, has maintained one of its branch offices in Washington. Though the United States is in fact one of the "eight states", it has not taken its place on the Governing Body. If it should however find it advantageous to join the Labour Organisation without joining the League there is no indication that the opposition to such a step from the other member states or from the Office would be important.

[62a] Art. 397, Treaty of Versailles. [63] *Cf. New York Times*, October 25, 1933.

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A large number of those states with permanent representatives in Geneva have accredited them likewise to the Labour Office. Canada's representative came first to Geneva on the staff of the Labour Organisation, and his coöperation since assuming his new post has been valuable. Sweden abolished her prewar system of labor attachés at legations, and sent one of them to Geneva, the only resident delegate to the Labour Office alone except the Japanese.

In addition to the delegates accredited to the Labour Office, that office itself maintains branches in a number of important centers, with functions somewhat similar to those of the Information Section branches, though only the field of labor is covered. As indicated above, one of these offices exists in Washington.

The legal status of these various types of representatives both to the Secretariat and to the Labour Office has been a matter of some concern ever since the founding of the League. When the Secretariat was still in London the British government granted its members diplomatic immunities.[64] During the Peace Conference Switzerland gave assurances that the Secretariat would receive all the facilities and advantages it could wish, which according to the terms of a modus vivendi drawn up in 1921 between the Federal Political Department and the Secretary-General, were the diplomatic privileges of a legation staff.[65] They applied to the staff of the International Labour Office as well. The Swiss nationals on the Secretariat, however, were partially subject to Swiss law for their unofficial acts. In 1926, after some discussion between the Secretary-General and the Swiss Federal Government as to its status,[66] this modus vivendi was revised and clarified. It is now subject to denunciation by either party after one year's notice, on failure to agree on terms for its revision.[67]

The modus vivendi did not settle the question of the status of the permanent delegates. These men are of course purely

[64] *League document C. 127. 1926. V*, p. 8.

[65] July 19, 1921, *League document C. 66. 1926. V.*

[66] *Idem, C. 189. 1926. V.*

[67] September 18, 1926, *Official Journal*, October 1926, p. 1422, Annex 911a.

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representatives of their states and in no sense officials of the League, and any personal matters connected with them must be handled by the representative of their government accredited to Switzerland. If one man combines the two functions the matter if unsettled must be taken up directly with his government. Article 7 of the Covenant provides, however, that "representatives of the members of the League and officials of the League when engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities". The Swiss government has been reluctant to give them a special status, and has therefore put them in the category of the members of diplomatic missions in Berne. They were not granted freedom from customs duties, however, unless they were representatives to the Assembly or Council, or possessed the personal title of minister plenipotentiary—already held by many of them—or minister resident, or an equivalent administrative title.[68] Due to the irregular character of certain permanent delegations the Swiss government felt constrained to protect itself in this way. The result of these rules was to cover almost the entire body of permanent delegates with diplomatic immunity. One delegate received the title of minister plenipotentiary at this time, bringing him within an accepted category.

For those members of the Berne diplomatic corps accredited also to the League Secretariat the Swiss government has been less disposed to make special concessions. In the past, representatives of governments whose League business surpassed that with Switzerland in importance occasionally abandoned Berne as a place of residence in favor of Geneva, returning to Berne as occasion warranted. The Swiss have now made it necessary for the Berne diplomatic corps to maintain their residence in Berne. This does not mean that they may not maintain a second residence elsewhere, and as the social demands on a diplomat in Berne are very light he may easily spend a good deal of time away provided the affairs of his own government do not keep him there. Nor have the Swiss

[68] Report to Council of Committee of Experts for Codification of International Law, *League document C. 196. M.70. 1927. V.*

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objected when states maintain a representative in Geneva accredited to the League only—as is the case with both Hungary and Latvia at present—without having one at Berne.

The efficiency of the existing system of representation is a matter on which there is difference of opinion. So long as the League retains its present character it is probably necessary for the Great Powers to maintain a predominant voice in its affairs, and to know all that is going on in the Secretariat. A suggested alternative to the present system of Great Power representation in the higher Secretariat is the maintenance of large permanent delegations in Geneva. There are numerous objections both to the present and to this proposed system. As matters stand now, the representation of national interests in the higher posts may occupy so much of the time and energy of the incumbents as to make their work as Director of Section suffer, if they happen to hold that office, or to weaken their effectiveness as international officials in any case. During the Sino-Japanese dispute, the Under Secretary-General who served as director of the section handling the question at issue was a national of one of the Powers involved, and the situation called for more detachment than it is fair to expect. In this particular case a high degree of detachment was maintained, but it is not clear that the future prospects at home of the official concerned were greatly enhanced thereby. Yet when a diplomat of career assumes the post of Under Secretary-General his tenure of office is apt to be short, and he can scarcely be blamed for acting in a manner which will most aid him in his future career.

Under the conception of the League as merely a group of national representatives [69] meeting to solve common problems, this difficulty is perhaps not extremely serious, but if the League is conceived of as an agent of the international community in general then the present system works against it.

The system in effect diminishes the desirability of a career as a League official. Among posts in the higher Secretariat

[69] Italy frankly accepted this point of view in a decree compelling Italians working for international organizations to secure the consent of their government to their appointment. *Cf. New York Times*, April 26, 1927.

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only one is open to the nationals of a small Power, one post as Deputy Secretary-General. Nationals of any of the Great Powers are prevented from promotion to the post of Director of Section if one of their nationals already holds such a post. Nationals of any state may find difficulty in entering the Secretariat at all or in securing advancement, if their national representation is considered disproportionate.

The arguments against substituting permanent delegations of the Great Powers outside the League are equally strong. Ambassadorial rank would be necessary to give Great Power permanent delegates a position superior to that of the small Power representatives. They would have to be received by the Secretary-General whenever they requested it, which would greatly complicate his task. There would be a prospect of a sort of council of ambassadors outside of the League, which might be as powerful as the League itself, and almost certainly would be if the higher posts in the Secretariat were filled by the nationals of small Powers.

Nor it is certain that such an arrangement would be welcomed by the Swiss government. There is but one ambassador in the diplomatic corps in Berne, that of France, and the presence in Geneva of a permanent group of Great Power representatives of this rank might tend to displace the center of political gravity more definitely from Berne.

The present system of Great Power representation, that is, by informal offices, granted that the League retains its present character, possesses certain advantages. Certain embarrassments for both the Secretariat and the Swiss government, as indicated above, are avoided. It is doubtful, however, whether a Great Power at a distance from Geneva could afford to get along on this basis alone. It has always been possible for France, Great Britain, Italy or Germany to build up its Geneva staff from the League of Nations bureau or other experts in its own foreign office. Japan used its Paris League of Nations bureau in the same manner.

The United States has so far handled the problem of Geneva representation piecemeal. The consulate is essentially a fact-finding and reporting agency, and only to this limited extent

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corresponds to other permanent delegations, since its staff is little used for representation at conferences. During the Disarmament Conference the bureau of the Disarmament Delegation has somewhat resembled the hotel offices of the other Great Powers, but the scope of its work is officially limited, even if in practice those limits are not entirely clear. There is no body of experts in League of Nations affairs within easy reach of Geneva—with the exception of the consulate staff—which could be called upon to serve at short notice. If such an office were created it would clarify the present uncertainty concerning the competence of the different agencies now dealing with one or another aspect of League affairs.[70]

Should Great Power delegations be set up in Geneva the question of a diplomatic corps might again arise. The permanent delegates of the small states have several times considered the organization of a corps. The basis in international law of a diplomatic corps is lacking in Geneva; that is, there is no government to which diplomatic representatives could be accredited. In fact, however, many of the tasks of the representatives in Geneva are similar to those of diplomats, and there might be advantages to the members of such a corps. The purpose of the corps proposed in 1932 was to assure greater consideration from the Secretariat.[71] One of the principal functions of the permanent delegates has been the forwarding of documents and reports to their governments. Certain documents are circulated only among the higher Secretariat, and the representatives of states not there represented are often not aware of their existence. These delegates wished to secure for themselves access to all such documents.[72] They wished also to assure themselves that they received all information given to journalists. The annoyance

[70] The assembling of large delegations to meet the 1932 emergency took the Japanese and Chinese some time. They were drawn largely from European embassies and legations and from special students of the question, many of them quite young, who were called from posts at home or abroad.

[71] See *Journal des Nations*, November 30, 1932.

[72] *Cf.* Polish request for documents, *Official Journal*, December 1921, p. 1113. Recently greater privileges have been granted in regard to documents, and seats have been reserved for permanent delegates at Council meetings.

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caused by the search for such information among the Secretariat would be obviated, they maintained, if the information were automatically distributed to them. They also felt that the prestige of the group as a whole would be increased by organizing. But the desirability of such an organization was not unanimously felt by the delegates. The attachments of the delegations to each other were weak in most cases, compared with those to one or another of the Great Powers. No definite organization was carried through, though the issue is not yet dead.

But with representatives of Great Powers in Geneva, a corps with them included would assume quite a different aspect. This body might easily become the center of the political activity now carried on by the League. Several permanent delegates and foreign officials have indicated that this might be a desirable development. Convinced though they are of the utility of the League as a technical bureau, they would reduce its political activity as much as possible. The initiative and development of League action would then come entirely from without the League, through the permanent delegations, only the technical work necessary for the development of projects being handled by the Secretariat, and each government would maintain its own staff to study each question from its own angle.

This concept would of course mean the end of the League in its present form. With its political activities amputated the remainder might theoretically be carried on less haltingly, but the significance of the League would be so reduced as to make it difficult to secure contributions from member states to keep it alive. But such a plan is perhaps the logical outcome of the theory of a League based on an equality of states possessing unlimited sovereignty whose domestic affairs are withdrawn from League competence. It would practically eliminate the points at which unlimited sovereignties might clash, as well as those where the smallest and greatest states have the same weight in determining a combined course of action, or in deciding what states are to carry out sanctions against violators of League decisions.

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It is, however, unlikely to be adopted. Any new development is more likely to be in the direction of greater control by the League of international activity, with carefully defined limitations of state sovereignty, but with a closer association of authority and responsibility than has existed during the League's trial period.

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PROVISIONS FOR MINERALS IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS[1]

TO those who are not intimately acquainted with some of the broader aspects of the mineral industry, the reasons for the attention devoted to minerals in international agreements may be somewhat obscure. In order to clarify the background it may be well to point out certain facts, all of which are not widely known and whose significance is even less widely appreciated.

It has been realized quite generally that the modern industrial development is based principally upon a large use of mineral products, particularly coal and oil and iron and steel, and to a lesser degree on many other minerals, such as copper, lead and zinc. It is less generally known how large the present consumption of minerals is or how quickly it was attained, for instance, that more minerals have been mined and consumed since the turn of the century than in all previous history. The technical questions connected with the new scale of production were mastered without too great difficulty, but the problems whose solution has not been so readily forthcoming are those of a political and economic nature, arising from the fact that minerals are distributed so erratically about the globe that no nations are self-sufficient, and all are mutually interdependent.

The fact that all nations must go beyond their own boundaries to secure a balanced complement of raw materials furnishes an explanation for much of the governmental participation in the mineral industry. Statesmen have endeavored to improve the mineral position of their countries by securing for their nationals access to foreign supplies of minerals, on the

[1] This study was initiated by The Mineral Inquiry, a body organized by the American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers to make factual investigations of the mineral resources of the United States and the world in their political and international relations. The members of the committee are: C. K. Leith, chairman, H. Foster Bain, G. Temple Bridgman, Mark L. Requa, J. E. Spurr and William P. Rawles, secretary.

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best terms possible, and, at the same time, guarding the domestic resources against excessive exploitation by outside interests. Treaty provisions regarding minerals are additional efforts among a host of measures devised to further these interests.[1]

Formerly, minerals received scant attention in agreements between nations, and those provisions that did occur consisted for the most part of occasional references to the precious metals. Even after it had been realized that supplies of mineral raw materials were vitally important for modern industrial development, the trade agreements and commercial conventions already in force were, and still are by some nations, considered adequate to care for the situation.

The acute distress caused by the interruption of trade routes during the World War served to bring the situation into sharper focus, and emergency measures to control the flow of raw materials were adopted by the Allied Powers. Since the war, several plans have been proposed for preserving the control of minerals but their reception has not been enthusiastic.

Nations acting individually, however, have negotiated numerous treaties in which minerals have had a more or less important part, and three broad objectives are apparent: the attempt to secure mineral rights, the facilitating or regulation of the movement of minerals and mineral products, and the settlement of questions, involving minerals, that had arisen from political readjustments.

ATTEMPTS TO SECURE MINERAL RIGHTS

The Franco-British Agreement for Iraq

Of all the understandings devoted to the subject of minerals, probably the best known is the San Remo Agreement[2] between France and Great Britain, signed in 1920. The two governments agreed to support their nationals in any common negotiations for securing oil concessions from the Rumanian Govern-

[1] For a full discussion of this situation, see C. K. Leith, *World Minerals and World Politics* (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1931).

[2] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 22.

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ment and from the Rumanian states, which concessions should be shared equally between British and French interests. Similar support was agreed upon for the operations of their nationals in the territories of the old Russian Empire.

In regard to the territory formerly held by Turkey the British Government consented to place at the disposal of the French Government 25 per cent of the net output of crude oil in Mesopotamia, if developed by government action, or a similar proportion of the shares in a private company if developed through such an agency. It was further stipulated that the company should be under permanent British control. In the event of development by a private company it was agreed that native governments or interests should be allowed to participate to the extent of 20 per cent.

It was understood that British interests might participate to the extent of one-third in oil concessions in the French colonies, and the British allowed the same proportion to be taken by French interests in concessions in the British crown colonies.

The two parties also agreed upon the terms governing the construction of pipe lines through British or French spheres of influence.

In accordance with this agreement, British and French nationals obtained, and still hold, the control of several Rumanian oil companies (Steaua Romana, Concordia and Vega) that had formerly been owned by German interests. At the present time these companies constitute about one-fifth of the Rumanian industry. In Mesopotamia, the Iraq Petroleum Company was formed under almost complete British and French ownership, and the development of concessions and construction of pipe lines was begun.

The protests from the United States Government on behalf of American oil companies who were excluded from operating in Mesopotamia, led to a modification of the terms of this agreement, and they were permitted to acquire almost a one-fourth interest in the company, although on terms that were not the most favorable. A few years after the signing, the agreement was regarded as not being in force but for a time it was a document of tremendous importance.

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American Efforts to Secure Mining Rights

An important instance of the support given to American oil interests by the United States Government, was cited in the last paragraph. In this case there was no formal treaty or convention, but the results of the negotiations were far-reaching. Such vigorous moves have been the usual course of events when one of the rich prizes among the world's mineral resources is at stake.

The sequel to this episode appeared in an agreement reached in 1930. In the anticipation of Iraq's becoming an autonomous state, a convention[1] defining the rights of the United States and of its nationals was concluded between the United States as one party and Great Britain and Iraq as the other. Rights equal to those accorded to the members of the League of Nations and their nationals were promised to the United States. The terms are much the same as those in the agreements regarding mandated areas.

Prolonged negotiations between the Governments of the Netherlands and the United States resulted, during 1928, in an understanding[2] which, although it did not attain the dignity of a treaty, is rather important. By this agreement the nationals of each country are permitted to participate in the development of oil lands in the territory of the other. The representative of the United States Government in supporting his contentions pointed to the provisions of the U. S. Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 which prohibit citizens of countries denying similar privileges to citizens of the United States from owning any lease acquired under the provision of the Act. Previously, American companies had been unable to secure concessions in Dutch territory although Dutch companies had operated extensively in the United States. Following this agreement one American oil company secured a concession in the Dutch East Indies but two other companies have been unsuccessful in similar enterprises, and one is reported to have abandoned its efforts.

[1] United States, *Treaty Series*, No. 835.

[2] Press release. Department of State, Washington. Sept. 17, 1928. Texts of correspondence in a press release of Feb. 16, 1929.

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Following the principle set forth in the Mineral Leasing Act, the United States Government has included a clause in the newer commercial treaties which reads as follows:

> The nationals of either High Contracting Party shall, moreover, enjoy within the territories of the other, reciprocally and upon compliance with the conditions there imposed, such rights and privileges as have been or may hereafter be accorded the nationals of any other State with respect to the mining of coal, phosphate, oil, oil shale, gas, and sodium on the public domain of the other.

Treaties containing this clause have been negotiated with Austria,[1] Esthonia,[2] Germany,[3] Honduras,[4] Hungary,[5] Latvia,[6] Norway [7] and El Salvador.[8] It also appears in a treaty with Poland [9] which has been ratified by the United States Government but not by the Polish Government. In the treaty with Norway an exception is made to the clause guaranteeing equality of treatment in taxation for American nationals in Norway and Norwegian nationals. The exception is as follows: "This paragraph does not apply to charges and taxes on the acquisition and exploitation of waterfalls, energy produced by waterfalls, mines or forests." The reservation by Norway, regarding certain matters of taxation, reflects the desire to protect the natural resources from excessive exploitation by foreign groups.

The clause providing for reciprocal mining rights has been to the net advantage of the United States, as the participation of American capital in the mineral industries of some of these countries is considerable, while the participation of foreign capital in the mineral industries of the United States is negli-

[1] United States, *Treaty Series*, No. 838, 1931.
[2] *Ibid.*, No. 736, 1926.
[3] *Ibid.*, No. 725, 1925.
[4] *Ibid.*, No. 764, 1928.
[5] *Ibid.*, No. 748, 1926.
[6] *Ibid.*, No. 765, 1928.
[7] *Ibid.*, No. 852, 1932.
[8] *Ibid.*, No. 827, 1930.
[9] *Congressional Record*, vol. 75, No. 90, April 5, 1932.

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gible, with the exception of petroleum. American capital shares in companies operating smelters and refineries in Germany, Norway and Poland and in mining companies in Hungary and Poland.

In a treaty [1] regarding commercial relations signed with the United States in 1903, China agreed to revise her mining laws so that foreign capital might participate in the development of natural resources and so as to permit citizens of the United States to carry on mining in Chinese territory, subject to the local laws and regulations.

Provisions in British Treaties

There are only a few British treaties that contain clauses specifying the rights of British subjects in connection with mining, and the natural supposition is that, for the most part, the general clauses have been adequate to care for the situations that have arisen.

The principle of a reciprocal extension of mining rights, embodied in the newer treaties of the United States, has been adopted in a commercial treaty [2] between Great Britain and Guatemala, signed in 1928. It was agreed that petroleum companies domiciled in any British territory should not have the right to operate in Guatemala unless reciprocal rights were extended to Guatemalan companies.

The most-favored-nation treatment has been accorded to British nationals for mining in Siam [3] and Poland.[4]

French Negotiations for Minerals

In an agreement [5] signed in 1922 regarding the régime of mineral oil industries in Poland, certain French firms that had received the approval of their Government were allowed to export petroleum and its products. In order to encourage French capital to participate in the petroleum industry, Poland

[1] United States, *Treaty Series*, No. 430.

[2] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 2226.

[3] *Ibid.*, No. 1176.

[4] *Ibid.*, No. 772.

[5] *Ibid.*, No. 1074.

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consented to exempt future capital from levies and forced loans. Poland also promised to facilitate the construction of pipe lines. Within less than ten years one-half of the Polish petroleum industry was controlled by French capital.

Through an exchange of notes [1] in 1921 between the diplomatic representatives of the two nations, the Turkish Government granted a concession to a French group for iron, silver and chrome mines in the Harachite Valley. The concession was to run for ninety-nine years, work was to be begun within five years, and Turkish interests were to participate to the extent of 50 per cent. In spite of all the keen competition for chromite concessions in Turkey during the last few years, this appears to be the only published instance of governmental assistance to nationals seeking concessions for minerals in that country. Within ten years after this agreement was signed, French companies were producing a substantial share of the Turkish output of chromite.

The Russo-Japanese Agreement for Sakhalin

A treaty [2] between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics set up the conditions for Japanese exploitation of coal fields and oil fields on Sakhalin Island. It was agreed that the oil fields of Northern Sakhalin should be divided in a checker-board pattern and alternate squares should be leased to Japanese concerns, which had been recommended by the Japanese Government, with the provision that the leased areas should include existing wells. It was also understood that, if the unleased portions should be opened to foreign concessions, Japanese firms should have equal opportunty to secure additional grants. Japan was given the right to conduct explorations for oil in Eastern Sakhalin and the privilege of leasing one-half of the area of any oil fields so established on the same conditions that were extended in Northern Sakhalin. Russia also agreed to grant concessions for coal fields on the western coast of Northern Sakhalin, the specific areas to be decided in the concession contracts.

[1] *Ibid.*, No. 1284.

[2] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 866.

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It was stipulated that the concessions should run from forty to fifty years, that the royalty on coal should be from 5 to 8 per cent of the gross output, on oil from 5 to 15 per cent of the gross output with the provision that it might go as high as 45 per cent in the case of gushers. Special arrangements were made for the importation of equipment and the development of the areas.

While a fair amount of production has been obtained from these concessions, the results have been somewhat disappointing. Owing to the insufficiency of Japan's domestic petroleum resources and the vital necessity for fuel for her navy, a vigorous attempt at development can be expected.

The Spitsbergen Treaty

A treaty [1] relating to Spitsbergen, signed in 1924, provides that the nationals of the contracting parties shall enjoy equal rights for carrying on mining operations on that island. Although Russia is not a party to the convention, her nationals are given the same treatment as those of the contracting parties, until a government recognized by the other powers can adhere to the treaty. Twenty-nine nations are party to this treaty.

The Siamese Treaties

The treaties signed by Siam with France in 1925,[2] with Great Britain in the same year, and with Italy [3] in 1926 contain assurances that the nationals of those countries will receive most-favored-nation treatment for carrying on mining enterprises in Siam. Permission to engage in mining in Siam had been granted to the nationals of Germany [4] in 1862 and to the nationals of Spain [5] ten years later. Similar provisions for most-favored-nation treatment for nationals exploiting natural resources exist in a treaty between Germany and Russia.[6]

[1] United States, *Treaty Series*, No. 686.

[2] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 1055.

[3] *Ibid.*, No. 1436.

[4] *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. 53, p. 741.

[5] *Ibid.*, vol. 61, p. 483.

[6] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 1257.

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General Provisions

For the most part, mining rights come under the general provisions of commercial treaties defining the rights of the nationals of each contracting party. In the great majority of commercial treaties, the general provisions are included in the "most-favored-nation" clauses, which state that the nationals and products of each contracting party will receive at the hands of the other party the same treatment which may be extended to those of any third party.

Unless the right to engage in mining is mentioned specifically, the general provisions regarding the rights of nationals are of little importance, as far as the mineral industry is concerned, for they are almost always qualified by being subjected to the local laws and regulations. The function of the treaty is to secure the best of whatever treatment may be extended.

Agreements for the Protection of Rights

The manner in which nations coöperate occasionally to protect their nationals who are exploiting mineral resources in other countries, was illustrated in 1914 by a series of notes[1] from the United States to Spain and Great Britain. Mining rights in Mexico, which were held extensively by the nationals of these countries, had been jeopardized by the inability of the holders to fulfill the legal requirements of the concessions during military operations and political disturbances. Accordingly the United States Government sent notes to the other powers suggesting that they withhold diplomatic support from their respective nationals who, after January 1, 1913, took up leases that had been confiscated or canceled on account of the unavoidable default of the concessionaires. Great Britain and Spain agreed to follow this course of action. Similar agreements were made with Great Britain and with the Netherlands to protect oil leases.

AGREEMENTS TO FACILITATE OR REGULATE THE MOVEMENT OF MINERALS AND MINERAL PRODUCTS

A growth in the belief that a free exchange of raw materials is to the advantage of all, has resulted in a number of agree-

[1] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, vol. 14, pp. 707-708, 718-720.

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ments whose object has been to remove existing obstructions. One of these documents is interesting, not on account of the importance of the operations involved but because the situation is unique.

The German-Dutch Coal Agreement

In an annex to a treaty [1] between Germany and the Netherlands, dated 1921, special arrangements were made for certain coal-mining areas situated on the Limburg frontier. Because of economic, geographic and technical reasons, Germany agreed to permit exploitation by the Dutch company by means of shafts in German territory, and granted special frontier facilities for operating the properties. In case the properties should be expropriated by the State, the German Government promised to allow 50 per cent of the output, up to one-quarter million tons per year, to be exported to the Netherlands, at a reduction of the export charges until the end of 1923 and free of charges from then until 1954.

This appears to be the first instance of an international agreement which recognizes that the most efficient development of a mineral deposit should proceed on a plan in which more consideration is given to the conditions underground than to property, or in this case political, lines on the surface. Unit operation has been adopted for several domestic situations but its international application is rare. The privileges were extended in this case in return for a loan from the Netherlands to Germany.

The Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions

This agreement which is the most advanced step toward the removal of barriers against the free international movement of mineral raw materials, was taken after several years of economic conferences, and its chief importance is that it is a recognition of a principle.

A convention and protocol [2] for the abolition of import and

[1] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 97.

[2] United States, *Treaty Series*, No. 811.

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export prohibitions and restrictions went into effect January 1, 1930. In this agreement the parties undertake to abolish import and export prohibitions and restrictions within six months after the document has come into force and not to impose any more prohibitions thereafter and to reduce the existing measures to a minimum during the six-months period. Exceptions were made to customs tariffs, the prohibitions relating to public health, national security and other matters for which control is essential.

Considering that before the removal of all prohibitions and restrictions, some period of readjustment would be desirable to avoid working unnecessary hardships on the individual nations, they were given the opportunity to make temporary reservations, which they agreed to abolish as soon as circumstances would permit. The following reservations were made for mineral raw materials: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg and Rumania reserved the right to maintain their export prohibitions on metal scrap. Germany also made reservations for the import and export of coal, coke, peat, lignite and briquettes. Rumania reserved the right to prohibit the export of petroleum and ores of iron, copper and manganese. The United States made reservation for the prohibition of the export of helium gas.

About thirty nations signed the treaty but it was ratified by only seven, the United States, Great Britain, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Denmark, and Portugal has since withdrawn.[1] Several of the other signatory powers have withheld their ratifications until certain other nations have deposited theirs. None of the reservations mentioned above was removed in the first three years the convention was in force.

The Tin Agreement

One of the most important of all agreements is the one concerning tin[2] which became effective on March 1, 1931.

[1] In June 1933 Great Britain and the United States gave notice of withdrawal.—Ed.

[2] Described in *Commerce Reports*, Sept. 28, 1931. Bur. of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Dept. of Commerce.

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In order to improve the conditions of the industry, which was suffering sorely from ruinous overproduction, the governments of the tin-producing countries agreed to limit their production to certain quotas. It was necessary to lower these quotas repeatedly, but the soundness of the scheme has been proven by tremendous betterment of the industry's position. It is an interesting modification of the cartel idea and its success suggests the desirability of similar arrangements for other minerals.

Regulation by Tariffs

The chief regulation of the international movement of minerals and mineral products is effected by levying import tariffs on them. In order to secure the best terms of entry for their products, practically all nations have negotiated commercial treaties, stipulating the tariff treatment that will be extended by each party to the other.

The majority of the commercial treaties now in force are of the most-favored-nation type, containing assurance that the treatment accorded will be as favorable as that extended to any other nation. Usually these clauses are worded to include all products, but in a few cases minerals have been given specific mention.

Belgium extended most-favored-nation treatment to Finland for mineral raw materials;[1] Portugal agreed[2] to admit tin from Siam under the same terms; while Greece offered the most-favored-nation treatment for mineral tariffs to Finland[3] and in return, Finland gave to Greece the same treatment for raw materials. These provisions smack somewhat of empty concessions, for the commerce in minerals is not large in any of the instances given.

By extending the most-favored-nation treatment to all others, a country would establish uniform customs treatment, and the universal extension of such equality is desired in many quarters. There are, however, a few nations, most notably France and Spain, who follow the double tariff system and do

[1] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 595.

[2] *Ibid.*, No. 1304.

[3] *Ibid.*, No. 1626.

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not extend uniform treatment to all nations for all products. France's tariff treatment of the United States is one of the most important of these instances in which the most favorable treatment is not fully accorded.

Many commercial treaties contain tariff schedules, particularly when one of the parties adheres to a double tariff system, but as many of them are in force for only a short time, occasionally for as brief a period as three months, any detailed discussion would be of little value. The impermanency of these documents is further aggravated by the fact that the tariff schedules in several countries fluctuate with the rate of exchange.

As might be expected, countries frequently exempt from import tariffs those minerals which they are forced to import, and those countries which are conspicuously deficient in a large number of mineral supplies, such as Germany, list the greatest number of exemptions. Particular products from certain countries are exempted from import duties, on occasion, to supplement the grade of the domestic product; for example, Germany and Czechoslovakia [1] exchange coal of different grades without import charges.

Spain's position as a country whose mineral industry depends largely on export trade is reflected in the large number of treaties [2] which obtain free entry abroad for Spanish ores.

Exceptions to the articles according general most-favored-nation treatment found in commercial treaties, are made by countries wishing to give preferential treatment to some third state. In some cases this preferential treatment has been established formally in agreements for customs unions, informally in others by the granting of special privileges, often with a view to a subsequent agreement of definite nature. It is hardly necessary to elaborate on the special arrangements existing between countries and their dependencies.

Customs tariffs have been abolished between Luxemburg and Belgium,[3] and among the Scandinavian states, Denmark,

[1] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 430.

[2] *Ibid.*, Nos. 719, 932, 1067, 1135, 1490.

[3] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 256.

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Norway and Sweden; and negotiations are under way for similar relations between the Baltic states, Esthonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania, and also between the individual states of this group and Russia. Pending the completion of such plans, the countries are making exceptions for their treatment of each other in their commercial agreements.

Without defining what the privileges are, many countries have made reservations to the most-favored-nation clause, just as the Baltic States have done, with the purpose of giving preferential treatment to certain states. Closer relations of this sort exist between Austria and Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia, Portugal and Spain, Portugal and Brazil, Austria and Germany, Spain and the Spanish-American republics, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey and Rumania, Cuba and the United States, and among the Spanish-American republics. Russia reserves the right to give special treatment to the countries that recognized her *de jure* before February 14, 1924. Many treaties leave the way open for future preferential treatment of contiguous territories, and most of the countries that suffered losses in territory after the World War have made preferential economic terms for the areas which were once united with them. This is illustrated by Turkey's provisions for trade with areas that were once part of Turkey and are now detached.

The Protection of Property

A series of international conventions, ratified by the leading nations, constitutes the basis of a union for the protection of industrial property. These conventions [1] were devoted almost entirely to arrangements for the protection of patents and trade marks, but industrial property is defined as including minerals and mineral waters, presumably such of these products as carry brands.

TREATIES NECESSITATED BY POLITICAL READJUSTMENTS

The peace treaties following the World War, in addition to the reëstablishing of relations between the combatants, set up

[1] United States, *Treaty Series*, No. 579 and League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 1743.

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conditions for the new territories and, as additional problems developed, the first provisions had to be modified and revised.

The Versailles Peace Treaty

In framing the Versailles Treaty,[1] mineral products received considerable attention because of their ready adaptability as a medium for the payment of reparation charges, but unfortunately for the smooth functioning of some of the industrial units which had developed as a consequence of the distribution of raw materials, mineral deposits were much neglected in the drawing of new political boundaries. In settling the affairs of practically every district that experienced a change in status, provisions relating to minerals were found necessary.

The coal mines and accessory properties in the Saar Basin were given to the French Government as compensation for the destruction of the coal mines of northern France during the war. Import and export taxes were prohibited for five years on products originating in either Germany or the Saar territory and passing into the other.

It was agreed that the natural products from Alsace-Lorraine were to be duty-free upon entering Germany for a period of five years. The right was given to France to prohibit all new German participation in the ownership of mines and metallurgical establishments in the territories. Germany also renounced, on behalf of the Government and its nationals, all the rights regarding products, including the potash industry, in these territories. France took advantage of this opportunity.

Poland agreed to permit for fifteen years the free exportation of the products from the mines of Upper Silesia to Germany, and on as favorable terms as might be made to purchasers in Poland or any other country.

Germany renounced the rights and privileges in Morocco that had been granted by the General Act of Algeciras, and all property of the German Government in that country. Germany agreed to give the same customs treatment to Moroccan goods as to French. Similar conditions were imposed

[1] *Senate Document* No. 51. 66th Congress. First Session. Washington, 1919.

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upon Germany with respect to Egypt, excepting that Egyptian goods were to be admitted on the same terms as British. This customs treatment amounted to most-favored-nation treatment in both cases.

All rights regarding mines in Kiaochow and other arrangements in Shantung were renounced by Germany in favor of Japan.

As reparation measures, Germany agreed to deliver to France, Belgium, and Italy fixed amounts of coal at the same price at pithead as coal offered to German nationals and at a figure not to exceed the British or Dutch export prices.

The right was reserved for the Reparation Commission to demand that Germany take over from her nationals any rights or concessions in Austria, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Hungary, Morocco, Russia, Turkey and Shantung and transfer them to the Commission, and this was done in some cases. Germany agreed to indemnify the nationals so dispossessed.

Germany agreed to grant most-favored-nation treatment to the nationals of the Allied Powers and for the imports from, and the exports to, these states.

In order to carry out certain provisions of the Versailles Treaty, Germany agreed [1] to allow the free importation of contingents of some minor minerals from Poland. The questions between Poland and Germany which arose in Upper Silesia from the division of the coal fields by the postwar boundary were settled by a series of agreements,[2] during the years 1922 to 1926, that transferred property, divided regions, and established mining regulations.

Other Postwar Agreements

Since the customs service in the Saar Basin was placed under French jurisdiction, commerce between Germany and the Saar has been regulated by a number of agreements [3] between France and Germany. These conventions state the amount of mineral products which may be exported from one territory

[1] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 158.

[2] *Ibid.*, Nos. 550, 553, 1693.

[3] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, Nos. 1463, 1711, 1815.

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to the other and the import and export charges which shall be levied against them.

In consequence of Germany's renunciation of her rights in Shantung in favor of Japan, a series [1] of agreements between China and Japan in 1922 established the conditions under which Japan might participate in the mining industry in that territory. According to the terms, one-half of the stock in the operating company must be owned by Chinese nationals and they must have control of the company.

Poland made agreements with France [2] and Belgium [3] in 1922 recognizing the validity of mining concessions granted by the former states, provinces, municipalities, or by the owners of lands or concessions, before August 1, 1914.

In a treaty [4] signed at Trianon in 1920, it was stipulated that Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia should make agreements for reciprocal supplies of coal, lignite, foodstuffs and raw materials, and that no import prohibitions or restrictions should be imposed upon the goods, up to a reasonable quantity, to be decided upon.

The Conference of Ambassadors, representing the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan and the United States, in the decision [5] concerning the former Duchy of Teschen or the districts of Orava and Spisz, stipulated that Czechoslovakia and Poland respectively must recognize all rights, privileges or concessions acquired by individuals or associations in that area, and further that no legislation regarding concessions should be enacted that was not equally applicable throughout Poland and Czechoslovakia respectively. It was also provided that a bilateral agreement should come into force within two months in order that Poland might be supplied with the same amount of coal that came from this area in 1913, and that Poland should supply naphtha in exchange.

[1] *Ibid.*, Nos. 277, 559.

[2] *Ibid.*, No. 1073.

[3] *Ibid.*, No. 543.

[4] *Senate Document* No. 7. 67th Congress. First Session. Washington, 1921, pp. 163-319.

[5] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 46.

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Great Britain concluded a group of treaties with Denmark,[1] Greece,[2] Norway,[3] Portugal[4] and Sweden[5] in 1920 and 1921 concerning capitulations in Egypt, whereby the nationals of each of these States received the promise of the same rights as those enjoyed by British nationals in Egypt for several matters including mining privileges.

The powers holding "A" and "B" mandates over territories formerly under the jurisdiction of Germany or Turkey have extended to the United States all the benefits existing for States Members of the League of Nations, under the terms as defined by the Council of the League of Nations. France has made treaties with the United States concerning rights in the Cameroons,[6] Togoland,[7] and Syria and the Lebanon;[8] the Belgian treaty has to do with rights in Ruanda Urundi[9] in former German East Africa; and the British conventions relate to rights in Palestine,[10] the Cameroons,[11] Togoland[12] and East Africa.[13]

According to the provisions of the mandates, thus extended to include the United States, the mandatory powers agreed to make no distinction between the nationals of the League Members and their own nationals in granting concessions for the development of natural resources within the mandated areas.

The Treaty[14] of St. Germain-en-Laye of 1919, revising the

[1] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 153.
[2] *Ibid.*, No. 90.
[3] *Ibid.*, No. 114.
[4] *Ibid.*, No. 192.
[5] *Ibid.*, No. 139.
[6] United States, *Treaty Series*, No. 690.
[7] *Ibid.*, No. 691.
[8] *Ibid.*, No. 695.
[9] *Ibid.*, No. 704.
[10] *Ibid.*, No. 728.
[11] *Ibid.*, No. 743.
[12] *Ibid.*, No. 745.
[13] *Ibid.*, No. 744.
[14] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 202.

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General Acts of Berlin and Brussels, provides for freedom of trade for all nations in certain parts of Africa, and the same treatment for the nationals of the signatory powers or States Members of the League of Nations, as for the nationals of the governing power, in the granting of concessions for the development of natural resources. These are the same principles as those embodied in the League of Nations mandates. This treaty was signed and ratified by the United States. As mentioned before, treaties to the same effect were concluded with the individual mandatory powers.

The Russian Soviet Government, in 1921, renounced [1] the concessions acquired by the old Imperial Government in Persia and agreed not to require that Persia repay the loans for which the concessions had been security. Three years later in a treaty [2] with China, the Soviet Government agreed to renounce the special privileges and concessions acquired there by the former Tsarist Government. Although the concessions and privileges were not described, mining rights may have been included.

CONCLUSION

A review of these agreements reveals that the nations that are the largest consumers of minerals, United States, Great Britain, France and Germany, have been the most active in furthering their interests in such fields by means of treaties. Broadly speaking, there is a tendency in the treaties of the European group to deal specifically with individual cases, whereas the American agreements are concerned largely with obtaining general rights for nationals.

It is regrettable that many agreements concerning minerals, such as the understanding between the United States and the Netherlands regarding oil, are not published as widely as treaties. These agreements as to the precise application of the general rules for particular instances are the instruments that are the most illuminating.

The treaties or agreements involving minerals to which the

[1] *Ibid.*, No. 268.

[2] League of Nations, *Treaty Series*, No. 955.

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United States is a party are: the understanding with the Netherlands regarding oil; the commercial treaty with China, whereby American citizens were given the right to engage in mining in China; the agreements with Great Britain, Spain, and the Netherlands for the protection of mineral rights in Mexico; the commercial treaties with Austria, Germany, Esthonia, Honduras, Hungary, Latvia, Norway and El Salvador, containing the clause allowing the nationals of each party to carry on mining operations in the public domain of the other; the treaties with the mandatory powers giving nationals of the United States the right to acquire concessions for the exploitation of natural resources in the Cameroons, Ruanda Urundi, Togoland, East Africa, Syria and the Lebanon, and Palestine on equal terms with any other nationals, and the treaty with Great Britain and Iraq to the same purpose; an international convention for the protection of industrial property; the treaty relating to Spitsbergen; and the treaty for the abolition of import and export prohibitions and restrictions.[1]

A recital of the provisions in treaties regarding minerals may seem to be a mere collection of unrelated facts, more or less generally well known, that are only mildly interesting at the best. If viewed as such, they are rather dry bits of information, for few of them have been of much importance to the world for any great length of time; but if the assemblage is viewed as a whole, a philosophy may be discerned running through the treaties that bids fair to guide future political thought regarding minerals in connection with international affairs. The guiding principles may be stated briefly as follows:

1. Mineral reserves, regardless of their geographical distribution, are world resources which should be available to all nations.

2. The movement of minerals from their sources to the points of consumption should be as free as possible.

[1] The United States in June 1933 gave notice of withdrawal from the last-mentioned treaty.—ED.

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Extreme as these ideas may seem, they do not appear to be so impossible of realization if one stops to consider the progress already made toward their fulfilment in the short time since the World War. For instance, the League of Nations has declared the mandated areas open for exploitation, and the mineral deposits of Spitsbergen have been made accessible to many nations; but, of course, the prospect of such developments in autonomous portions of the world is much more remote.

The desirability of the free movement of raw materials has been recognized in the recent multilateral convention for the abolition of import and export prohibitions and restrictions and in many economic treaties; but again, the possibility of such practice ever evolving into free trade for minerals is something for the distant future. Until such a state of affairs comes to pass, if it ever does, we may expect constantly increasing activity on the part of governments to improve the mineral position of their own nationals.

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THE DEPUTIES EXTRAORDINARY OF COMMERCE AND THE FRENCH MONARCHY[1]

THE problem of representation existed in France under the old régime in a form very different from the problem of representation in the nineteenth century. The need of participating in the decisions of government was felt, not so much by the population as a whole, as by those parts of it whose fortunes had risen with the monarchy and were still involved with its action. The merchants of the great ports, whose maritime and colonial commerce had thus grown so large, were highly sensitive to variations in policy and had developed and were developing organs of effective action at the center of government. On the other hand, the necessity of broadening the basis of the absolutism to correspond to the increased and increasing complexity of the affairs of government was by no means absent from the minds of the extraordinarily able men who were governing France in the eighteenth century and especially not from the minds of those of the period from 1750 to 1789. From their rational and practical point of view, the solution of the problem was not to be found either in the history of the kingdom or in the practice of its neighbors. The historic institution, the Estates General, was the organized embodiment of the obstacles to unity and to rationality which it had been the function of the monarchy to reduce to unimportance. If the statesmen looked across the Channel or to Spain or to Germany, they saw quasi-representative institutions that, despite the Anglophilic enthusiasms of the Philosophers, conformed little if any more with the real forces of the world with which the monarchy had to deal. Their problem, as men of high intelligence, was not to revive an outworn institution of the kingdom's past nor to imitate the inadequate institutions of other states. It was rather to create new institutions conforming to the existing forces in French society.[2]

[1] This paper is based on research supported by a grant-in-aid of the Social Science Research Council and the University of Wyoming.

[2] For the general setting of this problem see especially Hedwig Hintze,

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In 1787, just before the death of Vergennes and his own fall from power, Calonne had formulated an *arrêt*, which in effect created a national economic council composed of deputies to be freely elected for limited terms by the chambers of commerce and other economic groups. When Calonne was dismissed, the project was dropped and under Loménie de Brienne the administration of commercial affairs was reorganized in even more bureaucratic form than ever.[3] Calonne's project, however, was the culmination of a development going back some thirty years that is of considerable significance not only for the light it throws on the somewhat formal question of representation, but even in greater degree for the light it throws on the nature and process of the alienation from the monarchy of a powerful element of the population in association with which some of its greatest historical victories had been won, namely, the merchants of the great towns.

I

Colbert in his day often consulted with the merchants of the kingdom. It remained for one of his successors to formalize his practice. In the first years of the eighteenth century, a council of commerce was established as a part of the central government and a chamber of commerce was organized in each of the more important commercial centers. As a link between the council and the chambers, a deputy from each chamber, named by the king from a list of three nominated by the chamber, was to reside at Paris. At first, the deputies were appointed only for a term of two years, then to be replaced by another nominee. The council was to consult the deputies

Staatseinheit und Föderalismus im alten Frankreich und in der Revolution (1928), and Dupont-Ferrier, *La Formation de l'état français et l'unité française* (1929). The review of the latter work by Olivier-Martin in the *Revue Historique du Droit Français* (July-September, 1929, page 616) is especially thoughtful and significant. *Cf.* also P. Renouvin, *Les Assemblées provinciales de 1787* (1921).

[3] MS. memoir of the Baron J.-F. Mahy de Cormeré. Arch. nat., T 38 1-2, undated, but late in 1790 or early in 1791. Minutes of the Council of Commerce, Feb. 25, 1788, Arch. nat., F12* 107-8.

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in regard to all the matters which came before it, without permitting them to vote as members of the council. Such activity as the early deputies manifested seems to have consisted in lobbying for their communities and, especially, for themselves. During the first half of the century, this institution fell under the blight that seems to have affected all the councils. The activity of the council and of the deputies became purely perfunctory. The nominations of the deputies were ordinarily made at the behest of some minister and appointments became permanent, so that all representative character was lost.[4]

About the turn of the half-century, however, a new spirit and a new interest becomes visible in the commercial policy of the government and in this institution. The general change was ascribed to the elder Trudaine, director-general of commerce (1749-1769). The ordinary functions of the council were taken over by its "bureau", composed of several intendants of commerce presided over by a member of the council. The records of the bureau grow more voluminous and significant, the consultations of the deputies more frequent. In 1756, the newly elected deputy of Marseilles wrote back to his chamber, "In the weekly meetings, I have heard hardly anything but the reading of the essential abstracts of the reports and opinions of the deputies and the successive approving votes of the members of the bureau. I know that you will be pleased to hear that the opinions of people of your own sort count for something."[5]

Biollay supposed[6] that the rôle of the council of commerce was sharply reduced after 1761. The fact is that questions of commerce "went out of court", as the English constitutionalists say. That is, the problems became too numerous, too

[4] For the history of the council, see Bonnassieux and Lelong, *Inventaire analytique des procès-verbaux du Conseil du commerce* (1900), especially the very full introduction, and Biollay, "L'Administration du commerce", in *Le Pacte de Famine. Études économiques sur le XVIII^e siècle* (1885).

[5] P. Simian to the chamber of Marseilles, December 16, 1756. Quoted in Fournier, *La Chambre de commerce de Marseille et ses représentants permanentes à Paris* (1920), page 32.

[6] *Le Pacte de Famine*, page 365.

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technical for the council and fell more and more into the hands of the rising intendants of commerce working in close relations with the deputies from the chambers. A communication from the controller-general to the president of the bureau in 1765 shows the operation of the whole machinery in a case of exceptional interest. The minister transmits a memoir on the extent and limits of the prohibitive régime in the colonies which had been read in the royal council on April 9, 1765. His Majesty had directed communication of the memoir to the bureau for deliberation, after it had been considered and reported upon by the deputies. The intendants of the bureau were also to render a fully developed opinion. "Those members of the council of state," wrote the controller-general, "who have the honor to be members of the council of commerce desire to be present when the bureau takes up the question."[7] It is obvious that neither the council of commerce, the bureau of commerce, nor the deputies of commerce had fallen into desuetude. In general, from this time forward the bureau of commerce and the deputies were constantly utilized in connection with nearly all of the increasingly numerous questions, both judicial and political, of an economic character with which the government had to deal. Aside from Turgot's abolition of the corporations, I know of no important measure of this character passed upon between 1765 and 1789 in regard to which they were not consulted. In 1788, indeed, the bureau felt justified in protesting when Lambert, then controller-general, ventured to take out of their hands for his own decision two minor questions which had come before them.[8]

The system was even considerably extended. The merchants of Nantes, who, suspicious of possible new taxes, had never organized a chamber, nevertheless had sent a deputy from the beginning, carrying on their relations through the *juges-consuls*. Similarly, Le Havre although it had no legal

[7] Controller-general to Montaran, April 17, 1765. Archives des colonies, F2B 8.

[8] Procès-verbaux du bureau du commerce, February 14, 1788. Arch. nat., F12 106.

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chamber until 1802, had its *négociants chargés des affaires générales de la place* from 1749, who were dealt with by the government much as were the regularly organized chambers.[9] The chamber of commerce of Picardy was organized only in 1761. In 1759, chambers *mi-commerce, mi-agriculture,* were established at Port-au-Prince and Le Cap in San Domingo. After 1766, Dubuq, the author of the memoir referred to above, appears in the *Almanach Royal* as the deputy of Martinique. In 1775, a deputy of Guadeloupe appears with the others at a conference summoned by Sartine.[10]

The increasing importance of the deputies was a natural antecedent to raising the question of their relationship to their chambers. Were they responsible and revocable representatives? The question was answered in different ways at different times during the half-century preceding the Revolution. It was hardly an issue in 1751, when the deputy of Lyons, one M. Palerne, resigned in consequence of a vote of the *consulat* of Lyons and was replaced by M. de Pernon, who retained the place until his death in 1779. Trudaine, however, as a part of his reorganization, established the principle that the deputy's primary function was to act, not as agent for his chamber, but for the general interest.[11] In 1768, when the chamber of Marseilles got its deputy Simian to attempt to change his vote on a certain issue, the Duc de Praslin, minister of marine, gave the chamber a scathing rebuke, not without interest as an expression of absolutist principles.

> Your chamber [he wrote] is nothing but a private organization which has not and cannot have any existence of its own, which depends entirely upon the king and which he can modify or terminate at will. . . . I do not comprehend the error into which you have fallen. I am not less surprised at the tone of your memoir than to see reappearing among you so often petty

[9] Barrey, "Le Havre et la navigation des Antilles sous l'ancien régime" in J. Hayem, *Mémoires et documents pour servir à l'histoire du commerce et de l'industrie en France,* vol. V, pp. 211-276.

[10] Arch. des colonies, F^3 126; Barrey, *op. cit.,* pp. 241-242.

[11] Drouet to the juges-consuls of Nantes, August 23, 1783. Archives, Nantes, C 624 (1).

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captious notions, arbitrary and republican, which His Majesty will no longer suffer on your part and in regard to which I must effectively undeceive you. . . . The deputy of Marseilles is, then, named by His Majesty alone and removable by him alone. . . . [The deputies] must give their opinions freely according to their knowledge and conscience without being subjected to instructions which might affect their opinions and their votes, even in cases where they are led to vote against the interests of their towns or against opinions which would be there rendered if there were occasion for such expression. . . . This will recall you without doubt to the principles from which the king does not intend that you should ever depart.[12]

As directed by further expressions in the letter, the chamber tendered a most abject apology.

Nevertheless, four years later when Simian resigned, the election of his successor was treated in a quite different spirit. The chamber was overwhelmed by recommendations from highly placed personages for one or the other of the many aspirants for the place. One of the candidates, "neither business man or Marseillais", had the support of the archbishop of Paris and of the wife of the minister of marine. Thus embarrassed and possibly bearing in mind the painful character of its encounter with the Duc de Praslin, the chamber asked the minister of marine for permission to name nine candidates instead of the usual three.

The minister replied in a letter full of civic virtue. Recommendations from any source, however high, were not to determine the choices of the chamber, but only to assure thorough attention to the qualifications of the candidate recommended. "You surely have not reflected", he wrote, "that in abandoning the right to designate the subjects whom you consider the most suitable to protect the interests of your commerce, you would be losing the most valuable of your privileges. It appears remarkable that it should be necessary to remind you of it."

Thus emboldened, the chamber presented a list of three names which included none of those recommended by the great

[12] Fournier, *op. cit.*, appendix xiii.

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personages. The minister replied that the principles enunciated in his earlier letter had led him to recommend to the king that he should determine his decision solely on the basis of the plurality of votes.[13] The result was the appointment of Rostagny, who, by all accounts, commanded more fully than any other deputy the respect of his chamber, of his fellow deputies and of the government.

The bureau of commerce was too conservative for Turgot. He took his assistants elsewhere and his two immediate successors concerned themselves little with it. Necker, on the contrary, used the bureau very intensively, especially in the working out of his *système intermédiaire,* which was his more tactful and more statesmanlike approach to the problem of breaking down the old system of industrial regulation. In an *arrêt* of September 12, 1779,[14] he regularized the form of election of deputies. If less brutal than the Duc de Praslin, he none the less definitively repudiated the notion that the king was bound in any way to appoint that subject among those recommended by the chamber who had received the most votes. When the deputies of commerce recommended the appointment of Tournachon as deputy for Lyons, they were careful to disavow having been influenced by the fact that he had received a plurality of votes.[15] When in the following year the chamber of Lyons attempted to hold Tournachon to account as it had held Palerne in 1751, Necker denied that it had any right to do so.[16]

The *affaire Marion,* under D'Ormesson and Calonne, elevated the question of representation into an issue. Marion, originally deputy for Saint-Malo, in 1768 had been imposed upon the Six Corps de Marchands de Paris, the old guild organization which had some of the functions and perquisites of a chamber of commerce, as deputy. In 1783, he induced his fellow deputies to support unanimously a request that his

[13] *Ibid.*, page 145.

[14] Quoted by Wallon, *La Chambre de commerce de la province de Normandie (1703-1791)* (Rouen, 1903), p. 69.

[15] Opinion of the deputies, October 22, 1779. Arch. nat., F12 719.

[16] Necker to the chamber of Lyons, February 28, 1781. Arch. nat., F12 38.

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son, a lawyer at the Châtelet, the criminal court of Paris, be given an appointment to assist him with the right of succeeding to his position at his retirement or death. The request of the deputies was favorably acted upon by the bureau and transmitted to D'Ormesson. When he referred it to the Six Corps, that body at once initiated a protest. The sudden replacement of D'Ormesson by Calonne seems to have occasioned a suspension of Marion's efforts. When he resumed his solicitations in August 1784, the Six Corps resumed their protest, going directly to Calonne and, apparently with his approval, appealing to the chambers of commerce for their support. Most of the chambers addressed memoirs to the controller-general demanding the maintenance of the prescribed form of election. The chambers of La Rochelle and Rouen addressed their deputies directly and demanded that they undo what they had done to support Marion's cause. Deschamps, the deputy of Rouen, turned the letter from his chamber over to the bureau.

The syndics of the chamber had used the words, "*confrères constituants*", to express their relation to Deschamps. The bureau seized upon them and directed Tolozan, the intendant who had Normandy in his department, to write to the chamber in terms obviously inspired by the letter of the Duc de Praslin to the chamber of Marseilles in 1768. The deputies were called in and assured that the bureau intended to take steps to bring about the immediate termination of the Marion affair to their satisfaction and to protect them against any unpleasantness from the chambers on the pretended ground that it was the chambers that had constituted them deputies.

Calonne supported the Six Corps. He had already shown a disposition to devolve authority upon the chambers. La Rochelle had been authorized to elect its members on the basis of merit and to elect its director without ministerial control.[17] The local members of the association for trading with China had been given a free hand in dealing with their

[17] Ordinance of May 24, 1784. Arch. nat., F12 9.

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directors.[18] On September 2, 1784, in a conversation with the representatives of the Six Corps, he agreed that it was not proper that such a place should be held by a lawyer from the Châtelet. The Six Corps supposed that their victory had been won. It was to be demonstrated that a minister, at any rate Calonne, could be defeated by the bureaucracy. To Marville, the president of the bureau, was joined the intendant of commerce Montaran, who secured the assistance of Lenoir, the famous lieutenant general of police, and among them, the three forced Calonne to accept the nomination of Marion *fils*. He attempted to satisfy the Six Corps by reviving the practice, suspended since 1720, of having a second deputy from Paris. He authorized a nomination which the Six Corps proceeded to make.

Marville and the intendants of the bureau took up the challenge and refused to permit their victory to be compromised. The minutes of the Six Corps refer discreetly to the "*malentendu*" between Marville and Calonne. In spite of the undoubted basis in law for the selection of a second deputy, within a few months the bureau emerged victorious. An *arrêt* of April 27, 1785, provided that the deputy from Paris should regularly be appointed from a list of three nominated by the deputies of the other towns. The Six Corps were to have the poor consolation of electing an agent who was under the orders of the lieutenant general of police and who might on occasion be called with the regular deputies to sessions of the bureau. An *arrêt* of June 16, 1785, gave Marion *fils* his appointment as assistant to his father and the survivorship of the office.

The Six Corps protested with great vigor and declared an intention not to participate nor to consent to the decree. After maintaining this attitude, without noticeable result, for nearly a year, they at last reconsidered and in March 1786 sought a reconciliation with Lenoir, who required a complete surrender of their pretensions and conceded the Corps only a vague promise of equality for the agent of Paris with the other deputies some time in the future. The members con-

[18] For this association, see my article on "The Formation of the New India Company" in the *American Historical Review*, April 1933.

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soled themselves that at least they had secured a place in perpetuity for one of their members.[19]

II

The nationalization of the deputies by Trudaine in 1756 caused the chambers considerable dissatisfaction. "We have thought as you do, messieurs," wrote the chamber of Bordeaux to the chamber of Saint-Malo on March 10, 1765, "that the small satisfaction which the chambers of commerce have been getting from their representations through their deputies leaves commerce today no other resource but to transmit its complaints to the king and his ministers directly through the Parlements." The relation of the chambers to the sovereign courts during the succeeding period was of considerable significance, but it was only in part the parlements that served the purpose of the chambers in getting their views before the government. The chambers developed instead the practice of coördinating their written protests and demands by correspondence among themselves and the practice of sending deputies extraordinary to Paris to negotiate with the ministers.

The coördination of opinion and action among the chambers by correspondence began to grow significantly at the end of the Seven Years' War. In 1761, Bordeaux took the lead in securing the coöperation of the other chambers in a protest against the proposed admission of slaves from the trade of other countries into the colonies. "The evil is great", ran the circular letter of the chamber; "we can not cry out too soon nor cry out too much at the same time."[20] When the first free ports were established in the colonies (1767), "these towns raised a general outcry against that decision" and even went to the unprecedented length of publishing their memoirs

[19] The sources for the Marion affair: minutes of the Six Corps, Arch. nat., KK 1343; minutes of the bureau of commerce, *ibid.*, F12 106; Wallon, *La Chambre de commerce de la province de Normandie* (1903); Garnault, *Le Commerce rochéllais au XVIIIe siècle, première partie* (1888).

[20] August 22, 1761. Archives, Bordeaux, C 4264. See also L.-P. May, "Le Mercier de la Rivière, intendant des Iles du Vent, 1759-1764", *Revue de l'Histoire Économique et Sociale*, XX (1932): 44-70.

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against the new policy.[21] When the chambers made a united protest against the *arrêt* of August 30, 1784, Dubuq wrote:

> In France, it would seem that this prohibitive régime belongs as patrimony to our merchants, who, the letters patent of 1727 in hand, protest any measure of the government that touches this private interest and quickly confederate from one end of the realm to the other to denounce in scandalous fashion the most just and the most useful arrangements of the king's ministers in the subject of most importance to the prosperity of the kingdom.[22]

Dubuq in his way was more representative of the absolutist ideal than even the Duc de Praslin. From his point of view, the defense of private interests had no place in proper political activity.

It is not difficult to agree with Dubuq and even to extend his indictment beyond the subject of colonial trade to which he referred. The protests of the chambers defeated the government's attempt to establish a control of marine insurance that would prevent the inhumane risk of sailors' lives (1779). Similarly attempts to establish a governmentally controlled freighting system for goods in transit, to establish a governmental postal system, to establish a line of packet boats for regular mail and passenger service to the colonies and to the United States, and several other proposals which from a present-day point of view had much merit were furiously opposed. The alignment was almost consistently uniform: the government attempted some rationalizing readjustment, the confederated merchants opposed any change.

The coöperation of the chambers was not always spontaneously inspired by a sense of their common wrongs. The correspondence of the *juges-consuls* of Nantes reveals that at least in some cases, coöperation was rendered from motives less direct in character. Thus Amiens joined in the extraordinary protest against the *arrêt* of August 30, 1784, although

[21] "Mémoire au sujet des questions qui ont été élevées concernant les lois prohibitives du commerce étranger dans nos colonies." Undated and unsigned, but about 1775 and certainly by Dubuq. Arch. des colonies, F2B 9.

[22] Archives des colonies, F2B 8.

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it admitted that the *arrêt* was justified and although its interest in the question was so slight that it could only use the memoir of Nantes as a model of its own protest. The business men of Chollet were more naïvely explicit. They accepted the invitation of Nantes to join in the protest against the *arrêt* but added to their acceptance a request that Nantes on its part support their demand for a further revision of the industrial regulations. The Six Corps of Paris, anxious for the support of the chambers in the Marion affair, also composed a protest.[23]

The most remarkable manifestation of this practice of coördinated protest, as has already been indicated, was on the occasion of the colonial *arrêt* of August 30, 1784. In principle, the *arrêt* was not remarkable. It was merely an extension and an adjustment of the *arrêt* of June 29, 1767, admitting somewhat more freely the trade of foreigners into the colonies. What had changed was the organization of public opinion among the business men of the ports. Under the leadership of Bordeaux, not only the interested chambers—La Rochelle, Nantes, Le Havre, Rouen—and not only groups that hoped for reciprocal assistance in other matters, but even the sovereign courts of Guienne, of Brittany and of Normandy were enlisted in a protest that shook the government: "The ministers tremble for their places", wrote Jefferson.[24] The protests were printed. The question became sufficiently interesting to the public to warrant the publication of a collection, a *Récueil des différentes pièces pour et contre l'admission des étrangers dans les Isles françaises de l'Amérique (1785)*. The Marshal de Castries, the minister of marine, and his lieutenants were obliged to resort to the press to defend this law which was justified by the real and pressing necessities of the colonies. The opinion of the regular deputies of commerce, although it supported the *arrêt* only with certain important reservations, was published under the government's

[23] Chamber of Amiens to the juges-consuls of Nantes, December 14, 1784; negociants of Chollet to same, December 10, 1784, archives, Nantes, C 624 (1). Minutes of the Six Corps, March 21, 1785, Arch. nat., KK 1343.

[24] Jefferson to Monroe, February 1785. *Writings* (Ford ed.), IV, 31.

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imprint. In spite of the changes which the deputies advocated, wrote the intendant La Porte to the minister,

> their opinion can not but be of great weight with the public to destroy the impression which may have been created by the various writings which have appeared on the subject of the *arrêt*. It should be especially an unanswerable retort to the letters of the parlements of Bordeaux and Rouen. . . . It is important to persuade the public that the king. . . . has the true interests of commerce as much in view as the interests of the colonies and I believe, Monseigneur, that the publication of the opinion of the deputies should effect that result.[25]

The *Pour et Contre sur un objet de grande discorde et d'importance majeure* of Dubuq, a radical attack on the restrictionist position which went far beyond the intentions of the government, was nevertheless printed by order of the minister.[26] The Marshal de Castries submitted to the king a formal justification of his action in promoting the *arrêt*.[27]

The *arrêt* of August 30 was not revoked, but it was found desirable to do something to conciliate the commercial interests. The result was the *arrêt* of September 18, 1785, which increased the bounties on French cod introduced into the islands. It was secured by the active solicitation of deputies extraordinary from Saint-Malo, Granville and three or four other Breton and Norman ports.

III

The practice of sending deputies extraordinary had also, it appears, originated with Bordeaux. In 1756, when Machault had undertaken to provide for the colonies by admitting neutrals, that chamber "had distinguished itself" by sending two deputies to protest.[28] The action was a not unnatural

[25] May 9, 1785. Archives des colonies, F2B 8.

[26] Minister of marine to Lenoir, lieutenant general of police, December 9, 1784. Arch. des colonies, F2B 9.

[27] Commerce étranger dans les colonies. Arrêt du Conseil du 30 Août 1784. *Ibid.*

[28] Dubuq, *Réponse au contradicteur* (1785), page 19; archives, Bordeaux, C 4318.

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consequence of Trudaine's reform, by which the deputies attached to the bureau of commerce became national functionaries rather than attorneys of the chambers which had nominated them.

The deputies extraordinary were usually individuals chosen by the several chambers among their own membership without any interference or control by any agency of the government. An important exception is to be made in the case of Marseilles. The peculiar confidence and appreciation with which that chamber regarded Rostagny, who was its ordinary deputy from 1772, led them to make him on occasion also their deputy extraordinary. On one occasion, indeed, the chamber of Marseilles, after having elected an additional deputy extraordinary to reinforce his efforts, followed his advice not to send him at that particular time. Some of the chambers sent the same men as deputies extraordinary as often as occasion arose. Thus Nairac appears many times as deputy extraordinary for La Rochelle, Begouen for Le Havre, Mosneron for Nantes. Other chambers seem to have chosen their deputies rather from motives of convenience: Bordeaux usually chose some one whose business called him to Paris. Burgalat of Toulouse undertook the mission to Paris in 1787 "to satisfy his curiosity." When the month that he had expected to spend stretched into a year, he demanded reimbursement, which the chamber refused.

The functions of the deputies ordinary and extraordinary were quite clearly distinguished. The deputies ordinary had only the right to be consulted as a group by the bureau of commerce. In 1779, they formally refused even to correspond with the chamber of Lyons, at the time without a deputy, in regard to the revision of the commercial code of 1673. The deputies extraordinary addressed themselves directly to one or another of the ministers, particularly to the controller general or to the minister of marine. They were generally commissioned for one particular purpose. Thus in 1777 Rostagny as deputy extraordinary for Marseilles by industrious lobbying secured the abolition of the brokers' corporation at Marseilles over the opposition of the corporation and of the parlement of

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Provence.[29] Thus when the minister of marine in 1781 proposed to take vessels at Bordeaux by condemnation rather than pay the exorbitant rates demanded by the Bordeaux shipowners, the chamber at their solicitation sent two deputies extraordinary who, in spite of a hostile reception, managed to negotiate a scale of rates satisfactory to the shipowners and to the minister.[30]

In 1775, the deputies extraordinary received a sort of regularization by the act of Sartine, the minister of marine. He invited each of seven of the more important maritime towns trading with the colonies to send deputies extraordinary to debate with the deputies of San Domingo, Martinique and Guadeloupe in his presence the whole question of the trade with the colonies. Twenty-two conferences were held between December 18, 1775 and January 9, 1776. Some of the deputies were still in Paris as late as June 1776.[31] Although the net result of their labors was essentially negative, their presence was a recognition of the insufficiency of the deputies ordinary as representatives of the business interests.

When the *arrêt* of August 30, 1784, became known in November, the *juges-consuls* of Nantes wished to induce the chambers to join with them in sending deputies extraordinary to protest. The leadership of Nantes, however, was coolly regarded by the chamber of Bordeaux. "Messieurs de Nantes" had boasted too much of being "the first to show themselves in the great matter of foreign trade in the colonies" and had manifested "too great a desire to direct with authority the maneuvers of the chambers." This jealousy led the Bordeaux chamber to decline the invitation. La Rochelle replied that it would follow the example of Bordeaux: "*Si Bordeaux députe, La Rochelle le fera aussi.*" Only Le Havre agreed to elect deputies. When the deputies of Nantes arrived in Paris, they found themselves alone. They were able to secure an audience with the minister, but failed, as Nantes and its deputies so often did, in tact. When they

[29] Arch. nat., F12 969.

[30] Archives, Bordeaux, C 4258, C 4265.

[31] *Ibid.*, C 4257.

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suggested that under the circumstances the French merchants would abandon the colonial trade, Castries replied, "What, you mean to force the hand of the king? I shall easily find means to supply the colonies." The deputies came regretfully to the conclusion that the *arrêt* would not be revoked.[32]

The most dramatic and most nearly effective and, certainly, the most coördinated protest of the chambers by means of deputies extraordinary was evoked by the establishment of the New India company by the *arrêt* of April 1785. While Calonne remained in power, the hostile action of the chambers was restricted to technical obstruction. The chamber of Bordeaux announced to its deputy ordinary that it intended to protest the formation of the company if other chambers would join with it, but that it did not intend to risk being compromised by protesting alone. To secure support it circularized the other chambers during June 1785, apparently without result. A group of the Bordeaux merchants, apparently dissatisfied with the conservative attitude of the chamber, organized a separate association to lead a more emphatic protest. They formulated a petition and announced the formation of their association to the other chambers. Some violent talk against Calonne appears in the inter-cameral correspondence and many memoirs were written but nothing was done as long as Calonne remained.[33]

His fall was the signal for action. "With Calonne gone", wrote the chamber of Bordeaux, "the company has lost its best and perhaps its only support." The chamber at once (April 14, 1787) elected a deputy extraordinary and circularized the other towns to invite them to do likewise.[34] Nantes and Lorient promptly agreed. La Rochelle agreed in principle but advised delay until ministerial stability was reestablished. The Six Corps, friendly to Calonne and perhaps somewhat chilled by their comparative abandonment by the

[32] Du Collet and Mosneron to the juges-consuls, December 27, 1784, archives, Nantes, C 624 (1).

[33] La Tuiliere, Gransé and J.-L. Baux to the juges-consuls of Nantes, May 11, 1786, archives, Nantes C 749; the petition of the association, same date, archives, Bordeaux, C 4354.

[34] Archives, Bordeaux, C 4258, C 4266.

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other chambers in the Marion affair, answered the invitation of Nantes with much reserve. Saint-Malo and Lille opposed the revocation of the monopoly. Nevertheless eleven of the commercial towns united in sending deputies extraordinary. The memoir against the company presented by "*les députés des principales villes de commerce du Royaume*" early in the summer of 1787 was signed by the deputies extraordinary of Marseilles, Rouen, Lyons, Montpellier, Dunkirk, Bordeaux, Toulouse, La Rochelle, Nantes, Lorient and Le Havre. They had effected sufficient organization to secure the services of the famous abbé Morellet who had made a reputation attacking the old company before its dissolution in 1769.

It was the high point of the combined action of the chambers and for a while it seemed that they would succeed. Loménie de Brienne and Breteuil promised everything. On December 29, 1787, a commission was appointed to investigate the company and to read the memoirs of the chambers. In June, it was even expected that the company would voluntarily surrender its privilege. The hopes of the merchants were not to be realized. After a year of promising everything and doing nothing, Loménie de Brienne passed out of the political picture. Necker, hostile as he was to Calonne, was too close to big business and to the English financiers interested in the India company to give the deputies any encouragement. He preferred to leave the question to the Estates General.

Thus from the days of Trudaine and of Turgot down to the very eve of the meeting of the Estates General, the record of the relations of the French merchants with the monarchy presents a constantly developing opposition with a constantly intensifying organization. It was something more than the mere expression of occasional grievances. It was the expression of a deeply felt distrust of the processes of government. Several utterances leave no doubt that the more thoughtful business men were conscious of a general evolution of the commercial policy of the government toward an undesired liberalism. In 1776, Begouen, then in Paris for the conference of deputies extraordinary called by Sartine, wrote to his constituents at Le Havre, "Some ideas destructive of

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commerce and of the colonies are prevalent here even in the government." [35] In 1787, when the chamber of Marseilles proposed to send Isnard to coöperate with Rostagny, nominally in compiling a history of the Levant trade, but actually in defense of the special position of Marseilles in the Levant trade, Rostagny advised them to let sleeping dogs lie.

> We are at a point where the system of absolute liberty for commerce has the greatest power. It would be dangerous to raise any question of a special nature since it would not fail to bring about a general discussion which without doubt would result in a decision that might prove to be irrevocable. The time has passed for seeking prohibitions.[36]

In 1789, Begouen, compiling the *cahier* of the business men of Le Havre, indicated "three characteristic acts of the administration . . . as notoriously the principal causes of the decline of manufactures, of the desertion of the shops, of the numerous bankruptcies, of the discouragement and misery of the people condemned to idleness, to rags and to the horrors of starvation", that is, the *arrêt* of August 30, 1784, facilitating the trade of foreigners in the colonies, the reëstablishment of monopoly in the India trade, and the treaty of commerce with England.[37] The chamber of commerce of Bordeaux, using almost the same specific terms, even more explicitly stated the grievance of the mercantile class against the government:

> The chambers of commerce have long been making vain attempts to enlighten the administration. Their opinions have been disregarded and their complaints have remained without effect. . . . For several years, all the mercantile population [*tout le peuple commerçant*] have been groaning under the weight of a destructive régime. Onerous treaties, privileges, *arrêts* which opened the ports of our colonies to the foreigner, leave to the

[35] April 6, 1776. Quoted by Barrey, *op. cit.*

[36] "Le temps de combinaisons prohibitives s'évanouit." Rostagny to the chamber of Marseilles, May 3, 1787, archives, Marseilles, BB 125. Quoted by Fournier, *op. cit.*

[37] E. Pollio, "Le Commerce maritime pendant la Révolution", Part I, *La Révolution française*, vol. 84 (1931), p. 311.

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French nation only the frightful perspective of a despairing inaction.[38]

IV

In spite of a failure to appreciate the place and function of the deputies extraordinary of commerce in the period before 1789, M. J. Letaconnoux [39] has so well formulated the story of their activities in their last and greatest phase that it would be redundant to do more than summarize his paper as the conclusion of this article.

The prospect of the revival of the Estates General transformed and accentuated the problem of the representation of the commercial interests at the center of government. Even while it was still a prospect, the *juges-consuls* of Nantes initiated a movement to secure for the merchants a larger place in the Third Estate than that which they had enjoyed under the more purely agricultural conditions of 1614. In a circular letter dated July 23, 1788, they pointed out to the various chambers that while the representation chosen from among "the *echevins, jurats, capitouls,* or other members of the municipality" was at one time sufficient, it was no longer so in view of the transformation of the situation. The discovery of the two Indies, they argued, had completely changed the face of the earth: "*Il n'y avait alors* [before 1614] *ni colonies ni commerce extérieur.*" On these and other grounds the *juges-consuls* advocated united action by all the commercial towns to ask for specific representation of commerce. In September, they sent out another circular proposing more definitely that each town ask for two deputies with voting power in the assembly.

The response was general, indeed almost unanimous. Ten of the chambers followed the lead of Nantes and no less than thirty-nine of the consular jurisdictions were enlisted in support of the proposal by the consuls of Paris. All of these

[38] Garnault, *Le Commerce rochéllais au XVIII^e siècle* (1888), vol. I, pp. 327-330.

[39] "Les Deputés extraordinaires des manufactures et du commerce de la France et l'oeuvre économique de l'Assemblée Constituante (1789-1791)", *Annales révolutionnaires*, vol. VI (1913), pp. 150-208.

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bodies sent petitions to the king and council during the month of October 1788. The council at first firmly declined "to isolate the interest of commerce from the general interest", but in the course of the winter various special arrangements were made providing for more or less specific representation of some of the ports among the deputies to the Estates General.

The outcome of the elections justified the fears of the chambers. In many cases, important commercial towns were represented only by *robins* (lawyers) elected by the votes of the peasants. Even at Havre, Begouen was only elected last of the list as a special concession on the part of the peasant majority.

During the spring of 1789, several plans were brought forward to organize an effective representation of the commercial interests, only to be dropped for lack of agreement among the towns. The emergence of colonial questions in the summer led to decisive action. The news of the unrestricted opening of the ports of the colonies by Du Chilleau, the new governor of San Domingo, and the admission to the bar of the Assembly of the deputies of the American colonies alarmed the chambers of commerce of the ports to such a degree that almost all of them united in sending deputies extraordinary to Versailles. They promptly effected an organization, calling themselves, with some variations, *le comité de députés extraordinaires des manufactures et du commerce de la France*. In reality, it was not manufactures at all and not commerce in general that they represented, but only the maritime and colonial commerce of the great ports.

They found among the deputies in the National Assembly a very hostile and unfriendly atmosphere. Mosneron, the deputy extraordinary of Nantes, wrote to the *juges-consuls* that the members of the Assembly were "indifferent and ignorant" in matters of commerce. The first maneuver of the deputies extraordinary was an attempt to secure admission to the bar of the Assembly (August 31, 1789). It was simply ignored. Within a few weeks, however, the newly formed Committee of Agriculture and Commerce began inviting the deputies extraordinary to communicate to it their views and

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thus gave them a quasi-legal existence as a group. Immediately after the removal of the Assembly to Paris (October 8, 1789), they were formally admitted to the bar of the Assembly and given official communication of all measures affecting commerce, as well as the right to have two members present at each meeting of the Committee of Agriculture and Commerce.

The record of their influence during the remainder of the National Assembly, as summarized by M. Letaconnoux, shows a considerable activity and a considerable degree of success. Their most conspicuous success was the revocation of the monopoly of the India Company (April 3, 1790). The deputies extraordinary of Bordeaux won over the rather hesitant Assembly by reading to it the pledge signed by five hundred merchants of the Southwest to support its financial measures. An equally significant index of the influence of the deputies extraordinary was their success in checking and limiting the powerful *Société des Amis des Noirs*. Less spectacular but equally substantial achievements were registered in the tariff measures and the customs organization.

The method by which most of the successes of the deputies extraordinary were won was simply lobbying of a very energetic and enterprising sort. In some cases, the deputies of their towns in the Assembly utilized their assistance, even to the extent of submitting to them reports about to be presented to the Assembly. Thus Sinety submitted to Rostagny his reports on the franchise of Marseilles and on the *retours de l'Inde*. In other cases, the deputies harassed reporters, presidents, committees, until resistance or patience was exhausted. In the Assembly, they depended upon the leadership of the Vicomte de Noailles, Barnave, Roederer and Le Chapelier. In general, the Constituent Assembly, at first regarded as hostile and dangerous to the established commercial interests, was held to a program that as a whole was not in any sense destructive and was, indeed, generally advantageous to the existing commercial interests.

Some attempt was made to secure the constitutional establishment of this great lobby. In July 1790, the *juges-consuls* of Nantes initiated a proposal that the deputies extraordinary

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"should request the National Assembly to provide for the full execution of the *arrêt* of 1700, to the end that the deputies ordinary which they the chambers have at Paris should be changed every two years."[40] In effect, this would have reversed the work of Trudaine and reduced the deputies ordinary to dependence on the Chambers, thus obviating the necessity of using deputies extraordinary. In spite of the cordial support of the proposal by the chambers of Bordeaux and La Rochelle, it was not presented to the Assembly.

As a matter of fact, the whole administration of commerce, including the chambers and the deputies ordinary and extraordinary, was abolished by a measure of September 27, 1791. The intention seems to have been that the system should be reëstablished by the Legislature in more generalized form with representation for lesser towns as well as for the great ports. It was not, however, until 1802, that the modern system of chambers of commerce was established, to play, perhaps, in the nineteenth century an even greater part than their congeners of the eighteenth had played in their day.

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[40] Quoted by Garnault, *Le Commerce rochéllais au XVIII^e siècle* (1888), vol. I, p. 187.

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THE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE OF FASCISM

DESPITE the fact that the Fascist movement is taking an increasing hold in Europe, and that tendencies of a similar nature are discernible in the United States, a thorough scientific analysis of the phenomenon is still wanting. To be sure, single characteristics have been studied, but in most cases there has been a tendency to regard a part as the whole, while on the contrary it is only a combination of a series of apparently antagonistic factors that results in Fascism.

The fundamental prerequisite for the development of Fascist tendencies is a feeling of impotency on the part of nations or of social classes. Fascist methods are the means of rebellion against an existing state of affairs; or, looking at it from another angle, they are the expression of an inferiority complex. Thus, the inferiority imposed upon Germany by the treaty of Versailles laid the first and perhaps most important basis for the nationalist spirit which brought Hitler to power. Likewise, disappointment with the Versailles peace conference and the belief that Italy had been treated unfairly by her allies was the grievance seized upon by Mussolini when attempting to rally the first Fascist elements around him. While in the case of Germany the inferiority of the country was sanctioned by international treaties embodying such clauses as the war-guilt accusation, unilateral disarmament and the obligation to pay reparations, and while this was sufficient cause for fearing annihilation unless a reaction took place, the explanations of Italy's inferiority complex lie deeper. Realizing that she is practically without natural resources and can only offer her labor force in the world market, or, as the Italians themselves have expressed it, that they are the proletarians in the materialist and capitalist world, the assertion of the will to live and to live gloriously led Italy, at least theoretically, to deny the materialist conception of history and with it the alleged superiority of Nordic races. Endowed with the vitality of a prolific people, remembering Italy's

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contributions in art and science to world civilization, and drawing faith from the glory of ancient Rome, the Fascists worked out a program designed to bend all energies to an increase in national production which in turn was to assure Italy the rank of a first-rate power in the international order. By this program they subscribed to the materialist world conception which they denied. It is one of the paradoxes of historic development, and indeed an inconsistency of Italian Fascism, that a movement designed to combat the proletarian inferiority of a nation at the same time denies the right of revolt to the proletarian workers.

Nationalist tendencies in Germany were undoubtedly strengthened by the general belief of the German people in the hypocrisy of postwar international policies. A peaceful revision of the situation seemed impossible; hence militarist tendencies were strengthened, nourished mainly by those young men of the country whose urge to action had not been tempered by the experiences of the World War. Italy on her part also recognized the value of a strong army for a rising power and, unhindered in her armament policy by international limitations, devoted the greatest part of her budget to military purposes. It is obvious that in neither case can the military spirit be regarded as defensive in character.

This attitude of national aggressiveness is apparently in marked contrast to another Fascist tendency—the demand for national isolation, or *Autarkie*. Like the aggressive policies, however, this movement springs from an attitude of international distrust — from the conviction that every country must look out for itself, and that an adjustment is impossible through international commercial competition. In point of fact the populations of both Italy and Germany seem too dense for support on a decent living standard in these limited territories; hence the demand for colonial expansion, an imperialism which enters strangely into the philosophy of *Autarkie* and which, because it bears the seeds of international conflict, defeats the idea of national isolation. Conscious or unconscious recognition of this situation encourages the demand for military strength.

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The second most important factor in bringing Hitler to power in Germany is to be found in the revolt of the middle classes. It was this group which gave Hitler the strongest numerical support. Here, too, the spirit of rebellion had its roots in a feeling of impotency. War and inflation had financially ruined the middle class almost to the point of annihilation. Fear that their present economic status, painfully inferior to their cultural level, might be a stage in an inevitable downward trend toward proletarization, impelled middle-class men and women to lend their support to any party which promised a change. Unwilling to face the situation and draw the logical conclusions for their future policy, hoping against hope, they placed their faith in the leadership of one individual.

Hitler, moreover, gave them an outlet for their pent-up feelings by making the Jews the scapegoats for all evils. German anti-Semitic opinion was convinced that the Jews had succeeded in maintaining their economic position while the members of the middle class had lost their fortunes. Moreover, the Jews had entered the professional field in increasing numbers in postwar Germany, thus intensifying the struggle for existence. The small shopkeekers had resented the successful intrusion of Jewish competitors. Suppression or elimination of the Jews promised the tangible result of providing the followers of Hitler with opportunities for employment and advancement.

In order that the feeling of national inferiority and of class doom may result in Fascism, one further factor is necessary. Everywhere Fascism has been preceded by a period of economic deadlock. Mussolini rose to power in Italy when the industrialists and landlords found themselves incapable of subduing the agitation of the masses. The government upon which they called was not only unfriendly to them, but was itself impotent. Parliament was in a continuous deadlock. It became evident that while liberal and democratic methods may be sufficient for the ordinary routine of government, they did not suffice in times of stress. Fearing the spread of Communist sentiments, the capitalists and the middle classes united

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their efforts for the preservation of the present order of society, which to the one group assured their rights as property-owners and which apparently appealed to the other group because it protected them from the dangers of the unknown.

Here an analogy with the United States comes to mind, although the picture presents itself in less striking colors. Business, industrial and financial leadership had apparently broken down during the depression, and the Hoover government refused to face the facts. But in spite of it all, actual distress in this country was not as general and as prolonged as in European countries, and hope for a revival was rendered more reasonable by the natural wealth of the United States. The firm belief in a revival of prosperity rendered the probability of a Communist upheaval sufficiently remote to allow the groups in power to dispense with the organization of a national guard such as the European Fascists had created. Yet the stress is sufficiently great, or in other words, the margin of surplus energies is sufficiently reduced, to give rise to demands for the political and economic isolation of the United States so that she may first set her own house in order independently of the countries across the seas, and to pleas for an increase in land and naval armaments—both without doubt Fascist tendencies.

Inasmuch as the impulse to Fascism is in effect an impulse to strong-arm methods, and due to the fact that Fascism embodies a spirit of revolt, all Fascist movements and governments are characterized by violence. Mussolini, as a disciple of Sorel even in his Socialist days, held violence "sacred." Once in power, the Fascists legalized their violence by employing it in the name of the state. The same argument is advanced for Hitler's treatment of the Jews and other opposition elements. While this step of the leaders from illegal violence to state police methods is natural, it sometimes proves difficult to counteract the tendency to violent action among the followers. In particular the Right opposition are quite willing to permit the use of violence for the destruction of Left-wing organizations, but resent the same spirit when it threatens their own position.

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It would be erroneous to suppose that these conditions are clearly realized by the Fascists themselves. Out of a background of complex and un-analyzed factors arises a revolt almost primitive in its essential emotionalism. All is sentiment, movement. Thought occupies only a secondary place. Indeed, anti-intellectualism is one characteristic of Fascism. The official interpreters of Italian Fascism have definitely advanced the claim that action must precede thought, and in a way the theory of the foremost German social philosopher, Othmar Spann, that all individual energies and capacities are by nature latent and that only group action can release them, is implicitly akin to the same doctrine. It is easy to see how such an attitude would appeal to the younger elements of the party. Nevertheless, the leaders undoubtedly realize the political expediency of an anti-intellectualism which permits the holding together of divergent elements with conflicting interests. Also, clear analysis would reveal some of the contradictions inherent in Fascism. We have pointed out the inconsistency between the *Autarkie* movement, imperialism and militarism. We have referred to the half-conscious revolt of the middle class against proletarization and its unwillingness to act on the basis of a clear appraisal of the situation. At a later point we shall uncover an even more significant inconsistency in Fascist philosophy, the contrast between the desire to preserve the status quo and the endeavor to raise the masses economically and politically. Unequivocal recognition of this conflict must invariably lead to the alienation of the masses from Fascism. Disillusionment would push the workers toward the alternative of international proletarian solidarity, which would entail coöperation between the Fascist governments of various countries and conflict with the desire for national isolation. In view of all these inconsistencies, it is not astonishing that, notwithstanding their strong middle-class support, which includes the intellectuals, the Fascists subscribe to the doctrine of anti-intellectualism.

Neither is it surprising that the Fascist movement, in spite of its inconsistencies, has brought about some positive results, for it must be remembered that the conditions of political and

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economic deadlock against which it revolted were real. Foes and friends may disagree on whether nationalism, *Autarkie* and militarism are to be regarded as positive elements, but hardly any realistic person will dispute the advantage of economic planning over the chaos of the last stages of the individualist era. Italy about seven years ago in the corporate state first elaborated a complete machinery for national economic planning. It rests on the collaboration of all classes in the interest of national production and on the elimination of all methods of class warfare such as strikes and lockouts. Equity is assured by the state, which acts as arbitrator above individuals, categories and classes. In case of opposition, the state has legal means for enforcing its decisions. The socialist ideas which this conception embodies are subject to nationalist considerations; international class affiliations are abandoned.

The present economic and social organization of national society is thereby approved, and the right of individuals to hold property expressedly confirmed, provided the capital is used in the interests of national production. Under the present distribution of wealth the increment in the process of production accruing to the different strata of the people is disproportionate. Therefore, although a general rise in the standard of living might result, and notwithstanding the apparent impartiality of the scheme, it is in its conception more advantageous to the capitalist than to the working class. It not only perpetuates but enhances the present income discrepancies. In that sense Fascism is not only conservative, but reactionary.

It is probable that the NRA program in the United States was conceived independently of the Italian experiment. Nevertheless the similarity of the two is striking and there is a fair chance that development will be analogous. In contrast to European methods, however, the government in the United States still relies upon public opinion for the enforcement of its demands. At present we can observe the formation of an opposition which will undoubtedly fight any governmental intervention. These critics of the Right indeed show a realistic perception of the situation when they charge that

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methods of national economic planning combined with strong governmental authority are a step on the road to state capitalism and possibly socialism.

Planning, devised and introduced to save capitalism from destruction, is in reality a step away from pure capitalism. The seriousness of this development is aggravated for the capitalists by the fact that national economic planning, by focusing attention on the aim and purpose of production and the distribution of profits, must nourish the resentment of the proletarians, thus fostering that same class struggle which it was intended to overcome.

The struggle for control is further intensified by the fact that under Fascism control and the right of arbitration is in the hands of a comparatively small group, the government. The Fascists draw their right of government control from the theory of the superiority of the state. Debates as to whether the state is an ever-living unit superior to individuals and groups, as well as to generations, and as such should pursue a policy of its own, or whether it is merely an instrument to carry out the will of the people, are about as old as political theory itself. The principle, as is well known, was given a modern version by the German philosopher, Hegel, who influenced Karl Marx and Lenin, as well as Mussolini and Hitler. In any case, this conception is no monopoly of Fascism. Nevertheless, it is among the most important characteristics of Fascism. From it flow the principles of authority, hierarchy, discipline and control.

The superiority of the state is the crucial point in an appraisal of Fascism. According to the Fascist conception, the state finds its tangible expression in the government. In practice, then, the state is not an abstraction. In order to assure the impartiality of the ruling body, which is entrusted with the task of arbitration between groups of producers, the Fascists insist that it must consist of the élite of the country. The Fascists have never satisfactorily explained how it is possible to pick such an élite, who should select it, and how it is to come to power. They have evaded these difficulties by declaring their own party to be the élite. For that reason

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they can hardly claim political impartiality for their government, for parties—by definition—are created for the furtherance and defense of certain interests against other interests in the national complex. It is impossible to be disputant and arbiter at the same time. Moreover, the Fascist party is not homogeneous, but has followers in all strata of the population. Since decisions as to social and economic developments rest with the government formed by the party, the struggle for control which, in countries of open economic and political rivalry, is carried on through the ballot box, is transformed into a struggle within the party itself.

It is theoretically conceivable that an individual might so far rid himself of the ties of habitual thinking and group allegiance as to attain absolute impartiality. Nevertheless, even the existence of such a person at the head of the government could not long guarantee the impartiality of the state. Under pressure from contending parties he would either have to lean toward one group or the other, or he would be forced to resign.

The capitalist group, as the strongest element in our present society, legally and actually exercises the strongest influence on the government. The pro-capitalist measures which are an outcome of this situation are at the same time a rebuff for the workers. The hope envisaged in Fascist philosophy that under the benevolent guidance of the state the masses may raise their real and comparative level of existence, would be realizable only by a self-negation of the capitalist class, an idealism of which few individual capitalists have given proof, and which can hardly be expected of the group as a whole.

Neither will it prove possible indefinitely to check that process of education and social consciousness which has raised the masses from slavery to their present position. Since, however, a peaceful evolutionary course is forestalled by the fact that the state is entitled and supposed to use suppression against all attempts to alter the present order of society, a change can be brought about only by violent means. Herein the opposition acts entirely under the rules of Fascism. As the weaker group in the social complex, the workers, in spite of

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the spirit of nationalism, fostered by the Fascist state, will look toward the workers in other countries for support. A strengthening of the international workers' movement on the other hand must bring the ruling classes of various Fascist states near to each other, although national rivalries will probably prevent complete solidarity. In the long run, therefore, the question is whether the united proletarians of the world will be stronger or weaker than a "Holy Alliance" of capitalist interests. Fascism is an act in this historic drama.

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SILVER DIPLOMACY

WHEN the United States Senate on April 17, 1933 was discussing Senator Wheeler's proposal for the remonetization of silver at 16 to 1, Senator Borah of the silver state of Idaho declined to vote for it. He gave as his reason that "the only safe way to stabilize international exchange is through international agreement", and he thought it was "the same way with the silver question". On neither of them did he believe that there could be permanent relief otherwise. Economic warfare through repeated rivalries of depreciated currencies, he reminded the Senate, led God only knew where.

In taking this position Senator Borah not only showed his ability to think beyond the boundaries of Idaho, but also demonstrated the growth of his understanding of the intricate facts complicating international relationships. Knowing that the president had to carry the silver cause through the World Economic Conference scheduled to meet at London in midsummer, and informed that he did not want the Wheeler amendment adopted, Borah decided that the action most conducive to Roosevelt's success was to defeat the amendment. This he helped to do, and in so doing helped Roosevelt.[1]

It may be doubted whether either President Roosevelt or Senator Borah had the opportunity to study in detail precisely what silver senators and representatives had done in earlier depressions to defeat attempts of presidents to secure international agreements on silver. There is a general impression, which Will Rogers has recently reëmphasized, that the United States always wins its wars and loses its conferences. It is easy to point to proof of lost conferences and to couple that conviction with the badly worn tradition of isolationism, but

[1] *Congressional Record*, hereafter cited as *C. R.*, 73C-1S, pp. 1804-1829, daily edition. The data in the field of Silver Diplomacy are legion; therefore, for the purposes of this brief survey, only a few of the primary sources can be indicated, and of these only the most important.

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it is more difficult to find out just why the United States has been defeated in international monetary conferences. It is surprising how often silver senators and representatives from Colorado, Idaho, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Utah, and like-minded areas have made that defeat inevitable.[2]

The fact is that during the depression cycle following the Civil War and Reconstruction every president from Rutherford Birchard Hayes to William McKinley had his silver efforts defeated by the action of members of the Senate or House or both. Our silver diplomacy took the form of a series of commissions, confidential agents and conferences; and each of the "three C's", as they might be termed, had an intimate, and unfortunate, connection with one or more congressmen. Of course the members in each case were responding to local demands from various constituencies, not all of them western by any means; and of course it was impossible that in responding to those demands they could have intimate knowledge of the full consequences of their action. Else they might not have acted the way they did.

Their main difficulty has been their inability to comprehend that bimetallism might be difficult to maintain, except through agreement with other nations. There was more excuse for this error back in the nineteenth century. Then the United States psychology was that of a debtor nation, predominantly rural. But today Bryanism (and Buy-Americanism) alike ought to be outmoded. They are outmoded to the extent that several senators with inflation constituencies voted on April 17 against free coinage by the United States alone, citing the then pending Economic Conference as a reason.[3]

[2] Pennsylvania is included because Senator Cameron's influence was cast on the silver side at crucial moments. Senator Fletcher of Florida, in the Senate ever since 1909, well demonstrated the popular skepticism by his frank avowal, "Anyway, we never got anywhere in any of those conferences." *C. R.*, Apr. 17, 1933, p. 1822.

[3] Conspicuous Democrats, with inflation constituencies, who voted against the Thomas Amendment, included Bratton of New Mexico, Fletcher of Florida, Gore of Oklahoma, McKellar of Tennessee and Robinson of Arkansas.

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During the latter decades of the nineteenth century when the United States, and much of the rest of the world, were suffering from recurrent depressions and violent changes in monetary values, the remonetization of silver was a perennial issue. In England, France and Germany, as well as the United States, associations of farmers, exporting manufacturers, economists, and the political representatives of them all, were wont to join in bimetallic leagues. But the leagues of Europe differed from those in the United States because their membership generally understood that silver might not be remonetized by one country alone without that country's becoming the dumping ground of other nations.[4]

Inasmuch as the bimetallists of the United States were for the most part men who thought that their country could easily go it alone, the governments of Europe were through twenty years kept on the ragged edge of expectancy. They could say to their bimetallic petitioners, "We must wait to see what the United States is going to do. If they are so foolish as to maintain a silver market unaided, it is unnecessary for us to make readjustments in our own system." But occasionally the depression grew so burdensome in one country and another (especially as affecting India's relations to England and Germany's agricultural problem) that Europe appeared about to expand its currencies to enlarge moderately the functions of silver. Each time their bimetallists hoped anew and turned eagerly to the United States to supply the necessary propulsion. It never came and the favorable moment passed. Of course there were those in each country, as there are today, who believed an international agreement was not essential; but none of them ever were able to persuade their government of the validity of this position.[5]

[4] The American Bimetallic League and its sister organizations were violently national; the British Bimetallic League, the National Bimetallic League of France and the German Union for the International Double Standard all officially admitted the necessity of international coöperation, but that principle was adopted in the United States by no organized groups except a few local "Committees" organized by President Francis A. Walker of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

[5] Bimetallic organization and propaganda took definite form earliest in Eng-

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Positions in 1933 were half reversed. During the early heyday of the bimetallic movement the United States and France did the special pleading for silver, the one chiefly because of the combined political influence of debtors and silver producers, the other because of the amount of silver coins of its own and of the other members of the Latin Union (Italy, Switzerland and Belgium) which it held. In those days it was England, leading creditor and commercial nation of the world, who insisted on keeping her feet firmly planted upon the gold standard; she was not going to let debtor nations pay her in depreciated currency. And the ambitious young Germany saw no place for herself in the sun of industry unless she followed the British example; she had arduously won the gold with which to demonetize silver by whipping the French in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. These were the nations, and their general positions, which presidents of the United States had to face during the Bland-Bryan period of inflation politics. Early in 1933, however, when the former pleaders for bimetallism found themselves with more gold than all other countries combined, one of them—the United States—nevertheless abandoned the gold standard; the other — France — exerted herself unsparingly to retain it and force other nations to do so. Meanwhile, the nation formerly adamant against leaving the gold standard—Great Britain—had left it eighteen months earlier and was firmly declining to set a date for returning to it.

President Hayes twice had his efforts for silver defeated by members of Congress. In 1876 the bimetallic fervor in House and Senate ruined the chances of an international agreement, by providing *first* for the coinage of silver dollars and *second* for a conference with other nations. To make matters worse, Congress stipulated the ratio of 16 to 1, although there were in existence almost no dollars of that kind and no other country was using that ratio; insistence upon it would penalize the members of the Latin Union whose ratio stood at 15.50 to 1,

land, next in Germany and last in France; in all three countries the government periodically recognized the agitation by appointing commissions to investigate the depreciation in the price of silver.

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and it was below the then commercial ratio of 17.50 to 1. Hayes vetoed the measure but it passed over his veto, so that purchases were made compulsory before the invitations to a conference were sent out. The Senate, where silver was not yet so strong as in the House, had prevented the measure from becoming a law for unrestricted silver coinage; but the total of congressional action went so far as to make Europe expect it might soon go farther.[6]

The prospect of continuous monthly purchases by the United States of between $2,000,000 and $4,000,000 worth of silver removed the immediate necessity for Britain to worry over what had been a drain on her gold; and the stipulation of the ratio of 16 to 1 lessened the chances of French coöperation. Germany would not even attend the conference, lest she belittle herself thereby. At Paris, therefore, the United States was in the position of one who asked everything and had nothing to offer in exchange. The Conference of 1878 inevitably failed.[7]

The next year bimetallic prospects brightened, with pressure exerted on the Tories in Britain and the Conservatives in Germany. The United States Congress appropriated $20,000 for the purpose of further negotiations with foreign governments for the international remonetization of silver. The way was to be prepared by a confidential agent this time. Hayes sent Mr. George Walker of New York, an earnest international bimetallist who then was vice president of the Gold and Stock Telephone Company, to confer at the various European capitals. Walker's prospects seemed pleasing because improvements in American business and European purchases of

[6] The momentum of the silver movement which caused the enactment of the Bland-Allison compromise can be best appreciated by reading the debates connected with H. R. 1093, *C. R.*, 45C-2S, and the *Diary and Letters of R. B. Hayes*, edited by C. R. Williams (Columbus, 1924), vol. III, p. 459 *et seq.*

[7] The official report of the proceedings was printed, with voluminous accompanying documents, as *Sen. Ex. Doc. 58*, 45C-3S; important correspondence upon it is found in Dept. of State documents as follows: Instructions, Gt. Brit. v. 25, Fr. v. 19; Despatches, Gt. Brit. v. 134, Fr. v. 83, Ger. v. 23; Notes from Ger. v. 15; Domestic Letters, v. 123. Ernest Seyd to F. A. Walker, London, Aug. 16, 23, 1878, Walker MSS., gives the views of certain economists.

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American foodstuffs had strengthened our international position. He assured the politicians and business men of London and Paris that the United States was on the point of stopping the coinage of silver dollars and would surely do so if Europe did not coöperate for international bimetallism. European statesmen received Walker politely, although skeptical as to congressional eagerness to demonetize silver. It was a member of Congress, however, who completely undermined Walker's position.[8]

Before Walker was fairly started on his mission Congressman William D. Kelley, an ardent protectionist and inflationist of Pennsylvania who was enjoying a European jaunt, reached Berlin and on July 5, 1879, gained access to Bismarck himself. During a delightful walk in the chancellor's garden that Sunday afternoon the two found themselves in cordial agreement on the helpful nature of protective duties, and turned to a discussion of bimetallism. The canny Bismarck asked the exuberant congressman what the United States would do if Europe refused to coöperate for international bimetallism. Kelley promptly assured him that Congress immediately would establish the free coinage of silver throughout the United States.

To make matters worse, Kelley soon sent to the Philadelphia *Times* a long account of the confidences in the garden. Bismarck had admitted that Germany made a great mistake in so hastily selling her silver and said the Reichsbank had been instructed to sell no more for the present. This was good news for bimetallists at home and abroad, where the story was copied everywhere. But the German Liberals, opposed to protection and bimetallism, took alarm; they reënforced the opposition in the ministry, and the total effect of Kelley's premature announcement was to embarrass and antagonize the chancellor. Walker encountered Kelley in Paris, and with the aid of the international bimetallist, Cernuschi, extracted from him a promise. He was to assure the House of Representatives at

[8] Walker's experiences are illumined by Despatches, Gt. Brit. v. 137, Ger. v. 25; Instructions, Gt. Brit. v. 25, Fr. v. 20, Ger. v. 16; Special Missions, v. 3; Special Agents, v. 30; N. Y. *Tribune*, May 9, June 20, 1879.

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the next session that the United States should exhaust efforts for international bimetallism before going further toward free coinage. But the damage was done. When Walker reached Berlin, Bismarck politely declined to see him.[9]

Thereafter, Walker was made consul-general at Paris, where he associated with bimetallist friends. Late in 1880 they told him the reserve of the Bank of France was suffering a change —from two-thirds gold to two-thirds silver—with appropriate improvements in the French attitude toward an international conference. He also learned that bimetallists in the Reichstag were exerting sufficient pressure upon Bismarck to make him appear friendly to silver and willing that Germany should not refuse to participate in another monetary conference although the free trade faction there still opposed bimetallism. Acting upon this confidential information, William M. Evarts spent his last days as secretary of state under Hayes in pushing arrangements for another international conference.[10]

The incoming Garfield administration interpreted the election as giving something of an endorsement to "sound money" and aimed to make hay while the sun shone, for inflation pressure had lightened because times were not so hard as they had been. The new secretary of state, James G. Blaine, continued the negotiations begun by Evarts, who was chosen a delegate to the forthcoming conference.

Yet there was an undertone of haste about these negotiations —currency never can be treated apart from politics; and although France joined, this time, with the United States in

[9] Walker's account of his experience is set forth in his letters to Secretary of State Evarts, contained in State Dept. Special Agents, v. 30, from London Aug. 12, Paris Aug. 22, 28, Berlin Sept. 15, Paris Oct. 2, London Oct. 13, Washington Nov. 10, 1879. The embarrassed Andrew D. White, minister at Berlin, reported events to the State Dept. in letters contained in Despatches, Ger. v. 25, July 8, 12, Aug. 15, 20, Sept. 22, 27, Oct. 6, 15, 28, 1879. Kelley's press contacts are clarified by Phila. *Times*, Aug. 4, Sept. 10, 11, 18, N. Y. *Tribune*, Aug. 9, Nov. 20, 21, 1879.

[10] The State Dept. Consular Letters, v. 21, 22, reflect Walker's eagerness, through his letters to Evarts from Paris, Apr. 28, Nov. 24, Dec. 6, 27, 1880, Jan. 5, 27, 29, Feb. 4, 1881. The State Dept. policy toward Walker's proposals is indicated in Instructions, Ger. v. 16, Fr. v. 20; Despatches, Gt. Brit. v. 139, 140, Fr. v. 87, Ger. v. 26, 27; Notes, to Fr. v. 9.

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issuing the invitations to the conference, to convene at Paris April 29, 1881, they had to agree, in order to persuade Germany and England to appear, that the meeting was solely for discussion and exchange of opinions, not for action. That "exchange" indicated an increased strength for bimetallism in Europe, but foreign nations could not be dissuaded from the conviction that the United States were solely motivated by the political pressure exerted by the large silver-producing interests in this country. England offered to enlarge her use of silver provided France and the United States went the length of establishing free coinage. This they refused to do. At the same time, American delegates were not able to demonstrate that Congress would vote to stop silver coinage, should the Paris meeting fail of accomplishment. Therefore, nothing was achieved and the conference adjourned July 8, supposedly to reconvene April 12, 1882.[11]

Associated with the delegates of the United States at this meeting was a man who had been secretary to the delegation of 1878, S. Dana Horton, an enthusiastic Ohio bimetallist of the international variety. He was thirty-seven years old, spoke several languages, and had a flair for conferring. He later obtained endorsement from Senator Aldrich and other members of the Senate Finance Committee. As confidential agent Blaine retained him abroad through the summer and fall of 1882; and early in the next year Secretary of State Frelinghuysen, under permission of President Arthur, engaged him to build up agenda which should ensure a bimetallic agreement when the adjourned conference reconvened. Unfortunately, all of Horton's enthusiasm could not suffice to make England or Germany believe American support for silver was waning. The secretary of the treasury, in his annual report, advised it to wane, but Congress failed to stop the coinage of silver dollars. When Morrill of Vermont,

[11] The direct intercourse between the State Dept. and the U. S. delegates is chiefly contained in Miscl. Letters, Apr. 1881 and Special Agents, v. 31; information furnished by, and to, the ministers abroad is in Instructions, Gt. Brit. v. 26, Fr. v. 20; Despatches, Gt. Brit. v. 142, Fr. v. 88, Ger. v. 28, with enclosures. The proceedings and exhibits of the conference were printed as *H. Mis. Doc. 396*, part 3, 49C-1S.

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chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, received proposals for concessions from foreign governments, he looked on them with disfavor on the ground that the amount of silver to be coined under them would prove too small.

The peripatetic ambassador could not realize that his efforts, "in three languages", as he described them, were wholly in vain; he was merely obtaining the provisional promise of lesser countries to do certain things for silver if the greater nations led the way, a way they showed small desire to travel. Early in Horton's negotiations, American ministers to Great Britain and Germany repeatedly reported to Washington that those governments could not become interested in an international bimetallic arrangement as long as the behavior of Congress remained uncertain. The chances of an agreement would be greatly increased if the United States stopped coining silver. These attitudes persisted; Bismarck, not unnaturally, failed to find time to see Horton; his government called him home—in fact had to call him three times before he came—and the conference never convened.[12]

Agrarian unrest, and therefore bimetallic agitation, continued throughout the eighties, complicated abroad by the upsetting of England's exchange relations with India, and at home by the persistence of the inflation sentiment, east as well as west of the Mississippi. Reports of parliamentary committees and of special commissions on these subjects had in them much that reads like reports on allied subjects in 1933.

The agitation in the United States became sufficiently violent early in 1885 to haunt the dreams of President-elect Cleveland. He, like Harrison, McKinley and Franklin D. Roose-

[12] Horton was a voluminous, tireless letter-writer and his correspondence with the State Dept. reveals what happens when a peculiar temperament is at work on a special mission; most of it is contained in Special Agents, v. 31 and the leading dates are Horton to Blaine, Bad Ems, Ger., July 31, 1881; Horton to Frelinghuysen, Paris, Dec. 19, 1881, Jan. 7, Feb. 27, 28, London, Mar. 18, Paris, Mar. 31, Apr. 5, 6, 11, 21, 22, 24, May 1, Washington, July 17, 1882; Horton to President Arthur, Pomeroy, Ohio, June 30, 1882; Frelinghuysen to Horton, Feb. 2, 16, 24, Mar. 9, 17, Apr. 24, 1882. In addition, revealing sidelights are given in the Despatches and Instructions of Gt. Brit., Fr. and Ger., and in Domestic Letters, v. 140, 141, 142.

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velt, was asked to speak out on currency legislation pending in the Congress, prior to his own inauguration. He spoke. He urged the House to pass a pending amendment for cessation of silver coinage. The House refused. The day before he was inaugurated the Senate passed an Aldrich resolution (apparently designed to meet his wishes) requesting the renewal of international negotiations; and he was scarcely well in office before he had news from American ministers at Berlin, Paris and London of silver pressure upon Reichstag, Parlement and Parliament.[13]

Holding fast to the belief that national bimetallism would wreck the country, Cleveland, in his first administration, undertook to do everything possible to secure an international agreement, except to try to force his will severely on Congress. He kept the Republican, George Walker, in his berth as consul general at Paris, because the Latin Monetary Union was about to convene to consider the silver problem and Walker had contacts among its delegates which equipped him as an "unofficial observer". He instructed the consul to inform the delegates of American readiness and desire for international bimetallism; and he made it indubitably clear that he, personally, opposed silver coinage. But it was no less clear that the majority of his party in the House favored it.[14]

Early in the summer of 1885 Cleveland sent another international bimetallist, Mr. Manton Marble, ex-editor of the *New York World,* to Europe to ascertain the precise prospects.

[13] An appropriation of $10,000 for further negotiations with foreign governments, looking to an international ratio between gold and silver, secured enactment as part of the Sundry Civil bill, July 7, 1884; but campaign excitements seem to have prevented despatching an agent that summer; and during the fall and winter low wages and prices furnished highly charged political ammunition against proposals of the Arthur administration for suspending silver coinage. Despatches from foreign centers continued to reflect the course of European opinion. The situation as Cleveland encountered it is admirably summarized in Allan Nevins, *Grover Cleveland* (N. Y. 1932), pp. 201-205, 266-279.

[14] Leading facts of the Walker intervention are in the State Dept. Despatches, Fr. v. 96; Instructions, Fr. v. 21; Instructions to Consuls, v. 113; Consular Letters, Paris v. 25, Rome v. 12. Some correspondence was printed in *S. Ex. Doc. 29,* 49C-1S. Through the kindness of the State Dept. the writer obtained from the Paris consulate information on letters from Walker to the Dept. of State of Mar. 6, 12, Apr. 8, June 19, 1885.

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Marble, Walker and the United States ministers abroad gave Cleveland cold comfort. France would not change her ratio; Germany considered bimetallism tainted with French propaganda; Britain adhered to the gold standard; and throughout Europe nothing would do as much for bimetallism as the end of silver coinage in the United States. But Congress, again, would not end silver coinage. Europe, during the winter of 1885-1886, observed trends quite to the contrary. It was only through an alliance of conservative Republicans and Democrats in the House, and conservative influences in the Senate, that legislation was killed which would inevitably have put the United States on a silver basis.[15]

While this monetary deadlock persisted west of the Atlantic —the international bimetallists and the gold men unable to stop silver coinage while the national bimetallists were unable to increase it—agitation continued east of the Atlantic. Men high up in the English and German governments issued warnings of the disastrous effect upon European industry and trade if silver continued to depreciate. The silver in the dollar then had fallen to about eighty cents.[16]

In view of European investigations in the field, especially a British Gold and Silver Commission, Cleveland, during the summer of 1887, sent over one more confidential agent. Mr.

[15] The background of the Marble mission is provided by the State Dept. Despatches, Fr. v. 97, Ger. v. 39, 40; Instructions, Gt. Brit. v. 27, Ger. v. 17; Consular Letters, Paris, v. 25; Special Missions, v. 3; but Marble's actual experiences were set forth in memoranda he made for Bayard, with numerous enclosures, of which copies are to be found in the Marble MSS., together with letters from Bayard and Manning. Important Marble communications include N. Y., May 3; London, July 7, 9, 10, 29, Aug. 16; Paris, Aug. 17, 21, 22, 28; Dresden, Sept. 3; Berlin, Sept. 14, 15, 16, 19, 21, 24, 25, 27; Paris, Sept. 29, Oct. 1, 1885.

[16] Worries over the silver predicament of the Democratic party fill letters from Sec. of the Treasury Manning to Marble, Washington, Dec. 14, 22, 1885, Jan. 4, 6, 18, 19, 21, Feb. 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 23, Mar. 4, 9, 11, 20, Oct. 30, Dec. 20, 1886; Bayard to Marble, Washington, Jan. 9, 11, Mar. 17, 1886; Morrison to Marble, Washington, Feb. 9, 21, Mar. 11, 1886. Information of foreign bimetallic agitation came to Cleveland from the State Dept. Despatches, Fr. v. 97, Ger. v. 41; Consular Letters, Paris, v. 25. Queen Victoria appointed a Royal Commission on Gold and Silver, Sept. 20, 1886. The editor of the first volume of the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY admitted the issue with "Bimetallism in the United States", by A. E. Lee, 1:386-399, Sept., 1886.

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Edward Atkinson of Boston was neither a bimetallist nor a diplomat. His arguments served chiefly to emphasize foreign expectations that Congress was on the road to greater coinage of silver. The situation was further complicated at this time, through the part tariff rates played in it. In Germany, Bismarck, by favoring an agricultural tariff, had placated farmer bimetallists, even though that course angered the trade-union group; in the United States, Cleveland was worrying the protectionist faction of his own party. In all the countries involved, lines of division became more clearly marked and compromise moved further off.[17]

In December Mr. Cleveland himself lessened still further the chance of an international agreement for the enlarged use of silver, when he exhorted Congress to lower the tariff. The European powers resented the tariff for two reasons; insofar as it was effective it contracted the market for their goods; insofar as it was ineffective, and their goods climbed the tariff wall, payment of the duties diverted European gold to America. Consequently, as long as there was any chance of a lowered tariff, Europe looked to America to ease her gold stringency and was less minded to take immediate action herself. Horton tried to arouse the Democratic administration to renewed bimetallic efforts by making political charges; and his attack led Secretary of State Bayard to inquire the outlook of our ministers abroad. They reported that European powers were not, at this moment, interested.

The fact was that Europe was feeling the drain of gold, while the gold reserve in the United States was very high. If

[17] Atkinson's appointment was not altogether pleasing to Marble, who was traveling abroad and disapproved of some of his utterances. Atkinson reported to Bayard in a series of letters now in the Atkinson MSS., and submitted a brief formal report which was published with lengthy documents as *Sen. Ex. Doc. 34*, 50C-1S. The British reception of speeches by Atkinson and Dana Horton, who also was in England, is indicated in *Report*, British Association for Advancement of Science, 1887, and in *The Currency Question before the British Association for the Advancement of Science*, printed by the Manchester Council of the British Bimetallic League, 1887. Horton and Atkinson each published books in London that year, Horton, *The Silver Pound*, Atkinson, *What is Bimetallism?* The Royal Commission made its first report June 10, 1887.

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at this moment the United States had actually stopped silver coinage and either raised or left unaltered her tariff rates, she would have been in a position to force bimetallic concessions from Europe. But these are merely the "ifs" of history; the political situation obviously made such policies impossible. Late in 1888 a Republican administration prepared to move into power in Washington. It inherited the silver issue and would contribute its share to remove an agreement from the realms of probability.[18]

It was then Harrison's turn to handle silver and he well knew it was a prickly burr. Recent action by members of his party had not made it any easier to touch. The Republican exchequer had not been filled mainly by groups of debtors interested in national bimetallism—far from it—but the rank and file embraced many of that ilk living in the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi. Furthermore, as a means of swelling party ranks its members had labored to obtain the admission of six new states; four of them, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana and Washington, came in in 1889, and two more, Idaho and Wyoming, in 1890.

All six were supposed to be faithful to the Republican creed, but that expectation failed to take account of the psychology which goes with mountainous and high plains geography. Senators Jones and Stewart of Nevada had done a great deal to bring in these six states, but they knew what they were working for, and that was the strengthening of the silver element in the Senate. Nor was this wholly a western or middle-western issue. Among the manufacturers who helped to fill the protection chest in 1888 were some from Pennsylvania who saw protective virtues in bimetallism. Viewing the prospect o'er, many more politicians besides "Silver Dick"

[18] European factors affecting the United States situation were described in Despatches, Gt. Brit. v. 160, Fr. v. 101; Instructions, Gt. Brit. v. 28, Fr. v. 21, Ger. v. 18; Marble to Bayard, Chepstow, England, Aug. 28, 1888, Marble MSS. The second and final reports of the Royal Gold and Silver Commission, submitted Jan. 30, 1888 and Oct. (n. d.) 1888, carried a wealth of detail in the "minutes of evidence", and were printed as *Command Papers*, 1888, v. 45. The tariff troubles of the Democracy were sharply pointed in Randall to Marble, Dec. 30, 1887; Jan. 6, Mar. 8, 1888, Marble MSS.

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Bland were sure that free coinage for the United States was just around the corner.

But Harrison was not by disposition or affiliation a national bimetallist and he turned to Europe for relief. England offered him a little excuse for hope. Queen Victoria, ten days before his inauguration, had informed Parliament that a measure for restoring the gold coinage to a satisfactory condition would be laid before them. At the end of May an influential deputation of peers and members of Parliament visited the Conservative prime minister and chancellor of the exchequer, on behalf of international bimetallism. In their replies Lord Salisbury and Mr. Goschen used phraseology frequently heard today. They reminded the deputation that inflation would raise the price of bread and take money from the capitalists. The prime minister spoke of bimetallism as an international question; they must persuade other nations to act with them and they must also overcome the opposition of the influential monetary classes of their own country. He hoped that this international discussion would become "really international".[19]

So President Harrison and Secretary Blaine, again in the State Department, with William Windom, secretary of the treasury, put their heads together and concluded to use Mr. Horton's linguistic talents again. Possibly with the notion that he needed a balance wheel, they begged Mr. Charles H. Dalton, a manufacturer of Boston, to share in the ardors of the undertaking. Dalton, although he was already abroad, saw fit to decline, with the utmost regret. This left Mr. Horton in solitary grandeur. He was instructed to confine his inquiries chiefly to France, Germany and Great Britain, to maintain the greatest privacy, and not to discuss the differences existing among his fellow-countrymen.[20]

[19] Minister Lincoln and Secretary White of the London legation kept Bayard informed of the policy followed by the Conservative ministry; Despatches, v. 160, 161, 162, with enclosures from prominent newspapers. The bimetallic deputation to Salisbury of May 10, 1889, was markedly successful from the standpoint of publicity.

[20] The inception of this mission of 1889 is described in Special Missions, v. 4, Miscl. Letters, July, 1889, especially Blaine to Horton, Washington, June

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Horton placed himself *en rapport* with the French bimetallists in an effort to bring that country back to her coöperative position of 1881. At his request Harrison and Blaine permitted him to act as observer at an unofficial monetary conference held in conjunction with the Paris Exposition in September. He also had press contacts of a helpful nature in Paris and London; but the "journal" of the Exposition conference showed a trend which made him anxious lest it be published in English, and the sum total of his experiences did not reassure him. In fact, the pressure for gold from France, Germany and England was depleting the American reserve. The outlook could not be encouraging under the circumstances, for this, more than ever, was a session in the halls of Congress best described by the phrase "When Knighthood was in Flower." [21]

Silver men, in the winter of 1889-1890, were bargaining with the protectionists, and vice versa, each member jousting for his own constituency without great concern as to the total result. The main consequences were two: an increase in the tariff rates and an enlargement of the silver purchases to four million five hundred thousand ounces per month. The price of the McKinley bill came high, in silver. Congress had acted in the currency direction which Europe had expected, regardless of anything that Walker or Horton had said. As for the tariff, retaliation by France was rumored. International bimetallists abroad might be disappointed, but their opponents were vindicated.[22]

22, July 1; Blaine to Dalton, June 28, 29; Horton to Blaine, London, July 8; Dalton to Blaine, London, July 9, 1889.

[21] The most enlightening of the communications on Horton's efforts are, in the Despatches, Fr. v. 103, Reid to Blaine, Paris, Sept. 7, 13, 1889 (with enclosures); Ger. v. 49, Phelps to Blaine, Berlin, Nov. 9; Gt. Brit. v. 163, White to Blaine, Nov. 16, 1889; in the Instructions, Fr. v. 21, Adee to Reid, Washington, Sept. 10, 1889; in the Miscl. Letters, Horton to Blaine, London, Aug. 17; Paris, Sept. 20 (with enclosures), Washington, Dec. 21, 1889.

[22] Premier Ribot took up the tariff increases with Vignaud of the United States legation in Paris and the increases were made the subject of an interpellation in the Chamber of Deputies; Ribot also attempted to get other powers to agree upon retaliation. In Britain, the bimetallists failed in an effort to pass through the Commons a motion for another international bimetallic conference.

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Yet the national bimetallists at home were not satisfied; again their political representatives had accepted something less than free coinage of silver. This time it was the House, not the Senate, which was responsible for the limitation; the new far-western states had secured the balance of power in the Senate, and with their help the extreme silverites were driving hard toward complete remonetization of silver. They were greatly disappointed when the Act of 1890 proved incapable of holding the price of silver up and they prepared to redouble their agitation. Those of them out of office under the Democratic label thought they might mount the silver steed and ride him back into power. Then, as now, it was impossible to separate the silver issue from political ambitions.

Harrison felt renewed alarm and turned again to Europe, with Horton once more on the rolls. A financial crisis involved the failure of the famous Baring firm in London and very hard times throughout England. More British leaders came out for bimetallism as the Bank of England struggled to get an adequate gold supply. It appeared that public opinion might force Britain to greater sympathy with bimetallism. But just then European papers were carrying stories of the gathering of American farmers behind the silver banner, demanding unlimited coinage; and some reporters reasoned that this was the direct result of the burden the tariff made the farmer carry, as well as proof of the low state of public morals, which permitted the destruction of American credit.[23]

Harrison found it necessary in the fall of 1890 to assure the silver branch of his party that he was watching for a chance to arrange another international conference. He and Blaine next decided that Horton's presence abroad was not promoting the establishment of silver and sent him a message of recall.

[23] The circumstances of Horton's last employment are told in Special Missions, v. 4, Wharton to Horton, Washington, Aug. 30, 1890; Despatches, Gt. Brit. v. 166, Lincoln to Blaine, London, Jan. 29, 1891; Fr. v. 105, Reid to Blaine, Paris, Nov. 20, 1890, Vignaud to Blaine, Paris, Jan. 6, 1891 (with enclosures); Instructions, Fr. v. 22, Blaine to Reid, Washington, Nov. 18, 19, 24, 1890. Marble and Cernuschi, continually corresponding across the Atlantic on matters bimetallic and political, found the winter a tempting occasion for speculation in silver.

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Unfortunately, his absence on the Riviera prevented him from receiving it promptly. As the bimetallists of England and France appreciated his services and were eager for him to remain abroad, it must have been a sad blow to him to learn that, once more, an administration was shifting from the use of a confidential agent to an international conference.[24]

Unhappily this conference for a long time refused to convene. This might seem surprising, since the British bimetallists had big plans for progress, between May and August of 1891. They planned to send another strong deputation to Lord Salisbury and Mr. Goschen and one to prospective members of the Liberal ministry Gladstone was bringing in. They had lost their night for debate in Parliament—due to an Irish land bill—but they believed themselves strong enough to press forward and get another. So busy were they with these plans that they failed to realize the disastrous effect of the American trend. The rest of Europe was watching the ever-widening gap between what the administration hoped to accomplish by international diplomacy and what the national bimetallists hoped to achieve through Congress alone.[25]

When Harrison and Blaine sought a place for the conference to meet, and delegates to attend it, they experienced the greatest difficulty. They learned that even in England there were important authorities who denied that the bimetallic agitation had advanced or stood any chance of achieving its object. The pressure was admittedly strong from Lancashire

[24] During the course of his wanderings, Horton wrote Blaine from Rome, Apr. 7, London, Apr. 20, Paris, May 15, 18, 1891, in a vein more optimistic than definite as to results. Blaine and Harrison lost patience with him, judging by Blaine to Reid, Washington, Mar. 31; Reid to Blaine, Paris, Apr. 2; Blaine to Horton, Washington, Apr. 7; Wharton to Horton, Washington, Apr. 21; Wharton to Reid, Washington, May 14 and Adee to Reid, Washington, May 27, 1891. A thread of annoyance runs through the Despatches, Fr. v. 105, Instructions, Fr. v. 22, Special Missions, v. 4 and Miscl. Letters, dealing with this episode. Instructions to the ministers for ascertaining the dispositions of various governments toward another attempt at international agreement were issued under date of July 2, 1891.

[25] Horton finally reported to Harrison more explicitly, in a lengthy letter, Cape May, N. J., July 31, 1891, with copious enclosures, showing that he had been intimately associated with British bimetallists particularly, in projecting a new offensive against the gold standard enemy; Miscl. Letters, 1889.

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and Liverpool; but banking and business interests generally were so strong in opposition that even the bimetallist Balfour was unwilling to go counter to their wishes. France made British support the condition of action and so did Germany.[26]

Yet luck turned Harrison's way. The ministries in all three countries wanted to placate the bimetallic sentiment, if they could do so without too much offense to the monometallists. Eventually the United States assumed sole responsibility for calling the conference; a Belgian minister, for reasons of personal friendship, agreed to let it meet at Brussels and it convened there November 26, 1892.[27]

From then on, it proved a failure nationally and internationally. In prospect, it failed to save the elections for the Republicans. In performance, the delicate state of feeling in the United States and the natural unwillingness of Europe to do anything about silver as long as there was a prospect that the United States might do it all, prevented the conferees from accomplishing more than airing their views. By common consent it adjourned December 17, supposedly to reconvene May 30, 1893. Thus the Brussels meeting joined that of Paris (of 1881) in the limbo of conferences that never ended.[28]

When Harrison vacated the White House, he, like his predecessors, left the silver problem behind for his successor to solve. Harrison had failed to master it, either as arithmetic or politics, and Cleveland's predicament soon became vastly more serious. The hard times, which had re-descended upon

[26] This distressing information was conveyed in Lincoln to Blaine, London, Aug. 11; White to Blaine, London, Dec. 4; Reid to Blaine, Paris, Oct. 2, Dec. 16, 1891, Despatches, Gt. Brit. v. 168, 169; Fr. v. 106.

[27] Arrangements were consummated after almost daily communication by cable and letter between the State Dept. and United States ministers at the principal foreign capitals, drawn out from Jan. 27 to Nov. 16, 1892; see especially Instructions, Gt. Brit. v. 29, 30; Fr. v. 22; Ger. v. 18; and Despatches, Gt. Brit. v. 169, 170, 171, 172; Fr. v. 107, 108; Ger. v. 53, 54.

[28] Henry White, from the vantage point of the London legation, kept Secretary of State Foster informed of the trend of the conference, by letters of Nov. 26, Dec. 3, 6, 10, 14, 23, 1892, with significant clippings from the British press; Despatches, Gt. Brit. v. 172, 173. The report of the United States commissioners and the journal of the conference were printed in official form as *Sen. Ex. Doc. 82*, 52C-2S.

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the farmers many months before, now fell upon the industrial cities of the East in a severe financial panic. For this the federal treasury was ill-prepared; daily it was showing a larger stock of cheapening silver and a smaller stock of the precious gold. That remarkable reserve of the yellow metal, amounting to over $200,000,000, which had given American international bimetallists a talking point early in 1888, was sadly depleted. American credit was falling with it and likely to disappear altogether if the silver purchases continued.

Cleveland hoped for help from England, because bimetallism there still appealed strongly to farmers and to exporting manufacturers, as a protective device. These groups tried to force the Liberal ministry to take the initiative for a reconvening of the Brussels conference; and although the chancellor of the exchequer, Sir William Harcourt, had defeated them in the House of Commons on the eve of Cleveland's inauguration, the latter hoped the former might coöperate a little. Cleveland knew that Harcourt's victory had been obtained only after earnest belaboring of certain Irish silver members at the hands of the party whips in the lobbies; yet the fact that the victory was more apparent than real did not lessen its political usefulness. It made early reassembling of the conference useless and Cleveland notified the participating governments of a further postponement until November; this would also allow time for learning the decision of the British government as to the silver problem in India.[29]

Before the report of the Commission on the Indian Currency was made public, one more confidential agent for the United States Treasury appeared in London. This was no less a personage than the mightiest figure in American banking, J. Pierpont Morgan, Senior, come to seek aid for the stabilization of American currency. He talked with Harcourt in the chancellor's private room at the House of Commons, suggest-

[29] Cleveland received his inside information of the British attitude through letters from Lincoln and Henry White to the Dept. of State, in March, May and June, 1893, indicating the drift of public opinion; Despatches, Gt. Brit. v. 173, 174. White's place in British society and his confidential correspondence with Harcourt made him a valuable informant.

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ing that it would be desirable to remove the question of international finance from the realm of national politics to that of a treaty between the leading powers. Thus could be ended that shifting in foreign exchange which had caused the world so much misery.

But the British political leader, recognizing, like the bimetallist Balfour, that it was political folly to ignore the wishes of the bankers in the "City", was not responsive to the plea of the American financier. In England, Harcourt told Morgan, the recent threat of the bimetallic movement had been turned aside. They were now getting on extremely well in his opinion (barring Indian uncertainties), with gold monometallism. He objected decidedly to entering into partnership with any other country. Morgan asked what could be done for the United States, and Sir William replied, "Nothing". These were the days when England was secure on the gold standard, when the United States was not the greatest creditor nation in the world.[30]

If anyone had tried to tell the bimetallists of the United States that J. Pierpont Morgan had done a special errand abroad in the effort to get this country out of its predicament he would have been scoffed at; but Cleveland knew all about it. He also knew that the mints of India were about to be closed to silver, a smashing blow. Thrown wholly on his own resources, he buckled on his patronage armor and forced the Senate to coöperate with the House and with him in putting an end to silver purchases. The United States should not be made the dumping ground for a metal that none of the other great nations wanted. He would renounce all his other measures for this one cause. The full story of that historic session has yet to see the light, but in sum it amounted to the Democrats' paying the penalty for the Republican haste in admitting six states prematurely. It was the irony of fate that in paying this penalty the Democrats secured to

[30] This interview was so carefully guarded that the only references to it which seem to have survived are a letter from Harcourt to White, London, May 16, 1893, White MSS., and a report of White to Gresham, May 31, Despatches, Gt. Brit. v. 174.

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the Republicans sixteen years of control of the national government.[31]

At last an American administration had carried out the promise made to Europe by Walker in 1879. The United States had joined Europe on the gold standard. Unfortunately the tricks of fate following this feat were such as to defeat its object internationally. The silver inflation faction, stimulated by the longlastingness of the panic and by political propulsions, acquired a vitality which carried them through three more years of hectic agitation. The bitterness engendered was in part artificially created but it had a solid basis of economic maladjustment behind it. What we today call "technological unemployment" and "farm peasantry" then were on the way, although they were called by more picturesque and vivid names. One has only to look at the cartoons of Bryan's three happiest years, 1894-1897, to realize how deeply men and women were stirred. Then, as in 1930-1933, depression talk dominated the pulpit, the farm and the home. If God had not intervened on the Republican side, sending good crops to the United States and bad ones to Europe, all of Hanna's purse-filling would not have availed against Bryan's oratory.[32]

Even as it was, the Republican platform makers had found it necessary to promise action looking toward a larger supply of money, that money to be based on silver. They promised to ask Europe, again, for an international conference. This promise the victorious President-elect, William McKinley,

[31] Harcourt delayed announcing the decision on India to the House of Commons, but White's despatches gave Cleveland warning of what was coming. Bayard's despatches of August indicated that the British bimetallists could be readily shunted aside by the ministry as long as the outcome of Cleveland's struggle with the Senate remained uncertain. The Senate contest was prolonged by the efforts of four prominent Democrats in turn to use the emergency for attaining leadership in the party; it was so badly disorganized that none proved to have skill to match his ambition.

[32] Such correspondence between conservative Republican senators as survives indicates that their fright extended through July and the first half of August; the turn toward their party seemed to them due more to the rapid revolutions of Republican printing presses than to seasonal cycles.

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undertook to fulfill. Two months before he was inaugurated he agreed that Senator Wolcott of Colorado, whose personal and political predicament made it a matter of life and death to him, should feel out the situation abroad. The bargaining position of the United States was greatly improved, for the silver inflationists had been defeated while the whole world stood by and watched. Wolcott therefore did not suffer the same sort of disability as Walker, Horton, Marble and Morgan; but the trend of discovery was against him and had been these many months while the United States were too obsessed with politics to notice. In the midst of his labors the miners of Australia, Africa and the Klondike sent down a deluge of the yellow metal. Beneath it they effectually buried the propaganda for silver and with that Senator Wolcott's political future.[33]

Ten years after Wolcott's disappointment, the United States experienced a financial stringency of a lesser sort. It led, not to international silver diplomacy, but to domestic banking legislation. This time, the appeal to Europe was not for concession, but simply for instruction in the light of her experience. The chairman of the National Monetary Commission (Senator Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island) who unofficially visited London, Paris and Berlin on this errand in 1908 and 1909, had neither the viewpoint nor the temperament of the confidential agents of the nineties. Yet with them he had two things in common—an intense desire to re-order United States currency along lines favored by himself, and an experience of disappointment.

A quarter of a century passed, and the United States was again in the throes of a major depression—one deep enough to inflict economic paralysis and therefore certain to bring a demand for more money. From the depression the Chief

[33] Wolcott arranged with France a tentative compromise, to which the United States and France would jointly seek British adhesion; it had interesting points of similarity with the Pittman agreement of July 1933. Premature publicity aroused the "City" against it before the arrangements could be completed, so that there followed a British refusal, couched in the polite terms of a negative report from India. Wolcott's full reports to Chandler constitute the only detailed source on this episode: Chandler MSS.

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Executive obtained the power to take the United States off, or on, the gold standard, as he saw fit—a new power, unknown to his predecessors. And the nation over which he held this prerogative was not the debtor country of the nineties but the greatest creditor power on the globe, with an international position vastly stronger than it knew during the twenty years of "Silver and the Three C's."

Nevertheless, again, agricultural and industrial unrest, unemployment and indebtedness clamored at the doors of the White House for easier money. Again the United States participated in an international conference where success hinged upon an agreement as to currency standards. But at this conference the greatest creditor nation did not insist on the gold standard as England had done in days gone by; and France, the former friend of silver, proved its foremost enemy. Yet, at London, in 1933, Senator Pittman of Nevada seemed to get for silver some of the concessions which in 1897 slipped just out of Wolcott's grasp. He did persuade the representatives of eight nations to sign an agreement looking toward support of the silver market. The major objective, an international bimetallic agreement, remained unattained.

Home he came, to find the propaganda for national bimetallism again on the rise. Although the elections for the next Congress were more than a year distant, every member was down with his ear to the ground, and the depression was keeping them prone. The swell of protest, especially from agricultural areas after food prices fell from their July eminence, was unmistakable. Members from the plains increasingly bethought themselves of fiat money, of paper, as the right device for raising prices; and the arguments which their forbears, the greenbackers, had found pleasing to the ears of constituents again were pronounced good. Members from the mountain areas increasingly took leaves from the sacred books of Jones and Stewart, of Newlands and Bryan, on the gospel of free silver at 16 to 1. Theirs seemed a much smaller following than that of the paper inflationists; but they had the sense to see, as saw their ancestors, that during a very bitter contest between "sound money" and "inflation",

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loyal friends of silver producers might harvest the sheaves for their pet industry. So they undertook, once more, to persuade creditors that silver inflation was a lesser evil than paper inflation, and to divert debtor sentiment from paper to silver.

However, today's diversions are not yesterday's. There is no more freeland to absorb the discontented; western Europe is not starving for America's food surplus; adventurous spirits have not now the happy choice of a journey to the Klondike or to Cuba. Nor are international conferences now wholly lovely and of good report. Therefore, while the paper-inflationists and the free-silverites of 1933 burnish their ancestral armor for another pre-election battle in Congress along national lines, the president seeks for prosperity along divers paths, some of which are projected across the international scene.

One of these leads toward Moscow, where it is hoped United States wheat, corn and cotton (as well as manufactures) may enter the market place. Another leads to a market just in the making, where the United States enters as a buyer and seller of the world's gold, in order to control the value of the harassed dollar and of depressed commodities. Either path can be blocked by Congress; and a none too sympathetic Europe waits to see what those 527 men and 6 women may do.

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THE PEASANT IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION[1]

IN the general rush to interpret the French Revolution as a bourgeois movement aimed on the one hand against the aristocracy and on the other against the sans-culottes, even some very sophisticated historians have sometimes forgotten that at least two-thirds of the French people were after all neither aristocratic nor bourgeois nor sans-culotte but belonged to one or another of the several classes of peasantry. The strife and striving which took place at Versailles and Paris, though it left the whole country tense with expectation and eager for news, was of only secondary interest to most of the rural population, except when agrarian problems were being discussed. This was comparatively seldom, and occurred in even these rare instances, because the peasant had already taken some action which it was necessary either to repudiate or to accept. The national assemblies generally contented themselves with accepting as small a part of the peasants' *faits accomplis* as political exigency seemed to indicate was wise. Nevertheless, important changes were effected. Hence it is possible to look upon the French Revolution as an agrarian movement by which the pressure of rural opinion step by step forced reluctant middle-class governments to grant the farmers' demands, though their program was far from realization when the Civil Code once more stabilized the property system of France.

If this interpretation of the Revolution has frequently been neglected, it is not altogether the historian's fault. The peasant was generally inarticulate. Even when he did complain, his grievances were not likely to be recorded in the *Moniteur*, the memoirs of the literate, or even the rural *cahiers*, drawn up as they were by the less rustic of the agricultural population and almost completely forgotten in the formulation of the bailiwick *cahiers*. Local historians could and did find out about him for limited areas, and national historians

[1] *La Grande Peur de 1789*, by Georges Lefebvre. Paris, Libraire Armand Colin, 1932. 272 pp.

Questions agraires au temps de la Terreur. Documents publiés et annotés par Georges Lefebvre, professeur à la faculté des lettres de Strasbourg. (Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire économique de la Révolution française, publiés par le ministère de l'instruction publique.) Strasbourg, Imprimeries F. Laing, 1932. 256 pp.

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like Taine who dug among the reports of intendants and committees for unpublished papers were likely to discover some things too. But Taine looked for brigands rather than peasants, and the local historians too frequently suffered from myopia. No great history of the agricultural classes in France to compare with Émile Levasseur's *Histoire des classes ouvrières et de l'industrie en France* has yet been written.

Perhaps such a history will have to wait until the *Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire économique de la Révolution française*, which has already in some regards rendered Levassaur's work antiquated, reaches a more advanced stage than at present. At any rate, if it is done in our time at all, it is likely to be done either by Henri Sée or Georges Lefebvre. Sée's recent preoccupation with commercial and industrial history makes it unlikely that the great history of French agriculture will come from his pen. Lefebvre, on the other hand, is a younger man and has already given reason to hope that he will write the "standard" agricultural history of France for the Revolutionary period at least. In his article on "*La Place de la Révolution dans l'histoire agraire de la France*" in the *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*,[1] he produced a sketch of what such a study might be. This was based largely upon information acquired in the preparation of his extraordinary doctoral dissertation on *Les Paysans du Nord pendant la Révolution française*,[2] which comes as close as any work we now have to being a history of the agricultural classes during the Revolution, since frequent references to other parts of France calling attention to similarities and differences serve to make it more than the history of a limited area.

There was therefore some reason for mixed feelings when Lefebvre went from the study of agricultural problems into the general history of the Revolution as collaborator with MM. Sagnac and Guyot on the volume *La Révolution française*,[3] of which he wrote the major portion; for while it is probably the finest one-volume study of the French Revolution in any language, there was the danger that Lefebvre might leave the careful analysis of the agrarian movement to others, while he devoted his energies to synthesis. Nor is this danger (if danger it is) altogether past, for the mantle of the late Albert Mathiez has fallen on Lefebvre's shoulders as editor of the

[1] Vol. I (1929), pp. 508-523.

[2] 2 vols., Paris, 1924.

[3] Paris, 1930, in the "*Peuples et civilisations*" series.

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Annales historiques de la Révolution française, and with it goes the leading rôle in the *Société des Études robespierristes*.

But the two volumes now under review lend reassurance on that score. They both treat of agricultural history with the same painstaking care that was revealed in the charts of Vol. II of Lefebvre's thesis at the same time as they tell their respective stories in a manner worthy of one who stands in the anomalous position of being both Sagnac's collaborator and Mathiez's successor.

There had been a great number of articles and regional monographs on the Great Fear, a few of which were significant. In addition there had been some works which dealt with it as incidental to some larger problem. Several publications of the *Commission chargée de Rechercher et de Publier les Documents d'Archives relatifs à la Vie économique de la Révolution* had also shed some light upon it. But much of the story remained to be dug out of archives, memoirs, letters and journals. Taking what earlier publications had to give him and going into the unpublished sources as well, M. Lefebvre has produced the first monograph on the Great Fear as a national movement. It has a careful bibliography, four maps, one document quoted in full as an appendix, and an unusually long index, though no footnotes, the author and publisher hoping to create a popular demand for the book.

The general reader is however hardly likely to pore with bated breath over chapter vi of Part III (*"Les Courants de la Grande Peur"*), which reads like a railway time-table, telling with a precision that would do a *Kriegsschuldfrage* historian proud, the very moment at which the Fear reached almost every town of any importance which it visited. It is, nevertheless, the most significant, if not the most interesting, part of the book.

The preceding 196 pages lay the setting for it. In Part I is described the process by which the poverty of the peasantry, the wandering elements of the population, and the frequent disturbances in the villages, which became increasingly disorderly as the Revolution approached, led to local phenomena which resembled, and are sometimes mistaken for, but yet were not, the Great Fear. The first five chapters of Part II refute the charges sometimes made by contemporary writers and repeated by historians that the Fear was the result of instigation by "Patriots", who wished to rouse the farmers against the landed aristocracy (as the right wing would have it), or of aristocrats who wished to profit by local disorder (as the left wing would have it). Nevertheless, it is pointed out, one important

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cause of the Fear was the conviction, which started in Paris in July 1789, and spread rapidly throughout the country, that there was a *complot aristocratique* to abort the embryo revolution and destroy its aspiring sponsors. In the cities this disturbing impression generally led only to the arming of the bourgeoisie, but in the countryside, where its effect was heightened by the remembrance of recent outbursts and by the real, if not always well-founded, dread of brigands, it led to disorders that spread from village to village in well-defined waves and rapidly assumed an epidemic character.

It is this epidemic of fear that the author calls the Great Fear, distinguishing it carefully from the more isolated and localized uprisings which came before it and were in part its cause. Separating it thus, by definition, from similar movements even on a fairly extensive scale (as, for example, in Franche Comté and Alsace), he begins Part III by examining the distinguishing characteristics of the Great Fear. He finds that the Great Fear covered most of the kingdom, not, however, in a single simultaneous movement but in several large and rapid waves: "*Le caractère propre de la grande peur, c'est que ces alarmes se propagent très loin et avec une grande promptitude au lieu de rester locales*" (p. 161). There were several distinct points of departure for each of these waves. Nantes was the center of the current which engulfed the Poitou woodlands and the Mauges; Estrées-Saint-Denis was the starting point for the Clermontois; Mazières-la-Grande-Paroisse for southern Champagne; Ruffec for Aquitania and the region of the southwest in general; La Ferté-Bernard for Maine. There were several other "original panics", but whole sections of the country were entirely unaffected by any of them. The first one began on July 20; the last was spent in the first days of August, leaving, however, ripples which were to assume larger proportions on several subsequent occasions. From the points of origin the panic was carried to neighboring towns, generally by scared or misinformed individuals who seldom had any *arrières pensées*. Cooler persons who tried to check its course by sane remarks or inaction were likely to be regarded as traitors and to be dealt with hardly. Sometimes the seigneurs and officials of a region, whether because they were stricken with fear of bandits on the one hand or aristocrats on the other, or because they were afraid not to appear so stricken, aided the progress of the Fear. Occasionally a wave of panic which was already well under way would be reinforced by some local occurrence or by meeting with some other panic-stricken group, and would start off in other

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directions with an increased impetus. At Lourdes, for instance, there were four separate signals of alarm on August 6. These reinforcements the author calls "*relais.*"

Thus the scene is set for chapter vi of Part III ("*Les Courants de la Grande Peur*") which has already been called the most significant part of the book. With the aid of an excellent map (pp. 198-99), this chapter shows the way in which the waves of fear spread from the centers to the nearby towns, leaving certain areas unaffected. "*Millau est assurément la ville de France ou se sont conjugués le plus grand nombre de courants*" (p. 231). It is hardly a chapter which one would read for amusement but the long index of place-names in the back of the book will make it an easy one to consult for practically every village and town which the Great Fear visited.

The last chapters discuss the more or less sporadic and localized panics that until 1793 were to result from causes similar to those which had created the Great Fear, and also present the consequences of this extraordinary phenomenon. M. Lefebvre sees in the Great Fear not merely the impelling motive of the August decrees, but also a forerunner of the *levée en masse,* and of the Federations—a popular movement which promoted the solidarity of the Third Estate against the aristocracy. In the last pages Lefebvre points out that throughout the entire epidemic there were only three murders, one of which is not reliably documented; and fewer cases of arson than is generally believed. Chateaux were destroyed only rarely, except in Dauphiny, where about eighty were attacked and nine put to flames. It should be pointed out that M. Lefebvre does not consider as parts of the Great Fear the disorders in the Mâconnais and Dauphiny, which were the most violent; the Mâconnais revolt preceded and the Dauphiny *jacquerie* resulted from the more general movement. But even considering the vandalism of the Mâconnais and Dauphiny, no one ought now to repeat after Taine the figure of the lewd and bloodthirsty monkey. The peasant of the Great Fear was neither always sane nor humane, but there was method and a certain degree of moderation in his madness.

The Great Fear was the greatest and most universal of the rural disturbances during the Revolution, but it led to little official satisfaction for the peasant. For the decrees of August 4-13, 1789, did not, as the National Assembly boldly announced, "entirely destroy the feudal régime." Many of the dues were declared redeemable by a peasantry which was either unable or unwilling to redeem them.

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And so, down to the complete abolition of the dues in 1793, the farmers and their spokesmen complained of their feudal obligations, and even after 1793 they continued to complain of land-hunger and against the landlords.

These complaints are the subject of M. Lefebvre's book entitled *Questions agraires au temps de la Terreur.* It purports to be a collection of documents, though there are only 101 pages of documents and 135 pages of introductory text. The documents are extracts from petitions, addresses, memoirs, letters, minutes, and pamphlet publications of various individuals or groups of individuals interested in agricultural problems. Several of them give the attitude of only one man (though in such cases the editor considers it representative of a larger group opinion), but most of them express the grievances of parishes, communes, societies, municipalities, districts, cantons, committees, and some *ad hoc* groups. They generally were addressed to the national assemblies, their committees, the Jacobin Club, or some other official or semi-official agency. They are arranged according to departments, which are listed alphabetically, several whose point of origin is not clear being placed at the end. Thirty-nine departments are listed, with as few as one and as many as thirteen documents for each. There are extracts from 121 documents in all, the earliest dated November 20, 1789, and the latest July 9, 1795.

The introduction analyzes the background of these petitions under four separate heads. Chapter i (*"Les Décrets de Ventôse"*) takes up the legislation regarding the distribution of the *biens nationaux* until the close of the Terror. The point which is insisted upon the most is that the laws regulating the sale of the confiscated church and émigré property benefited chiefly the people of large or moderate means, as the land was sold in large lots, to the highest bidder at public auction, and on terms of payment which it was difficult for the poor to meet; the Convention (April 24, 1793) even forbade associations of peasants for the purpose of making a collective bid. The motive behind such legislation was to raise as much money as possible and as quickly as possible. Some concessions were made to the peasant after the suspension of Louis XVI by encouraging the sale of émigré lands in comparatively small lots, but the end of the year witnessed a reaction. It was only after the expulsion of the Girondin leaders that the Jacobins, who on the whole, until this juncture, had been no more agrarian-minded than the Girondins, listened to the friends of the peasantry and enacted legislation calcu-

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lated to win peasant support against the "federalists." Decrees of June 1793, though they preserved the sale by public auction, re-established payment by annual instalments and set aside a portion of the land to be sold on easy terms directly to the landless. This scheme of distribution, however, was not enforced in many parts of France, and in September there was substituted for it a plan to give to propertyless heads of families 500 livres bonds, payable in twenty annual instalments and receivable in exchange for émigré land. This law also remained largely a dead-letter, as public auction made it easy to outbid the poor peasant on the piece of land he particularly wanted to buy with his bond. It was therefore not until the Robespierrists, anxious to win support against the Hébertists, proposed the Ventôse decrees of 1794 and induced a reluctant Committee of Public Safety to support them, that an effort was made actually to distribute property (coming this time from a new source—the suspects) without auction or payments of any kind. Even this scheme was not successful, however—in part because the Robespierrists alone were willing that it should be (if indeed they too did not consider it as purely a political measure), and in part because it would not have been sufficient, even if practical, to abolish poverty. Thus all schemes proposed during the Revolution to satisfy the peasant's land-hunger failed.

The conditions under which he actually cultivated the land were even more important to the peasant than the question of ownership, and these conditions form the burden of the next three chapters. "*Si les paysans français n'ont pas songé à reclamer l'expropriation générale des grandes propriétaires, c'est qu'ils jouissaient déjà, comme métayers ou comme fermiers, des terres qui ne leur appartenaient pas*" (p. 59). This is an elaboration of the thesis already presented by Lefebvre in his article "*Les Recherches relatives à la répartition de la propriété et de l'exploitation foncière à la fin de l'ancien Régime*" in the *Revue d'Histoire Moderne*.[1] France was essentially a country of small holdings, as compared with England, where the enclosure was the general rule, or to eastern Europe, where large farms were cultivated by many landless workers. In the fertile plains of northwestern France the fields were generally divided among tenant-farmers (*fermiers*); elsewhere *métayers* (share-croppers) were more frequent. It was to the interest of the landlords, however, to rent in as large parcels as possible to the most reliable tenants, and large farms were also likely to be more profit-

[1] Vol. III (1928), pp. 103-130.

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able to the tenant. Hence, in the country where *fermage* prevailed, there was a tendency toward concentration of several farms in the hands of one farmer and a rapid disappearance of the small farm. On the other hand the small holding tended to become increasingly small because of division among heirs, making the growth of large farms all the more conspicuous and the complaints of the small farmers all the more bitter. The *cahiers* were comparatively silent on their grievances, as it was frequently the "*coq de village*" who drew up the rural *cahiers,* while the bailiwick assemblies were controlled by the bourgeois. There were, however, definite demands even in the *cahiers* for limitation of the amount of land any one farmer might exploit. In both the National Assembly and the Legislative Assembly arguments were made in favor of limitation of farms, not so much out of sympathy for the small holder as because *petite agriculture* was frequently regarded as having great social advantage, since it led to more intimate association of the farmer with the soil, prevented monopoly, and produced cheaper commodities. It was not until the sans-culotte demonstration of September 1793, however, that any real effort to restrict the size of holdings was made and even then it was without important result. It was felt that concurrent with the law fixing the price of foodstuffs there ought to be another limiting all farms to 200 *arpents,* but a proposal of that nature was allowed to die in committee. Nothing ever came of the *fermier* opposition to the large-scale farmer.

The poorer peasants also suffered greatly from the harshness of their leases, which resulted from the great competition among them for farms. Leases were frequently of short duration and the landlord was likely to break them even before expiration. Besides, the farmer had frequently to make extra payments as an added inducement to grant him a lease, and these he never got back if the lease were broken. Nor did he get paid for improvements he had made during his period of tenure. The rural code of September 29, 1791 forbade breaking of leases before the expiration of six years, and then only on the consent of both parties. But beyond this concession the Constituent Assembly did little with regard to these grievances. The Legislative Assembly also took the side of the proprietor. The Convention, during the discussion of the Maximum in September 1793, did pass a series of laws which would have aided the peasant, but they were never enforced. For the Mountain, an essentially bourgeois party, regarded the Maximum Law as a political expedient only, and had no intention of following out its logical

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consequences by the regulation of leases and the limitation of farm-holdings.

These particular problems concerned the *fermier* especially, but most of France's farmers were not tenants in this sense but were share-croppers (*métayers*), and their problems are discussed in chapter iii ("*Le Métayage et les 'Fermiers généraux'*"). The *métayer*'s particular enemy was the *fermier-général* (to be distinguished from the tax-farmer likewise so designated), who was a sort of tenant-in-chief of the lord's domain but also exploited any other farms for which there were no other farmers. Frequently he was only an agent for business men who had learned that capital could well be invested in agriculture, or for some ecclesiastical corporation. The type was most frequently to be found in Brittany, Franche Comté and Lorraine. Sometimes fifteen or twenty *domaines* might be in the hands of the same person, though he would often sublet his holdings. The *cahiers* here again are not a good source of information regarding this cause of the peasant's dissatisfaction; and here again the revolutionary assemblies protected the large holder rather than the *métayer*.

The *métayer* had even more cause than the *fermier* to complain of the leases he was obliged to make. The terms were short; while theoretically arranged on a basis of equal shares in most instances, the landlord generally succeeded in getting extra payments from the *métayer;* landlord and tenant were not equal in the courts, in case of litigation. The Constituent Assembly only aggravated these abuses by making the tenant responsible to the lord for the tithe upon its suppression and by demanding money redemption of certain feudal dues. The Legislative, in suppressing all dues to which title could not be proved, aided the peasant who owned his farm, but hardly the *métayer,* whose obligations rested upon definitive contract. The Convention suppressed the payments which the landlords had substituted for the church tithe (October 22, 1793) and the remaining feudal dues (July 17 and October 22, 1793). But in general the lot of the *métayer* was little improved by the Revolution; and "*en 1913, à la Chambre des députés, la situation des métayers a pu être décrite et leurs plaintes exposées dans les mêmes termes qu'avaient employés, plus de cent ans auparavant, les sans culottes de l'an II*" (pp. 115-116).

The problem of crop regulation forms the subject of chapter iv ("*La Réglementation de la Culture*"). The traditional system of crop rotation with one-third of the soil lying fallow each year was

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most common among the agricultural proletariat. They were therefore opposed to the "*liberté d'exploitation*," which the richer farmers favored. The poor, besides, derived great benefit from the open pasture and the right to glean after the harvest (*glanage*). Certain communities likewise insisted on the right to indicate the period of reaping and harvesting and to conduct these processes on a coöperative basis. The peasant was thus both by habit and by interest wedded to traditional practices and did not put too great store by individual initiative and enterprises. Such reforms as had been effected in the interests of private property before the Revolution were of greater benefit to the large-scale farmer than to the poor and were undone during the agrarian revolt of 1789. The Rural Code of the Constituent nevertheless provided for the liberty of cultivation, and the Convention even included it in the 1793 declaration of rights. The necessity, however, for producing as much grain as possible during the Terror for once put the national legislature on the side of the poorer peasants; the laws which fixed maximum prices also permitted the municipalities to regulate farming operations to a considerable extent. But in general, the various governmental agencies were more interested in bolstering up the *assignat* than in improving the lot of the agricultural poor.

In a "*Conclusion*" the author points out that even the Ventôse decrees, the nearest to the *loi agraire* ever reached by the Revolution, were far from meeting the demands of the peasantry. For fundamentally the Robespierrists were bourgeois, politically rather than socially minded, and obliged by war conditions to be opportunist. If there had been an organized peasant party, it might have been heard. But the peasants were sadly divided among themselves and could unite only in opposition to some common enemy. They therefore gained very little besides the suppression of the tithe and of real feudal obligations (and these had been a serious burden only to the *propriétaires* not to the *métayers* or *fermiers*). Only the more enterprising of the agricultural proletariat succeeded in increasing their holdings by purchases of *biens nationaux*. No wonder, then, that despite the inarticulateness of the peasants, there were enough radical petitions to enable M. Lefebvre to make up the collection of documents here given. These petitions probably explain why there was, in 1793 and after, such an overwhelming fear in the Convention of the *loi agraire*. It was not altogether, as Aulard says,[1] because there must have been a great deal of such talk going around

[1] *Histoire politique de la Révolution française*, p. 262.

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from mouth to mouth (*"une propagande socialiste orale"*) nor as the present writer once put it[1] because the bourgeois gentlemen of the Convention, unduly anxious to preserve the sacredness of property, were too easily frightened; but because there were many real grievances of which the peasant's spokesmen did not hesitate to write in a very frank and amazingly bold fashion. The peasant, in other words, was neither quite so inarticulate nor quite so negligible in Revolutionary politics as has often been thought. Thanks in great part to M. Lefebvre, he may soon receive the attention in the general study of the French Revolution to which his numbers at least entitle him.

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[1] "Communism during the French Revolution, 1789-1793", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. XL (1925), pp. 438-450.

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REVIEWS

Public Utility Regulation. By WILLIAM E. MOSHER and FINLA G. CRAWFORD. New York and London, Harper & Brothers, 1933.—xvii, 612 pp. $5.00.

This output of the School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University represents careful research work upon a large subject, and one of especial importance at the present time. Public utility services are rapidly increasing, and the more generally they are availed of, the more does each individual and society as a whole become dependent upon their adequate, efficient and economic performance. Their regulation in the public interest thus becomes a vital necessity.

Moreover, while the task of effective regulation of public utilities is becoming larger it is also being made more difficult by the rapid changes taking place in the industries that render the services and in the corporate management and financial control of the industries. Starting, and for a time developing, as local enterprises, some utility companies, particularly those furnishing electric current and gas, have largely ceased to be local either in ownership or management. Enlarged operating companies have been brought under the control of holding companies whose properties, often hundreds in number, are found in many states and in different sections of the country.

The regulation of public utilities has been, and presumably must remain, the special task of the states and of the commissions through which the state legislatures function; but utility services, such as the distribution of electric current and gas, are being rendered over wide areas, and operating utility companies, that are subject to regulation by state commissions, are passing under the control of holding companies not yet made amenable to the commissions. Thus a situation has developed that, unless corrected, will largely nullify public regulation of utilities and will hasten government ownership and operation.

The situation thus briefly described is fully set forth in the detailed, factual volume by Messrs. Mosher and Crawford. They

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have done for the subject of public regulation by the state commissions what Professor Sharfman is doing for the regulation of interstate carriers by the Interstate Commerce Commission. As is shown by the excellent bibliography in the volume under review, much has been written on different phases of commission regulation and upon public utilities (and much is being written at the present time), but every thorough student of these subjects will find this volume of great assistance. It brings together the thoughts and conclusions of previous writers and contains a large amount of information and "material secured directly from commission officials or through field investigators". These have, in fact, "been the chief sources of information".

The authors have succeeded in their aim of proceeding from factual information to its interpretation without bias or prejudice. There is no propagandism, but the authors have a definite point of view—one that the facts presented show to be sound. They believe that private ownership and operation of public utilities is preferable to government ownership and operation, when and if those who manage utilities believe in and act upon the principle that they are performing public services. "The foundation of the ethics of utility management should be that utility services are public services, without qualification and equivocation", and there are three requirements that utility managements must meet in living up to this standard: There must be "1. Acceptance of regulation without loopholes; 2. Full publicity for all transactions from top to bottom; 3. No profits in excess of a reasonable return for any stockholder, whether of the operating company or the top holding company."

Much road has yet to be traveled to reach this goal. Regulatory laws are still inadequate and "their administration is not without serious flaws"; public utility managers, for the most part, avoid and oppose publicity of their affairs; and as for the acceptance of the principle of limiting profits to a reasonable return on the investment, "the prospects . . . are far from promising". For these reasons, the authors believe that "the private operation of the utilities under a scheme of regulation is on trial as it has never been before", and their conclusion is that "unless there be cordial coöperation between those in control of public utility companies and public regulatory bodies, looking towards the bolstering up of regulation, the only possible alternative is public ownership and operation".

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The Mechanism of the Credit Standard. By HANS GLÜCKSTADT. London, P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1933.—xviii, 111 pp. 7s. 6d.

A year or two ago Mr. Glückstadt wrote a volume entitled *The Theory of the Credit Standard*, in which he put forward what he considered a new view of monetary principles and urged the self-conscious substitution of credit for money as a medium of exchange. The present volume is a "practical" outworking of the "new" theory in application, and is directly dependent upon the former volume, to which it forms a sort of epilogue. It is, therefore, worth while to sum up the substance of the theory previously set forth; and this the author has succinctly done as follows:

> Our plan is that this new standard should be established by creating a quantity of international money which should be kept on account with an international bank and be payable by cheque. The public will be informed of the inauguration of the standard by the establishment of an international bank, which, as shown later, will have at its disposal a considerable amount of capital. As convertibility into gold will no longer be required, this capital should be devoted to purchasing assets in all countries. Gold will be replaced by this international money which will be bought by the national central banks at a certain fixed ratio to their own national money, and the national money will be convertible into the international money at the same rate. A unit of this international money will be exactly the same as the gramme of gold is today—the common denominator of all national currencies; but as there are no transfer costs from one country to another, the money unlike gold, will not permit fluctuations in the rates of exchange. We will call this regulative agent the "International". By means of the volume of these Internationals, which should be determined by a regulative mechanism, we can fix the value of money in the world, and the international price-level, provided that by appropriate regulation of the volume of notes and of cheque currency, we secure for each country an invariable ratio between the total volume of its money and the volume of "internationals".

So far so good. But what is the proper "regulative mechanism"? And what is the "volume of money corresponding to the demand for money"? These questions, says the author, "have been dealt with from a scientific point of view in *The Theory of the Credit Standard*". Perhaps so—depending upon what definition we give to the term "scientific". At all events the present volume undertakes to treat them in a more "popular" form.

Aiming at this laudable object, Mr. Glückstadt takes the reader

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in his chapter ii into the "credit standard's workshop" and proceeds to exhibit the devices and mechanisms which "science" has installed there for the purpose of monetary analysis and prediction. It is an interesting visit, and leaves us with the thought that the workshop in question needs a good deal of rationalization and mechanization, before it becomes very efficient. In fact the interior seems to be nearly bare of any sort of mechanical device whatever. The chapter covers about twenty pages and of these the first eight are devoted to a study of what has been done in the United States toward the "stabilization of credit" under the Federal Reserve system. Has the Reserve Board a "workshop" for the control of prices? Mr. Glückstadt says it has.

> Whereas it *must* [italics ours] have been the intention of the Federal Reserve Board to stabilise credit, the outcome of its actual policy during the years 1922-1929 was a credit expansion of quite considerable dimensions which was concealed by the stability of the price index. The stabilisation of the price index necessarily caused a rise in the earning capacity of industry corresponding to the fall in costs of production caused by the process of rationalisation. Consequently, as indicated above, prices rose on the Stock Exchange and as a result there was wild speculation. The extent of this is best illustrated by the fact that 86% of the total increase in bank credit was used for this purpose.

Well, as to this, all that can be said is that the Board and its members have repeatedly asserted that they never sought to stabilize anything, and that the subject was never discussed, so that the "credit workshop" they ran must have been unconscious or automatic. Why "must" it have been their intention to stabilize credit, if they never succeeded in doing what is spoken of, and if they refuse to admit that they at any time attempted or thought of it? As for the statement that 86 per cent of the total increase in bank credit of the United States was used for speculation, this evidently means that 86 per cent was used for loans secured by stocks. But many of these loans were for actual business purposes, not for "speculation" at all except perhaps in a remote or indirect sense. The rest of the experience in the "workshop" is devoted to drawing some diagrams based again on American experience largely, and showing the scope of the assumed "demand for money". Why foreigners now always depend on American figures and statistics as British and Swedish economists are so fond of doing, is hard to understand. Most of what they say is vitiated by ignorance of

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American figures and their limitations; and so it is in this case. Let us leave the credit workshop, until it is better equipped.

In chapter iii we enter a realm of theory or constructive suggestion. Here instructions are given dogmatically, with the large utterance of the early gods, and it is directed that the state take over all old gold holdings (why it should do so is obscure if gold is so worthless as a standard of value), then issue the "proper quantity" of international money. But the fixation of that proper quantity is still elusive. The total production of "internationals" will be distributed among the several countries "according to their respective needs" of course, but there is no measure of these needs except that "the price of money-goods is determined by the relation between supply and demand". This is spoken of as a "new" theory and perhaps it would be—in "that new world which is the old", as the poet expresses it, though probably nowhere else. In short, chapter iii is a verbose restatement of the obvious, containing much that is true and much that is new but the true is not new and the new is not true.

Chapters iv and v are largely concerned with the formulation of rules designed to guide the management of bank reserves, gold production and the like under the "new" system, all depending upon the assumption that nations will join together to operate the proposed plan, penalizing themselves for defaults and of course abstaining from war, while everything else works as it should, and missing data, not now to be had in more than two or three countries, are supplied by the banks to the money-tinkers.

The author would have done well to cease his labors with his earlier volume.

H. PARKER WILLIS

Twenty Years of Federal Reserve Policy. By S. E. HARRIS. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1933. 2 vols.—xxxix, xi, 865 pp. $7.50.

In this exhaustive and most interesting work Dr. Harris examines all the important aspects of Federal Reserve policy, from the foundation of the system to the crisis of March 1933. He has made use of not only the familiar sources, but also vast quantities of material, both statistical and documentary, obtained from the mimeographed records and other files of the Federal Reserve Board itself and not hitherto systematically examined by outside students. The base on

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which the book is written is thus far broader than that of any other book that has appeared in the field to date.

With respect to the major problems of central bank policy and control, the main conclusions which Dr. Harris reaches are both striking and in a sense principally negative. First, he finds that the rediscount rate of the Reserve Banks has played only a minor part in the determination of monetary and banking conditions in the United States; this because enforcement of a penalty rate is not practicable, because of political pressure, and because of the peculiar relations prevailing between member and Reserve banks. Second, he finds that the effectiveness of open market operations here has been greatly exaggerated; and that the Reserve authorities have often conducted these operations with confused and even erroneous objectives in view. Third, the results of the use of moral suasion, at times so popular a device, have in fact been disappointing. Although such suasion has doubtless served to restrain particular banks at particular times, there is little to show that it has been successful in altering any major movement of member-bank credit or policy. Dr. Harris thus examines all three of the major instruments of central control utilized in this country, and on the basis of past experience here denies them any assuredly great efficacy. His conclusions, so far as they are accepted, will be painful but salutary to those many optimistic students who regard central control as involving little more than a prompt and courageous use of tools whose power is assumed to be beyond question. One only regrets that Dr. Harris has not gone farther. Although he removes many of the familiar objectives and methods of control, he makes little systematic attempt to put anything in their place, and thus leaves the reader rather up in the air as to the appropriate sphere of central banking itself.

In the second volume of his study, Dr. Harris confines himself entirely to the events of the past six years. In the main, his analysis is a severe indictment of both the Reserve authorities and the member banks themselves. The easy-money policy of the Reserve authorities in and after 1927 greatly exaggerated, if it did not wholly cause, the 1927-1929 skyrocket and collapse; both the Reserve authorities and the member banks failed to judge accurately the character of what was going on, and hence failed to use adequately even such correctives as were available to them; and in the years of growing depression after 1929, effective banking leadership was almost entirely lacking. It is perhaps still too soon, however, to

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attempt a definitive judgment of the 1929-1933 disasters; certainly no two opinions would agree on the proper allocation of responsibility for them.

A number of matters of greater detail deserve favorable mention. One is the reiterated and proper stress which Dr. Harris places on the size of member and other commercial bank *reserve balances*, as a guide to current banking and business conditions and to necessary policy, in contrast to magnitudes such as total Federal Reserve credit outstanding, total member-bank indebtedness at the Reserve, market rates and the like, which the Reserve authorities themselves have commonly defended and used. Another is the stress on interregional movements of cash and deposits within this country, a field of study which is only now beginning to be opened up, and one which is of far greater importance for American banking than international payment relations. A third is the discussion of net versus gross demand deposits, and the propositions concerning the large significance of the latter. A fourth is the interesting exposition of the frequent failure of the Reserve authorities to take adequate account of internal and external movements of gold and currency, as sources of contemporary disturbance. A fifth is the extended, though I think inconclusive, discussion of the extent to which security speculation really absorbs bank deposits. Space limitations prevent reference to a number of other interesting and valuable features of the study.

Taking his book as a whole, Dr. Harris can fairly be regarded as having made a remarkable contribution, both to the history of American banking and to central-bank theory; and this judgment can be advanced, whether one agrees with the main course of the argument or not. He has opened up great quantities of new material, and has set forth a number of important and novel generalizations which no subsequent writer can ignore. Yet apart from the argument of the book, a number of serious criticisms must be made. The style is often extremely difficult to follow; many of the charts are badly planned and hard to interpret; and the relegation of so large a part of the detailed statistical evidence and discussion to appendices both diminishes the force of the argument in the text, and maddens the would-be careful reader. Finally, the historical part of the analysis itself is frequently not well done in point of craftsmanship. The development of events and policies through time is not kept sharply defined, so that one often has the feeling of jumping back and forth aimlessly; the discussion of con-

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flicting opinions among the Reserve authorities is not always adequately separated from, yet coördinated with, the discussion of what actually took place in terms of statistical magnitudes and business events, so that again the reader is confused; and finally, that segregation of statistical and graphical material which has already been referred to makes many of the important conclusions reached in the text seem to rest on insecure and uncertain foundations, well reasoned and firmly based though they doubtless are in actuality. Dr. Harris has thus not always succeeded in building up a body of exposition in proof of his propositions which is convincing to the reader, and has thereby failed to do full justice to his own materials and to his own acute understanding of their significance. These defects are not fatal, but they are serious, and I fear will somewhat impair the success of the book in obtaining that close attention from students and banking authorities which it clearly deserves.

JAMES W. ANGELL

The Interdependent World and Its Problems. By RAMSAY MUIR. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933. —xiv, 204 pp. $1.75.

This is a very mature, wise, constructive, but not very encouraging, little book. Written by a man who is a historian and a social philosopher rather than a reformer or politician, it contains suggestions for reform and for practical politics but does not trust them, or inspire trust in them, too strongly. At the same time it seems to the reviewer that the author is unduly modest (p. xiii) in deprecating his ability to diagnose the international malady and prescribe its treatment; as will appear later, it is not that the remedy is unknown but that the patient refuses to take it.

The author purports to deal with the present crisis, economic and political, in world affairs (p. xi), but in his treatment that crisis is not a matter of the past four years but of the past forty. He describes the way in which the world has been and is being unified mechanically and culturally; this includes economic unification, of course, but it also includes political unification "in the sense that the political fortune of each of them [the peoples of the earth] is intimately linked with the fortunes of the rest" (p. 8). He describes the growth and nature of nationalism and its virtues and dangers. He then deals with what he calls "the perils of interdependency", political and economic; to the reviewer these turn out to be rather

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perils of nationalism operating in an interdependent world, as the dangers of certain unnecessary corollaries of self-determination (pp. 61-66) and of tariff warfare (pp. 69-80). At one point (pp. 92-100) the author presents a fresh, interesting, and to the reviewer convincing, if not wholly relevant, reply and rejoinder to the contention that socialism or communism must replace capitalism if world order and justice are to be attained. Finally he attempts to decide what steps must be taken to bring international organization and action into accord with factual conditions; this means chiefly the limitation of the doctrine of national sovereignty or its applications, elimination of war, and international economic coöperation. As an epilogue the author asks whether national states and governments are qualified to accomplish such results and comes close to the conclusion that they are not because of the present unwillingness of Russia and America to coöperate whole-heartedly with other nations, and the shortcomings and resistance of democracy in the intelligent conduct of public, especially international, affairs; how the shortcomings of democracy may possibly be remedied he not very convincingly suggests as his last word.

The reviewer regards the book as very sound and very instructive. A number of inconsistencies or irrelevancies weaken the analysis here and there. Thus the author admits (pp. 58, 121) the necessity for guaranteed security, and (p. 133) blames America for insisting on neutrality in the face of international sanctions (the book was completed before the declaration of 22 May, last), but he rather excuses (p. 130) Great Britain for shirking her obligations under the Covenant; the only logical escape is in regionalism, which, indeed, he adopts (p. 137) though not as a direct answer to the above. At another point (pp. 103-113) he misstates and exaggerates the doctrine of sovereignty and thus makes this doctrine the obstacle to progress, rather than unwillingness to take action which even that bothersome doctrine would admit—a tactic which badly misplaces the responsibility for lack of international coöperation today; similarly for his treatment of the idea of a world state (especially on pp. 118-119). But in spite of any and all such minor matters the treatment remains sound, intelligent and mellowly hopeful even where it cannot be confident.

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Die Anglo-Russische Entente: 1903–1907. By LUDWIG POLTZ. Hamburg, the author, 1932; sold by Gebrüder Ravens, Winsen (Luhe).—vii, 234 pp.

Although the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907 was an epoch-making event of the prewar diplomacy, little was known about the long negotiations which preceded it until the fourth volume of *British Documents on the Origins of the War* was published (1929) and, curiously enough, even since then both British and Russian historians seem to have neglected the subject. Dr. Poltz's volume is therefore very welcome. He has not been able to write the definitive story, for the Russian documents of these years have not been published—and any one who has tried, e. g. to sketch and understand British policy from the German and Austrian documents knows how incomplete the picture thus derived is. The author has indeed used what Russian material he could find in the *Krasny Arkhiv* and the memoirs of individuals, but obviously he cannot have fully penetrated the mind of the Russian foreign ministers of the day when he has to rely on what they said to the British and other ambassadors in St. Petersburg. Another limitation is that Herr Poltz has apparently made little study of the British and Russian press, being content to offer a strictly diplomatic narrative. With these reservations he can be credited with a workmanlike and substantial book which is based on wide reading, is fully documented and is written with considerable detachment. Following the example of the *British Documents*, he has first described the general course of the Entente negotiations and then set forth in separate chapters the details of the controversies over Tibet, Persia and Afghanistan, a method which contributes materially to the understanding of a complicated problem.

The initiative for an understanding came from Great Britain and met with no hearty response until the Russian defeat in Manchuria; the author brings out very well the intimate connection, through the medium of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, between the Far East and the European situation. While the immediate purpose of British diplomacy was no doubt the liquidation of old disputes, there was also, in Herr Poltz's opinion, the desire for Russian coöperation against Germany. But Izvolsky, the Russian foreign minister, was so unwilling to offend Germany that in 1906 he declined an invitation to London which might be resented in Berlin; Herr Poltz repeatedly recognizes that Izvolsky was not then pursuing an

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anti-German policy and acted loyally toward the German government. In the end, however, mutual suspicion of German activity in Persia overcame many obstacles to an Anglo-Russian understanding. Izvolsky was also handicapped by the reluctance of the Russian conservatives to make an agreement with Great Britain and the opposition of the general staff to the recognition of certain British claims in Persia. But the British ambassador, Sir Arthur Nicolson, understood Izvolsky's difficulties, handled him with rare tact and patience, and repeatedly advised the British government not to press matters unduly. Sir Edward Grey, for his part, broke down the opposition of the government of India and did not hesitate to take issue with Edward VII, who was disposed to support Indian views. The diplomatic technique of the British appears to have been perfect, notably in that they were able to exclude from the formal agreement any reference to the question of the Straits—yet it was the British promise to discuss that question, at an opportune moment, which Izvolsky regarded as the essential *quid pro quo* for his concessions in the Middle East.

Herr Poltz is to be congratulated on writing as a historian, and not as a propagandist, about a diplomatic event which in the end affected his country so vitally. Naturally he points out those aspects of the negotiations which reveal an anti-German tendency. But he notes that the Anglo-Russian Entente was originally "*ein recht schwaches Gebilde*", a "*Spezialabkommen*", and that only "*im Laufe der Zeit*" did it develop into "*einer Entente allgemeineren Charakters*". It would be interesting to have from this objective writer an explanation of this development.

BERNADOTTE E. SCHMITT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Internal Debts of the United States. Edited by EVANS CLARK. Published for Twentieth Century Fund, Inc. by The Macmillan Company, New York, 1933.—xx, 430 pp. $4.50.

Nine economists (laid end to end) did, after all, reach to some conclusions in their consideration of the internal debts of the United States. By internal debts they mean all the indebtedness of debtors in the country, public and private, to creditors in the country. The somewhat heroic nine are (alphabetically), with the special topic of each: Frieda Baird, Farm Mortgage Debts; John Bauer, Public Utility Debts; Evans Clark, The Nation's Total Debts; Wilfred

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Eldred, The Railroad Debt; George B. Galloway, The Debts of the Federal Government and Financial Corporations; Wylie Kilpatrick, State and Local Debts; Gardner C. Means, The Debts of Industrial Corporations and Banks; Victoria J. Pederson, Urban Mortgage Debts; Franklin W. Ryan, Short Term Debts. Since the treatment of each topic is in itself a substantial piece of work, the names of the several authors should receive the credit of this mention. And—"*quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*"—each contributor had an adviser; indeed, one had two. If there be wisdom in a multitude of counselors there should be wisdom here.

As with many books, one should read the conclusion first, then turn to the prefaces and introductory chapter, to see the premises from which the conclusions derive. The book, dealing with a pressing problem, is an important work and deserves more than a casual remark. A rather mountainous aggregation of economists has labored and produced, though one may not admire the nursling without reserve, something greater than a mouse. With all the risk of a summary, which cannot present explanatory and qualifying statements, an outline of the general recommendations is ventured. But first a quotation will help:

> The problem of debt subdivides into two separate closely parallel problems: First, that presented by the existing disproportion between the burden of debt payments and the current levels of prices and business activity, and second, that more general problem presented by debt as an inflexible constituent of an unstable economy. These we will refer to as the immediate and the more permanent debt problems.

So much for diagnosis. Going on:

> Practically all the suggestions for dealing with these two problems reflect one or the other of two directly opposing methods of approach —that which assumes the economy as given and seeks to solve the debt problem by adjustments on the side of debts, and that which accepts the debts as given and seeks to adjust the economy to their existence. So far as the immediate debt problem is concerned, the first of these schools would bring debt into line with prices and production by a downward adjustment of debts. The opposing school would bring them into line, lifting prices and production.

Though the quotation represents the two methods as directly opposing, the recommendations propose some change in debts and more change in the economy.

Treatment is to be both remedial and preventive. In outline:

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REMEDIAL.

Immediate relief.

That adjustment be individual between each debtor and each creditor.

Reduction in interest rate.

Waiving in part or as a whole amortization provisions.

Extension of maturity of principal.

That some administrative mechanism be established in each debt field to facilitate the individual adjustment.

Injunction against foreclosure (individual, not general moratorium).

Measures to induce recovery.

Expansion of the volume of money (bank credit and/or currency).

Expansion of public works.

PREVENTIVE—measures of permanent protection.

Control of money.

Control of the creation of capital.

Possible improvements in the direction of debt flexibility with respect to:

Volume of debt.

Duration of debt.

Flexible debt contract (contract for return of equivalence in value).

Recasting bankruptcy laws.

Continuance of administrative mechanisms.

It is not at first clearly stated that the administrative mechanism for individual adjustments should have mandatory power rather than relying only on persuasion, like a judge in chambers trying to bring opposing counsel together, but later it appears that the mechanism should be mandatory, at least to the extent of having the power, which a court of equity enjoys in receiverships, to enjoin foreclosure. Likewise at first the collaborating economists seem coy about recommending the control of money, but they soon come out boldly for it, even to the extent of advising the national government, if necessary, to take over all commercial banking. So our economists are *strong* men. They weaken a little when they come to control of the creation of capital, and recommend immediately only the gathering and consideration of data to see if some direct control may be desirable.

One might question whether a footnote was married to truth before giving birth to the idea that the position of the debtor in a

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period of falling prices concerns society more than the position of the creditor in a period of rising prices. It says:

> Rising prices and rising business activity do not affect debt relations in such a way as to cause important economic dislocation, or widespread suffering, while the impairment of creditors' real income through reduction in the purchasing power of fixed money payments is in part counterbalanced by the greater certainty of their payment. Rising prices and business activity do not produce such general economic disasters as wholesale bank failures. At most they bring about a shift in real income and wealth between debtor and creditor.

Though the position of the creditor in a period of rising prices may not worry this strategy board, its own statistics show the rapid expansion of debt in such a period to a tension at which it could not withstand the shock of the depression. A debtor is a speculator, and the speculations of debtors assisted by incautious lenders follow up the bull market of increasing nominal values of rising price, which eventually tip the topheavy economy until both debtor and creditor fall into the ditch. Which, falling or rising prices, is the proximate cause of disaster? It is an old statement that if we would sit on the bulges we would not have to iron out the depression. Of the total farm-mortgage debt isn't the 60 per cent concentrated in the North Central states largely due to a speculative chase of land values running neck and neck with rising prices for produce? And is not a recovery program based on raising the price level likely to defeat itself? To be sure the rise is to be accomplished in a manner "capable of immediate reversal", but will the speculator-debtor, under control by the creditor, maintain a reserve adequate to absorb any slack whatever of reversal?

An essentially false premise appears in the introductory chapter. "There is no 'debtor class' any more than there is a 'creditor class' in the United States. Most of us are both at the same time." It is true that the debtor-creditor relationships range between the extremes of those who are creditors without being debtors and those who are debtors without being creditors. Nevertheless, the greater interest of each man who is either debtor or creditor generally lies on one side or the other. If I owe others $10,000 and others owe me $5,000 I would be a gainer to the extent of $5,000 by a general debt repudiation. Political activity on behalf of debtors as self-seeking is not stupid.

Elaborating statistics of debts in relation to national wealth and national income, the authors seem concerned with the burden of debt

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on production, or perhaps, one would better say the creditors' claim on production. They seem to be careless of debt duplications—for example the debts of life insurance companies and other financial institutions, including investment trusts. In the end they clear up confusion by showing that their concern is with the inflexibility of a debt structure of such magnitude in relation to wealth and production. Though one may be skeptical of figures of "national wealth" and "national income" perhaps they represent something distantly approximating a fact. As given they apparently include the error of price. One might remark that presumably it is not the economist's function to fit his program into any particular constitutional frame.

Length of expression of incomplete agreement should not entirely exclude acknowledgment of the admirable execution of a large task. The concluding chapter in making its recommendations is a delightfully lucid and penetrative essay. Special comment on the performance of each author would prolong this review beyond the possible length of publication. The several sections ably present the situation in their respective fields.

HASTINGS LYON

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The Natural Laws of Social Convulsion. By SIDNEY A. REEVE. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1933.—xvi, 591 pp. $5.00.

This volume is an excerpt from a more comprehensive work, *The Evolution of Social Crises*, which has not as yet been published. It is divided into two parts, the first entitled "France and her Revolution", the second, "History Right End Foremost". The second is devoted to the exposition of forty-five "cosmic laws of social evolution". It is with the first that we are now concerned. The author's method of treatment obscures his theory of the causes and nature of the French Revolution. Instead of giving us the necessary details of fact, he constantly diverges into wearisome iteration of the evils of "Commercialism" and denunciations of the "nauseous compote of nonsense and cynicism which Commercialism, during the last fifty or sixty years, has disseminated, through our universities suborned to Commercialism, as history". Another characteristic of his method is to present the phases of the old régime or the Revolution mainly by quotation from other writers, whose opinions he pro-

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ceeds to combat or reënforce. His exposition is also marred by a multitude of minor errors. For example, Marat appears as a member of the Committee of Public Safety. The Declaration of Pillnitz and the Manifesto of Brunswick are confused. The First Coalition is predated. There are four Directors and the Directory abolished the Maximum. Such defects would not weaken the cogency of the main argument were this not undermined by errors more serious.

The thesis of the work appears to be that the Revolution was brought about by a topheavy social system, the creation of a rapid increase in wealth, which in turn was due to invention, especially of the steam engine, and to the expansion of credit, first through John Law's paper money, later by the "advent of modern interest-bearing securities". The crisis came when the Court and the Court nobles tried to absorb an undue share of this wealth through monopolies and sinecures. The consequence was bankruptcy, with the necessity of calling the States General. Then followed a revolution which no one anticipated. The resistance of the Court party brought on violence, while the machinations of English "Commercialism", backing the Coalition, produced the Reign of Terror. That France was growing richer in the quarter of a century following the end of the Seven Years' War, no serious student will deny. The paragraphs combating the "revolt-from-misery" conception of the Revolution are wasted effort. The idea that John Law's schemes or other eighteenth century promotions actually enriched France is as fantastic as the statement that "in 1715 Law's plan looked good to Louis XV", who was then five years old. Equally so is the statement that this wealth was in any sense due to the introduction of the steam engine, a notion repeated under many forms—"the land was being steamdriven into unprecedented prosperity", "old France, steamfactoried", "steamdriven Bourbon France", "wealth arising from steamdriven Commercialism". The author's own account (pp. 150-151) shows the absurdity of these phrases, for he says that in "1780 Perier is reported as having set up three steam-engines on or near Paris within a single year". He also says that in "1781 Watt brought out his first engine capable of driving rotating shafting, in factories", and that "only four years afterwards, such engines were being built in Paris". As this was but four years before the Revolution began, it is difficult to see how French wealth prior to the Revolution was in any sense the creation of the steam engine. The statement of Charles Ballot (*L'Introduction du machinisme dans l'industrie française*, Paris, 1923), is undisputed: "*La machine à*

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vapeur était donc fort peu employée en France au XVIII^e siècle". The theory that the Court tried to absorb the new French wealth through monopolies is well-nigh as flimsy, especially since by monopolies the author does not mean either the salt or the tobacco monopoly, but such government enterprises as the Gobelins, which, he intimates, produced high-priced tapestries to draw in the money of the rich.

Much might be said of the author's conception of the course of the Revolution, but space forbids. It is sufficiently evident that if the laws of social crises are to be inferred from the phenomena of the French Revolution, a primary condition is that the facts should be exactly determined.

HENRY E. BOURNE

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Economic Development in Modern Europe. By CLIVE DAY. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1933.—xiv, 447 pp. $2.50.

This sketch of the economic development of modern Europe deals with the development of industry and agriculture in England, France, Germany and Russia from the last quarter of the eighteenth century to the present time. Despite the concentration of attention on these primary topics the discussion is severely compressed, as the space is almost equally divided among the four countries. Germany receives the least space, seventy-three pages; England, the most, one hundred and twenty-nine pages. This compression of statement, however, is essentially in keeping with the elementary character of the text. The book is addressed to the underclassmen of the average college, and is doubtless within the compass of the last two classes of the best secondary schools. There are questions for study at the end of each chapter and references for further reading appropriate to such students. Notes at the end of the volume furnish the critical documentation and give brief bibliographical references. The book will thus be a useful companion volume to the author's *History of Commerce.*

In scope and interpretation the text follows the general position made familiar by Mantoux and the writers who hold that the nineteenth century was characterized by a process of industrialization that began specifically with an "Industrial Revolution" in England, which was "copied" or "transmitted" to the continental countries. Professor Day's position is distinctive in a number of ways. There

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is less emphasis than usual on invention and upon the development of the steam engine. The thesis of Epstein and Witt Bowden is adopted, subordinating the inventor to general social conditions. "There was an 'outburst of inventive genius' in England shortly before 1800, not because a new race of heroes had come into existence, but because a whole society had become ready to appreciate and apply inventions, to discover and stimulate them" (p. 26). Professor Day holds that the most significant element of novelty in England was the emergence of a new class of "captains of industry". "These men saw the opportunities offered by the economic society of the time; they found the separate parts and combined them as a whole. . . . No other country as yet offered similar opportunities. Old laws and customs in them stifled individual initiative, diverted men of vigor and originality from attempts to establish new forms in industry, or repressed them in any effort to accomplish that end" (p. 28). In general therefore, we find here a view that stresses differences in social and political conditions rather than the economic geography of basic economic resources and their changing significance under a new technology of industry and transport. Many mature readers will regret that this interesting position is presented in this compressed form, which does not fully reveal either its merits or its defects.

This general point of view is not ill suited to the description of the more important economic changes in the particular countries, but it does not present a satisfactory explanation of the timing or the magnitudes of the changes in the various countries. In a text of this general scope this deficiency is of slight importance, and it is hardly fitting to undertake any extensive discussion of the general issue. This general interpretation inevitably colors the entire discussion of development in England, France and Germany, but the nature of social conditions in Russia makes the history of that country a relatively independent episode, dominated by internal rather than by external conditions. These chapters on Russia are of especial interest. The sketch of conditions before and after the emancipation of the serfs is vivid and interesting. The discussion of the development of Soviet policy since the Revolution is painstaking and objective. The purposes of the leaders are fairly and significantly stated, though the difficulties encountered are pointed out with a keen sense of realism.

ABBOTT PAYSON USHER

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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Diritto coloniale italiano. By ERNESTO CUCINOTTA. 2d ed. Rome, Società Editrice del "Foro Italiano", 1933.—xii, 529 pp. 55 lire.

The development of the study of Italian colonial law and administration has been slow, due not only to the relative smallness of Italy's colonial domain, but also to the general indifference of pre-Fascist Italy in colonial matters. The advent of Fascism has been accompanied by an augmented enthusiasm for imperialism, of which a happy byproduct is the great advance made toward the erection of colonial law and administration into an autonomous discipline. This process, already under way prior to 1922, has been marked on the one hand by the establishment in one university after another of courses in colonial law, and on the other by the gradual divorce of colonial law from its status as an incidental subsidiary to international law, constitutional law and political history. The present work of Cucinotta may be considered as evidence that that process has been completed and that the new school of Italian colonial jurisprudence, of which he is one of the outstanding leaders, will henceforth stand on its own feet.

During the last decade there have appeared several useful textbooks on Italian colonial government, such as those of Mondaini, Malvezzi and Borsi. Of them all Cucinotta's revised edition is certainly the most comprehensive, the most up-to-date and the most reliable. Cucinotta's thorough grasp of the processes of government is based not only on academic researches but upon actual experience, for he combines his functions as professor of colonial law at the University of Rome with his duties as judge.

The material of Cucinotta's manual is highly organized and classified for ready reference by students and functionaries. The style is precise and clear, as one would expect from a jurist trained in the tradition of the Roman law. It is not, however, a mere compilation or catalogue. The author is guided by a very definite philosophy, which he unfolds in the opening chapter. His scholarship is unimpeachable and on the whole he succeeds admirably in his efforts to clear up the points in dispute among his predecessors. In addition to treating mere *law* as we would understand that term, Cucinotta describes the whole juridical and administrative structure of the Italian colonial system. He is, perhaps unfortunately, more interested in the morphology than in the physiology of governmental organs, although the presence of brief historical backgrounds pre-

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ceding his descriptions of present institutions indicates that the dynamic element is not wholly absent.

In Part I is analyzed the general juridical status of Italy's colonies. Part II, concerning politico-administrative organization, is the section that will be most welcome to students of comparative government. Much of the apparatus of Italian colonial government resembles that of the other imperial powers. Yet there are several interesting variations dictated by Italy's own experience, such as, for example, the complicated system whereby the natives of Eritrea and Libya with their various sects of Christians, Mohammedans and pagans, all living more or less intermixed, are subject in many cases to the norms of their ancient tribal or religious customs. In general the relation of the Italian régime to the natives has been governed by the prevailing political philosophy. Since the creation of the Fascist state this relationship has been based upon a policy of prestige, quite different from the policy of collaboration essayed by the former liberal governments.

The third part takes up financial and economic organization. It is in this field that we encounter Italy's most original contributions to colonial technique. Experience acquired in the allocation of concessions to state lands in Libya has recently led the Fascist government to adopt the policy of granting concessions in such a manner as to put the largest possible number of Italian colonists on the land, especially in the recently pacified Gebel of Cyrenaica. This is an experiment the results of which will certainly be highly instructive.

ROBERT GALE WOOLBERT

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Political Science. By RAYMOND GARFIELD GETTELL. Boston, Ginn and Company, 1933.—viii, 488 pp. $2.80.

As long as the effort is made to teach political science in American universities and colleges, differences of opinion appear certain to exist concerning the best way of teaching it. Many college and university students have studied, do study, and will for a long time continue to study political science only during one year, so far as an organized course in the subject is concerned. This course, the "introductory course", is, therefore, for large numbers of students not only the beginning but the end of organized study of political science. There is no wonder, then, that much interest attaches to what should be attempted in this course.

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Professor Gettell has taken a definite position in the matter. He states this position in the preface to a textbook which he has written with the simple title *Political Science*, a book similar in many respects to his well-known *Introduction to Political Science* and yet different enough to warrant its being considered a new book. He does not believe that the best way to begin a college or university study of political science is either through a descriptive account of the government of the United States or through a comparative examination of the political institutions of the most influential existing states. He considers, on the contrary, that the best introduction to political science consists of "a study of the state as an institution". His book has been consciously planned and executed on this basis.

In Part I, a preliminary examination is made of political science as a science through the treatment of questions concerning its methods and its relationship to other sciences, natural as well as humanistic. Part II, entitled "The Nature of the State", not only contains a treatment of the elements of the State which are yielded by analysis, but likewise deals with the question of the origin of the state and includes a chapter on political theory. In Part III, consisting of nine chapters, one of the elements of the state, namely government, is treated at some length. Two chapters which make up Part IV are devoted to the question of state functions and to theories concerning them. Three final chapters, which compose Part V, treat of international relations and law and of associations of states. Each chapter is followed by a list of references.

A textbook written with a definite end in view ought doubtless to be appraised primarily in terms of this end. From such a standpoint, Professor Gettell's book deserves high praise. It is on the whole well planned, and it is so concisely written that subject matter of enormous extent is brought within the compass of what is by no means a long book. In respect of controversial questions, varying views are succinctly but fairly stated, and only rarely does the effort at conciseness result in unqualified statements which give the appearance of certainty where there may well be difference of opinion.

On the other hand, though Professor Gettell's book may thus be regarded as a distinguished accomplishment of its avowed purpose, it will not necessarily for that reason alter the conviction of those who prefer a different introduction to political science. If the latter see in the book reasons for adhering to their former views, the fact that it is a good book serves really to strengthen those reasons. Some people may well feel sympathy for the principle on which the book

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is based, without for that reason considering it the most desirable type of introductory textbook. In so far as it manifests a reaction against overemphasis of the "pragmatic approach" and of "scientific method", it will be regarded by many students as wholesome and timely; and yet it will not necessarily bring nearer solution the problem how to begin teaching political science. Unless Professor Gettell is extraordinarily fortunate in his beginning students, then, with respect to them, much of his concise treatment must remain so allusive as to be relatively superficial. Doubtless there can in this matter be no disagreement about the desirability of "facts" but only about the necessary degree of knowledge of them and the relative order of their acquisition. Part III, for example, furnishes interesting illustrations. It is really a short treatise on comparative government. Whether or not it is a recognition of the necessity for furnishing beginning students with factual material, it is in a definite sense inconsistent with the announced aim of the book. On the other hand, the brevity of this comparative treatment, necessary for purposes of perspective, renders the account so sketchy as to be of doubtful adequacy. Finally, several mistakes of fact may doubtless be regarded as of minor importance on the part of the author of a book the emphasis of which is not on facts, but such errors will serve as a warning to some teachers against recommending to beginning students an emphasis congenial to the master of a subject.

R. K. Gooch

University of Virginia

British Industries and Their Organization. By G. C. Allen. London and New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1933.—xi, 338 pp. $2.60.

At a time when there is so much interest in the fate of the modern industrial system, a critical study of British industries and their organization is of considerable significance. This is particularly true since many economists have been accustomed to regard those industries as the apotheosis of the whole system. True, the British industrial structure, even before the war, was not the only important one, and it was excelled in some points by those of other countries such as Germany and the United States. But it was the first one to emerge after the Industrial and Commercial Revolutions, and long remained in many respects a sort of prototype. If that structure has shown persistent signs of weakness since the war, even during periods

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of prosperity, and if the whole industrial system of the Western world, as conducted under the régime of modified but fundamental private capitalism, has been subjected to the attack of the new doctrines, a careful and impartial analysis of it is useful both in an immediate way and as a major case study in the régime itself. In short, if British industry had become a tradition, a phenomenon whose success was pointed to in practical support of such things as free trade theory and the entire body of laissez-faire economic and politico-economic doctrine, and if it has not done too well, in recent times, it cannot fail to be profitable for more than one author to undertake to examine it and diagnose, if not prescribe for, its ailments. Moreover, modern British industry has always been so greatly and pivotally involved in world markets, that a study of it cannot avoid being in some measure also a study of international commerce and its trends.

Dr. Allen begins with a chapter on British industry before 1914. This is fairly familiar economic history, although some distinctions drawn between the characteristics of several different periods within the century are not without freshness. In any event the chapter is a good summary. The next eight chapters deal successively with different leading individual industries or groups of industries, which are examined shortly but apparently with considerable familiarity. The final chapters, on British industry since the war, and changes in the structure of industry, are the most engaging.

In these the author proceeds from his individual cases to a broader analysis. He avowedly avoids, for the most part, the labor question, and he has not very much to say about monetary policy, in their relation to industry. But he penetrates a good many features of industry and trade proper. He raises two questions as points of departure. "First, how is the change in the relative importance of the different industries—a world-wide phenomenon—to be explained; and secondly, why did Great Britain of all the industrial nations suffer the most severe losses in the older trades while failing to secure a compensating share of the growing industries?"

Some of his principal conclusions are sufficiently interesting to summarize. First of all he shares the view of some other writers that, the world over, demand for luxuries has grown more rapidly than that for primary commodities and capital goods. Consequently prices of raw materials and foodstuffs have declined, as is well known, more than other prices. The manufacturing nations have thus been able to obtain their raw stuffs more cheaply, and in this

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very way have been able to increase their luxury consumption. But they have also suffered by the attendant fall in the purchasing power of raw-product countries. The latter countries have also, for the same reason, tended to turn more to manufacturing of their own, but not being in a position to produce specialties have confined their fabrication to the staple finished goods which are the very things that Great Britain had so largely been relying upon in production and export. Again, technical developments have had their effect; for example, the declining importance of coal as a source of power and heat partly removed one of Britain's old advantages over her competitors. Financially, British industry has suffered from difficulty in raising new capital cheaply, and from the burdens imposed when in 1925 she returned to the gold standard without devaluation.

The author also reaches the general conclusion that "one of the chief sources of industrial depression since the war is to be found in increased instability of demand." He agrees with Mr. Loveday that this is primarily due to the increasing proportion of consumers' income available for luxuries, the demand for which is fickle. But he questions Mr. Loveday's belief that this will be a permanent source of difficulty in balancing consumption and productive capacity. He thinks the luxury demand will ultimately settle down into a fairly uniform mould. He goes on to point out the dangers of mass production, which he considers less quickly adaptable to changes in demand. Technical advances make large scale industry quickly expansible but difficult to contract and adapt. He also believes that the growth in size of concerns has widened the gulf between ownership and control and that this may contribute to rigidity. He alludes, too, to changes in administration in industry, and in the goods-distribution process—a process which occupies so much larger a portion of the population than it did in the earlier periods.

At the end he says that the maladjustments he has traced "demonstrate the failure of the modern variant of private capitalism at a time when technical progress is rapid to ensure a reasonable degree of stability in the economic life of nations", and that "it is becoming increasingly recognized that the structure of modern industry and finance and the present temper of society cannot be reconciled with free competition, and that the future lies with 'management' in some form or other." He winds up by contrasting national economic planning and international (functional) economic planning through producers' combines and cartels or otherwise, and by observing that "on the outcome of the conflict between

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these opposing principles depends the dominant industrial structure of the future." He fears the dangers of economic nationalism, and favors the international type of "management."

In recent years there have been innumerable books on the depression, many on its industrial aspects, and a number dealing with the British industrial position. Dr. Allen freely states that he has utilized some of these extensively. It may not be that he has presented any ideas entirely new. But his book has two real and somewhat distinctive merits. First, he has drawn his conclusions on the basis of what appears to be a fairly careful inductive examination of some leading industries in a leading country. Second, if he has suggested no detailed program for the cure of the ills he has described, he has at least summarized those ills in a brief, clear and readable fashion. Though nominally a study of a British situation, the book is at least equally suggestive of economic characteristics of the industrial situation in Western countries as a whole, and also of some important problems of their relationships, that is, of international economic relations.

JOHN DONALDSON

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

A History of Greek Public Finance. Volume I. By A. M. ANDREADES. Translated by CARROLL N. BROWN. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1933.—412 pp. $6.00.

The first volume of the projected four-volume *History of Greek Public Finance* by Professor A. M. Andreades of the Faculty of Law at the University of Athens was originally published in 1918 in Greek. In its first edition the book gradually gained recognition among students of the history of antiquity and among economists as a work of immense industry and erudition. Andreades' treatment of the subject was unique in the fact that he had boldly attempted to bring into one comprehensive scheme all the existing knowledge of the theory of public finance among the ancient Greeks, as well as its practice, which varied so widely among the multiple Greek municipal and territorial states. In his approach to the exacting task which he had undertaken Professor Andreades had the initial and important advantage of a wide and practical knowledge of modern finance and of a position of authority in the study of medieval finance. Also it was quite clear that his acqaintance with the scattered information from ancient sources was a thorough one.

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In 1931 a German translation of the second Greek edition (of 1928) appeared, in which the subject had been extensively reworked and expanded. The publication of the German version was generally regarded as a noteworthy event because it made accessible to a much wider circle of scholars the results of Andreades' long study and comprehensive grasp of this important section of ancient economic life. The translation into English, recently made by Professor Carroll N. Brown of the College of the City of New York, now widens the appeal which the volume will have, to include those scholars, and particularly graduate and undergraduate students, who would find the technical vocabulary of the German edition an effective barrier against an approach to the subject. A French translation is also promised for the near future. In the opinion of the present reviewer the solidity of the work and the unique place which it fills fully warrant the expense of publishing the English translation.

In four sections of quite unequal length Andreades, in this first volume, covers the methods of Greek public finance from the Homeric period to the time of Alexander the Great. Book I, covering thirty-two pages, is given over to the explanation of the finances of the primitive Greek states of the Homeric period, which are described as "parasitic" in character, that is, as based upon exactions by raid and robbery from enemies and neutrals. The bad financial system of the Spartan state was largely responsible, in the mind of the author, for the weakness of Sparta in the fourth century and its ultimate downfall (Book II, pp. 37-75). The bulk of this volume, however, is given over to the discussion of the general financial attitude and policies of the Greek city-states of the "classical" period (Book III, pp. 79-190), and the intensive study of Athenian financial history and financial methods in Book IV (pp. 197-390). Book III begins with a discussion of the meaning of the financial terms used by the ancient Greeks, followed by a very interesting and instructive comparison with the economic organization of the Persian Empire (pp. 89-107). The latter subject must necessarily be expanded when the author takes up the finances of Alexander the Great and his successors in the second volume.

In a short review one is tempted to call attention to this or that bit of inscriptional evidence or to some literary citation which does not appear in the book, or to present individual differences of conclusion drawn from the evidence which Professor Andreades has so thoroughly and conscientiously collected. The reviewer thinks it much more fair to call attention to the amazing care which the Greek

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scholar has taken in gathering his material and the sound judgment, on the whole, of his decisions. The notes display, as it seems to me, an overscrupulous attention to the modern secondary material, amounting at times to pedantry. Yet this fault, through the comprehensive bibliography incorporated in the notes, helps to give to the work its permanent value as one of the three essential studies which any scholar must constantly have at hand who would work in the field of Greek public finance preceding the time of Alexander. The other two are August Boeckh's *Haushaltung der Athener* and Henri Francotte's *Les Finances des cités grecques.*

The translator, Professor Carroll N. Brown, deserves much thanks for the trouble and time expended in making this valuable work accessible to English-reading students. The translation of the text, based upon the second Greek edition, is clear and readable. Unfortunately quite a number of irritating, though unimportant, typographical errors and careless mistakes of reference appear in the text and notes, some of which no doubt carry over from the Greek edition. As examples of this, note: Steinweter for Steinwenter, p. 33; Recht von Gortyns, p. 42; "*Staat der Athener und kein* (read *sein*) *Ende*" (p. 200, note 6). In the translation of a sentence from Bernhard Laum (see note 4 to page 80) *das republikanische Rom* appears as "the Roman democracy", and *das typische Beispiel eines Staates* as "a typical example of a nation". In a possible reprinting of the English edition the notes, particularly, should be very carefully revised and checked with the German edition which is, in this respect, much more accurate than the English version. Numerous references to modern Greek translations of German and French works could profitably be dropped as having no possible value in a publication intended for non-Greek readers.

WILLIAM LINN WESTERMANN

Monetary Problems of the British Empire. By S. E. HARRIS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1931.—xvi, 569 pp. $5.00.

Dr. Harris has written a careful volume dealing with five phases of recent British monetary policy: the financial policy of the early months of the war, followed by a review of control of prices and incidental matters; a discussion of inflation and deflation in Great Britain; a survey of exchange and gold policy thereafter; a study of Indian monetary policies; and a similar review of Australian and South African questions.

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The ground covered in the book before us is of first importance to the student of contemporary currency theory and practice, and any thoughtful survey of it ought to have attentive reading. Dr. Harris covers his subject meticulously, with a large array of footnotes, references, quotations of authorities and detailed discussion—much of it judicious—but the treatment lacks vitality. The reader must steadily hold his attention to the work in hand, or it will wander. The author is an annalist rather than an analyst, and his work suffers in influence correspondingly. As a result, his volume lacks incisiveness and force. It will be read by relatively few of those who ought to peruse it, and of those few only a percentage will carry away the lessons that are taught by the facts the author has painfully collected and set forth. Perhaps the reason for this failure is that too much is included in it; and too large a scope, ranging from Britain to India and back to South Africa, is taken within the purview of the study. It is impossible for any writer to show himself an authority on every issue of so vast an array, especially when some of the questions raised have only a very general relation one to another, in that they are all problems of that imposing but loose organization —the British Empire.

The volume, however, has been provided with an introduction in which the author has condensed some of his most significant findings, and the reader may then, at leisure, find his way through the remainder of the material that is presented.

According to Dr. Harris, the study he has made of the effects of the British financing at the opening of the World War reveals that the large discounts of premoratorium bills and advances to acceptors were not of as great significance as might be expected—largely because they were "successive". The moratorium can be justified in its international aspects, only if it did not lead to similar measures abroad. Apparently the policies of other debtor nations were determined by other considerations. In Book II, it is pointed out that the current financing of Great Britain was not as important a cause of inflation as has generally been assumed. To some extent, the British Treasury policy was actually deflationary. Conditions however, whether deflationary or not (for reasons insufficiently explained) led to price control—"in part a fiscal weapon". In Book III, it is pointed out that control of prices, which was necessarily followed by the control of the distribution of commodities, was to some extent responsible for the phenomenal sale of war securities in 1917 and 1918. When confidence in the government lagged,

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hoarding of cash and deposits became more general. The problem of inflation (Book IV) is in large part a problem of "deficient supplies". If a small deficit appears, the public dumps large quantities of purchasing power on the market in an attempt to obtain necessary supplies. The weight to be attached to large quantities of currency notes, in an explanation of inflation, has become the subject of rather bitter discussions. The position taken by the government (of Great Britain) that the creation of notes was not the cause of inflation was, on the whole, defensible. Proposals to limit notes in such periods are fanciful. Advances on premoratorium bills were the first inflationary measures taken. The government's contribution to the policy of deflation eventually was important. The British pegging policy was judicious (Book VI). Control of import trade saved the country from the large imports that might accompany pegging in a period in which unnecessary consumption, and particularly unnecessary imports, were to be discouraged. However, the increased value of sterling was "not a net gain, for American banks were forced to create more dollars on account of the large number of dollars put at the disposal of Great Britain in the course of the pegging process, and therefore as a result of the higher prices more dollars were required for the purchase of American commodities." The objective of England's deflation policy was to raise sterling to the prewar parity with gold, and therefore the appreciation of the dollar or its equivalent gold made England's task more difficult. The general position of British banking and fiscal policy thus afforded is followed by brief chapters on Australia and South Africa which, however, do not add greatly to what is already available regarding those countries, or to what has been developed (from the point of view of Britain) by Dr. Harris in the preceding pages of his own volume.

We have thus before us one of those detailed and indecisive studies of a large tract of thought which have become familiar in contemporary monetary study. They furnish the material with which others may work, and provide the basis for later analyses designed to afford interpretations and conclusions for the guidance of national policies. In this, they are serviceable, and their merit should not be minimized. A broader method of treatment is called for in the present emergencies. Incidentally, it is regrettable that this book (whose introduction is dated January 1931) could not have been held back for eight months or a year. The author would then have taken a different attitude on certain important matters, and would

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have altered some even of the very cautious judgments which he actually expresses. Unfortunately, no one can foresee the future, and if publication of economic studies were always deferred until conditions were "settled" perhaps it would never occur. But there is, at all times, need of great caution about regarding them as thus "settled", and about basing conclusions upon such judgments. Dr. Harris has in the main been successful in avoiding the pitfalls which such uncertainties open before us.

H. PARKER WILLIS

The Eighteenth Amendment and Our Foreign Relations. By ROBERT L. JONES. New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1933.—vii, 192 pp. $1.75.

This little book contains an interesting account of the international aspects of the United States government's efforts to enforce the prohibition laws especially with respect to the smuggling of intoxicating liquors over our land and water frontiers. It is written in a readable fashion, generally free from technicalities, yet sufficiently documented.

It opens with two chapters which contain a general survey of the situation. The difficulties attending the suppression of the rum-smugglers are outlined with a brief but accurate reference to the applicable rules of international law. The story is traced through the Supreme Court's decision in the *Cunard* case which gave the State Department a *quid pro quo* in negotiating the liquor treaties by which it secured from other governments consent to seize rum-runners within an hour's sail of shore, and is continued up to the conclusion of the treaties.

Then follow chapters dealing individually with Great Britain, Canada (with a separate chapter on the *I'm Alone* case), France, Cuba, Mexico and Japan. In these chapters, which go over much the same ground, though in greater detail, there is necessarily some repetition. They make a real contribution in describing the prohibition law problems in the setting of our general relations with the other countries concerned. The outline of the trend of opinion in other countries is excellent. The texts of the British, French and Japanese treaties are added in three appendices. There is a brief index, chiefly of proper names.

In a treatment such as this there are of course many omissions of detail, but Professor Jones is obviously familiar with the whole story

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and gives a fair picture of it. In case of a future edition, the reviewer ventures to call the author's attention to a few typographical errors and to some statements which might be improved:

On page 18, it would be well to note that a majority of the treaties which followed that with Great Britain reserved existing claims to territorial waters instead of affirming the three-mile limit as was done in the British treaty; the point is covered in the later detailed discussion of the French treaty.

On page 30, it is hardly correct to speak of the liquor treaty as a "reversal" of the Supreme Court's decision in the *Cunard* case.

On page 32, with reference to the case of *Milliken v. Stone*, the rôle of the Supreme Court was merely to refuse a writ of certiorari.

On page 33, note 23, the organization referred to is the Council on Foreign Relations, not "Foreign Affairs."

On page 39, the *Quandra* should be the *Quadra.*

On page 55, the reference to the State Department's secrecy is incorrect if it refers to the period prior to 1927; the Department was extremely free in making the diplomatic correspondence available to scholars.

On page 70, notes 21 and 22 should refer to Mr. Grew, not "Crew."

On page 157, there is a glaring error worthy only of a senator. The author says: "With Cuba there is a supplementary agreement that if the United States joins the League of Nations the Court of International Justice, instead of the Court of Arbitration, shall settle these claims." On page 121 the author had stated the point correctly: ". . . in the event of the adherence of the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice . . . ", which is *not* the same thing as joining the League!

PHILIP C. JESSUP

Population Trends in the United States. By WARREN S. THOMPSON and P. K. WHELPTON. New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1933.—x, 415 pp. $4.00.

In gathering data for the President's Research Committee on Recent Social Trends extensive compilations were made, many of them over long periods, which could not readily be included in the combined report of the Committee. This monograph makes these accumulated materials available to students of population problems in the United States. Larger space permits the authors to discuss

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the significance of the data in more detail, and about 70 pages of tables in the appendix present the statistics assembled from standard sources, relating to various aspects of the distribution and composition of the population.

The authors deal almost exclusively with the quantitative aspects of population, utilizing the great mass of data found in government reports—growth (chapter i), distribution (ii), national origins (iii), age composition (iv), sex (v), marital status (vi), mortality (vii), births (viii), immigration and natural increase (ix). The last chapter but one (x) discusses probable future trends and probable consequences of the slowing up in the rate of growth, as the country rapidly approaches a stationary or even a declining population. The final chapter (xi) reviews our population policies, from early encouragement of numbers from without and of rapid natural increase from within, characteristic of a new country, to our present rigid restriction by government regulation of immigration. Our changing attitude toward large families and the growing tendency to restrict numbers from within, through birth control, are briefly described.

The last few pages of the concluding chapter are devoted to outlining the problems of quality of the population, and to suggesting ways of improvement for the future. In this field objective data are not so abundant and the conclusions drawn from the data are controversial in character.

Our population is now more than fifty times larger than at the time when the colonies separated from the mother country. From the first census, in 1790, until the Civil War it doubled every twenty-five years or less—since that time the rate of growth has been steadily slowing up, to such an extent that the numbers did not quite double during the last forty years, 1890-1930. The greatest absolute increase during any single year was in 1923, well over 2,000,000, but this yearly increment had fallen to less than 900,000 in 1931.

It is very likely that birth rates will continue their downward trend and that restriction of immigration will become a permanent policy. The authors regard it as highly probable that our population will have approached a maximum number by the year 1980, at about 155,000,000. It may become stationary at this level or it may actually decline in numbers.

The economic and social consequences of a stationary, as compared with a rapidly growing population, are many and varied. The tempo of our economic development has been closely associated with rapid increase in numbers of people. We can no longer depend upon

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mere numbers to absorb the ever increasing flow of products which results from the combination of rich natural resources and the ingenuity of man. Under the new conditions it will be in the interest of both labor and capital that more attention be given to the distribution of wealth and to the equilibrium between production and consumption. This will make better customers of the people we have by assuring them of buying power.

Students of population are greatly indebted to the authors for this valuable compendium of data and for the organization of the materials. Some readers will be disappointed at the omission of such evidence as has accumulated concerning trends in the quality of our population. Questions are being raised as to the effects of the public health movement and modern social policies upon the quality of future population. Many are concerned about the differential rates of natural increase in different classes of the population, because it may be true that these differences are selecting the biologically poorer quality for survival. The authors do not attempt to answer in this monograph these and other questions concerning the quality of our future population.

ROBERT E. CHADDOCK

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BOOK NOTES

A one-volume survey of German history in English, which should be attractive in style and comprehensive in treatment, and which should also embody the findings of modern scholarship, has long been desired. Hermann Pinnow's *History of Germany, People and State, through a Thousand Years*, translated by Mabel Richmond Brailsford (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1933; viii, 473 pp. $2.75), unfortunately only partially fulfills the above requirements. The proportions are admirable, and ample attention is paid to the economic, social and cultural aspects. After a brief introduction covering the period before 900 A. D., there follow four books of approximately equal length, with dividing points at the years 1200, 1500 and 1800. The book is frankly for the layman and includes neither footnotes nor bibliography. On the whole the volume is a substantial piece of work, although in places the interpretation is not in accord with the best modern scholarship. The political ideals of Dr. Pinnow, a German historian and educator of some note, are those of the Frankfort Assembly of 1848 and of the Weimar Republic. Unfortunately, in his treatment of the World War, the author allows his patriotism free rein, and claims that the Germans "were fighting solely in their own defense" (p. 407). Not the least apology is made for the invasion of Belgium or the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The original German edition published at Berlin in 1929 contained thirty-two excellent plates and the whole format was typical of the best German practice. The American publishers regrettably saw fit to omit the plates, and to use a print which is a decided strain upon the eyes, as a result of which the American edition will make little appeal either as a text or for popular reading. The translation is rather unsatisfactory, for it reveals an ignorance of the terms used conventionally by historians and is sometimes actually misleading. None of the comparatively few glaring typographical errors of the translation appeared in the original.—JOHN G. GAZLEY, Dartmouth College.

Professor Arthur Berriedale Keith's extraordinary productivity in the field of legal and historical scholarship which he has made his

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own shows no sign of abating. *The Constitutional Law of the British Dominions* (London, Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1933; xxvi, 522 pp. $5.00) is the title of his latest book. The particular recent events which made it seem desirable to him to undertake a new exposition of Dominion government and constitutional law were the enactment of the Statute of Westminster and the adoption of new procedure in the conduct of the foreign affairs of the Irish Free State which eliminates the British government as an intermediary between the Free State government and the king. The work is divided into two parts, entitled respectively, "The Sovereignty of the Dominions" and "The Government of the Dominions". In his discussion of the internal sovereignty of the Dominions the author reaches the conclusion that they have attained the essential elements of sovereignty, though even yet independence of imperial intervention is not wholly complete. As to external sovereignty, his opinion is that "it is hardly possible to deny that the power to make treaties entirely uncontrolled by the British Government in any direct manner accords to the Dominions the right to claim international status as distinct states", and that "even when the Great Seal of the Realm is still used, the use is obviously now subject definitely to Dominion control, and it would be unreasonable to regard its employment as any proof of inferiority of status." At the same time he regards the relationships between the different parts of the British Commonwealth as far more intimate than those which exist in a merely personal union. In the second part of the volume Professor Keith gives a careful and strictly up-to-date account of the system of government in the Dominions.—R. L. SCHUYLER.

The profound gratitude of scholars and students is due Messrs. William L. Langer and Hamilton Fish Armstrong and the Council on Foreign Relations for the preparation and publication of *Foreign Affairs Bibliography: A Selected and Annotated List of Books on International Relations, 1919-1932* (published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, New York, 1933; xvii, 551 pp. $5.00). The volume comprises nine parts, dealing, respectively, with general international relations, including geographic, racial and economic factors, international law and organization, war, peace, security and disarmament; the World War, including its diplomatic background, its military, naval, economic and financial aspects, and the peace negotiations; general postwar conditions throughout the world; North and South America; Europe; Asia; the Pacific Area; the Polar Regions; and Africa. For the larger coun-

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tries there are special sections devoted to economic and social problems, foreign policy, biographies etc. In each category the works are listed in the alphabetical order of the authors' names and the index contains the names of all authors mentioned. The annotations are well phrased and exceedingly useful. Any general criticism of the book can only culminate in the word: "excellent." To find fault, it is necessary to search for minor slips. Without in any way detracting from the high praise which the volume merits, a few of the oversights may be indicated. The bibliography should certainly have included, among other works, 1. Professor Langer's own *The Franco-Russian Alliance*; 2. the two volumes of Theodore Marburg's documents and correspondence edited by John H. Latané under the title *Development of the League of Nations Idea*; 3. Marie J. Carroll's several *Keys to the League of Nations Documents Placed on Public Sale*; 4. F. L. Benns' *Europe Since 1914*, and this more especially since the journalistic volumes of Philip Gibbs (*Since Then*) and J. H. Powers (*Years of Tumult*) are mentioned; 5. Ilin's *New Russia's Primer*; 6. Danaïllow's *Les Effets de la guerre en Bulgarie*. On page 428 is listed in German the title of Mustafa Kemal's great speech of 1927, although the speech has been translated into English. Finally, one wonders why, for example, the spelling of "Halidah Adib" is used, when the author's books bear the name "Halidé Edib;" or "Trotskii", when the titlepages of the works referred to read "Trotsky." Despite these objections, let it be said again, the book is of prime importance, and is one of the best in the useful group of Council on Foreign Relations publications. —WALTER C. LANGSAM, Columbia University.

The diplomacy of modern France and England has never for any length of time been unconnected with the issues of commerce, naval power and the extension of political control over non-European areas. Among the regions where the ambitions of the two governments have conflicted the Mediterranean with its Asiatic and African borderlands has been of great importance. *The Struggle for the Control of the Mediterranean prior to 1848* (Boston, The Stratford Co., 1933; ii, 152 pp. $2.00) by Professor James Edgar Swain of Muhlenberg College is a well-documented study of limited phases of the perennial Anglo-French rivalry. Chapters v to ix are the most valuable ones. English interest in the Mediterranean is connected with trade and particularly with the route to India. "French activity in the Mediterranean lacked the materialistic motive which was so characteristic of the British. In some respects French inter-

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vention was spontaneous and inconsistent, yet they considered it as fundamental and realistic" (p. 54). French intervention in Algiers in 1830 is definitely shown to have been connected with Charles X's desire to strengthen his position at home. British opposition is discussed and its ineffectiveness ascribed largely to the fact that "Aberdeen . . . was not willing to resort to war to drive out the French" (p. 71) and that "Palmerston's Mediterranean policy, for a time, lacked precision" (p. 85). Except for Algeria, however, the British policy was in general successful in maintaining the territorial *status quo* in the Turkish Empire and Morocco. Since the Algerian venture brought France again into the colonial game the exception proved an important one. The volume is helpful as giving the earlier background of Anglo-French rivalry in north Africa, so important before the Entente of 1904.—Arthur P. Scott, University of Chicago.

Of the goodly number of works which the student of Far Eastern history and international relations must consult if he hopes to comprehend the ramifications and significance of the contemporary imbroglio in the extreme Orient, one of the most indispensable is *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 concerning Manchuria and Mongolia* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933; xiv, 164 pp. $1.75) by Dr. Ernest Batson Price. Since 1932 associated with the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations, the author served from 1914 to 1929 as a member of the China branch of the American Foreign Service, playing at times a by no means insignificant rôle in the attempted solution of several of the critical problems of republican China. Thanks to his former diplomatic chief, the Honorable J. V. A. MacMurray; to the latter's sometime colleague in Peking as Soviet ambassador, H. E. Leo Karakhan; and to Dr. Victor A. Yakhontoff, the author was enabled for the first time to obtain photostat copies of the original French texts of the treaties. These he has somewhat fully analyzed and made available to the student public. The unique worth of this material is manifest. Since, however, even uniquely valuable documents at times have fallen into the hands of the incompetent, it may be added that this study is of outstanding value for other reasons than that mentioned. Dr. Price's practical experience qualifies him to envisage his problem as a whole and to deal with it in a realistic manner. Not necessarily because of, but at least in spite of, his former official status he is not merely realistic but to a high degree objective. Furthermore he has acquainted himself with a mass of supplementary materials, both

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primary and secondary, which are digested not only in the body of his work but in detailed and critical notes to the seven chapters thereof and in an annotated bibliography of ten pages. Following an adequate preliminary sketch of China's position in northeastern Asia from the T'ang dynasty period to the close of the nineteenth century, the unavailing early efforts of certain Russian and Japanese leaders to arrive at an understanding which should prevent war are traced, as are the results of the latter upon those primarily affected. From preliminary failure to arrive at a peaceful understanding, and the military draw game following, developed the public and the secret treaties and agreements of 1907-1916. The analysis of these, constituting the body of the study, traces the logic of events which led directly and indirectly to the outbreak in Manchuria of September 1931. Of particular interest to American students are the comments upon the diplomacy of Secretary of State Knox, and the discussion of the "third Power" at which the secret convention of 1916 was apparently aimed. Interestingly enough the bearing upon the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of the secrecy of the Russo-Japanese defensive alliance of 1916 is not considered. It is to be hoped that Dr. Price may later broaden the scope of his study in the field of Russo-Sino-Japanese relations during this critical period.—HARLEY FARNSWORTH MACNAIR, University of Chicago.

Though Mr. Denis Gwynn attempted impartiality in his *De Valera* (New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1933; 286 pp. $3.50) the portrayal of the Irish leader closely resembles De Valera as his more moderate opponents view him. If there has been any consistency in Mr. De Valera's career or personality Mr. Gwynn has failed to discover it. The book bristles with contradictions. It is claimed that De Valera had little understanding of America and yet his speeches are described as perfectly adapted to the American people. Other examples might be cited. De Valera is generously credited with luck but evidences of intelligence are presented as surprising and diabolical in character. The biography is not a psychological study but a timely journalistic treatment, much of it based upon already published material, which has been accepted uncritically. If it was necessary to remind the reader that Professor Allison Phillips was vehemently Unionist it was certainly necessary to point out that Mr. Beaslai and Mr. O'Hegarty were violently opposed to De Valera. Yet Mr. Gwynn praises their vigorous and "candid" language and quotes it to the disadvantage of the Republican leader. Like many other pro-Treaty Irishmen Mr. Gwynn simply cannot

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understand the Republicans or their program. He says (p. 276), "To those who are accustomed to modern conditions, the program seems fantastic to the verge of insanity." The description of De Valera's activities since 1927 is generally fairer and one feels that had Mr. Gwynn not accepted the judgments of De Valera's opponents so uncritically his study would have been of greater value. On the whole the portrait which emerges from the book is that of a rather narrow and pedantic professor who found himself a hero on the political stage just after he had lost the greatest prize of his academic career. He reveled in his new activities and insisted upon making all decisions and playing rôles for which he was hardly cast. Ireland has paid a heavy price for his political cunning and the present Quixotic crusade may cost more, Mr. Gwynn believes.—WARNER MOSS, Washington Square College, New York University.

It is indeed difficult to review Professor Robert Joseph Kerner's *Bohemia in the Eighteenth Century* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1932; xii, 412 pp. $4.00). It is no exaggeration to state that the book is the first complete and thorough analysis of those bulky archival materials that accumulated around the *Desideria,* which the Estates in Central Europe presented after the manner of the French in their *Cahiers.* The task was so severe that no scholar, Czech or other, has ever before attempted it. It is for that reason that there will be few scholars who can criticize the book as a whole. In order to understand the eventual dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy, knowledge of eighteenth-century Bohemia is absolutely necessary. The author presents the main forces of Bohemian history from the fourteenth century on, showing step by step the decline of the medieval structure of society, the conquest and the destruction of the Czech state and its reduction to a mere province, and finally, the beginnings of its national revival and growth. The major emphasis is upon the eighteenth century. The forces of weak Czech nationalism and powerful German imperialism, of medieval political conceptions and modern centralizing tendencies were coming to grips. At the same time there was occurring the struggle, largely theoretical and academic, to preserve the semblance of the independent Bohemian state in the midst of the highly practical attempts by Maria Theresa and Joseph II to weld the Habsburg monarchy into a single, modern German state. In the case of Bohemia the vast mass of the population favored the economic and social reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, but the Estates, representing the old order, did not. There was, however, one exception. The Czech nation

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as a whole, where it expressed itself, was opposed to the Germanizing tendencies of Vienna. According to the author, "here are found the roots of that Czech national revival which resulted four generations later in the Czechoslovak Republic." The political scientist will be especially interested in the chapters covering the affairs of the Bohemian constitution under Leopold II, and the judicial system and law. Leopold II had some understanding of modern constitutional aspirations and was willing to grant political rights to burghers, and even to peasants. He was crowned as king of Bohemia and on this occasion the Czech language was used openly. In office, however, the Germanizing spirit held its sway. And, although the French Revolution frightened Leopold, the Bohemian Estates of 1790 looked only to their medieval past; talked vaguely of the common welfare, but did little in a practical way to promote it. They failed to demand the withdrawal of the great centralizing reforms of Maria Theresa. "Instead, the Bohemian Estates, under Leopold II, missed a golden opportunity to stand up for the autonomy of Bohemia" (p. 164). Professor Kerner has evidently disturbed a lot of dust covering the original documents pertaining to this period. But he does not present us with any dusty historical skeleton. His volume is an admirable historical introduction to the whole story of Central Europe, written with great skill by a scholar thoroughly in command of his material. Of great value is the critical bibliography of thirty pages, the like of which cannot be found elsewhere.—JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, Pennsylvania State College.

"Now that it has been decided once again to tax or restrict the nation's bread"—writes C. R. Fay as the opening words in the preface to his volume, *The Corn Laws and Social England* (Cambridge, at the University Press, 1932; x, 223 pp. $2.80)—"it seems not inappropriate to pass in review the circumstances under which in former times such taxes and restrictions were imposed and then repealed." Accordingly a discussion follows in chapter ii on the corn bounty granted by the act of 1 William and Mary, c. 12 which remained on the statute book until 1814 but was of small importance after 1765; in chapter iii on the act of 1773 which attempted to protect the consumer by making importation easier together with other legislation during a transition period (1765-1815); in chapter v on the law of 1815 with its subsequent changes to 1846; and in chapter vii on its effect on the price of corn 1815-1846. Chapter vi contains an interesting and well written account of the activity of the anti-corn law league. The final chapter deals

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with the corn laws and social thought, but preceding it is a digression on Huskisson and imperial statesmanship and in an earlier portion of the book a digression in the form of four reprinted articles on the corn trade around 1800. From beginning to end the work abounds with references both to contemporary sources and present-day judgments. There can be no doubt that the author of the volume has expended energy and thought upon the contents. Nevertheless he has done himself an injustice in his failure to utilize an adequate and clear organization and in his proneness to controversies the more violent parts of which might better appear in the footnotes. These faults are evident enough so that they may cause the volume to have less vogue than it deserves.—JOSEPH H. PARK, New York University.

The new volume of *Catalogues des "Bibliothèque et Musée de la Guerre"*, a *Catalogue méthodique du Fonds Russe de la bibliothèque*, edited by Alexandra Dumesnil in collaboration with Wilfrid Lerat, with an introduction by Camille Bloch (published for the Société de l'Histoire de la Guerre, by Alfred Costes, Paris, 1932; xiv, 734 pp. 200 francs), is a companion volume of the German, Italian and Anglo-American catalogues which appeared at an earlier date. As is clear from its title, the volume under review attempts to describe the Russian collection of the library. It is really much more than a catalogue. The 8,000 volumes and 1,200 periodicals assembled at the Château de Vincennes are carefully and ably classified, following the actual course of historical events, and present an extremely useful and surprisingly complete bibliography of Russia's development from the outbreak of the Great War, and in certain cases from an even earlier period, through the years of fighting against the Central Powers and the Civil War to the establishment of the Soviet state. The catalogue, naturally, is of particular value to students of modern Russia familiar with the Russian language; but its general usefulness has been greatly enhanced by including in the publication a brief French translation of every Russian title. It also contains a very comprehensive survey of periodical literature up to the end of 1930. The general arrangement is excellent and the *Musée de la Guerre* is to be again congratulated on having produced a most useful and scholarly publication. The Russian catalogue should be on the shelves of every library and no student of Russia can afford to disregard it.—MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY, Columbia University.

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